The Human Costs of Mexican Development

Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Mexico
Kevin J. Middlebrook
"Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Latin America"
Edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead
1986
ISBN 0801831881

Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Mexico

Mexico's recent political history in many ways contrasts sharply with the abrupt regime transformations that some Latin American countries underwent in the 1960s and 1970s. Mexico has experienced basic political stability and institutional continuity since the formation of its "official" single dominant party in 1929. The last major military revolt against civilian rule occurred in that same year, and since 1940 the armed forces' political role generally has been limited to symbolic representation in certain public offices and regular private consultations on issues of national importance. There has not been a significant challenge to the official party's presidential candidate since 1952. The early consolidation of centralized political power following Mexico's 1910-17 social revolution and state controls over organized labor and peasant movements contributed substantially to rapid economic growth in the period after 1940. The "Mexican economic miracle" came under increasing criticism in the 1970s as the rate of economic growth slowed and diverse socioeconomic problems (income and regional inequalities, unemployment and underemployment, inflation, and foreign indebtedness) worsened. The severity of these problems and the emergence of urban and rural guerrilla movements in the early 1970s led some observers to conclude that the Mexican authoritarian regime was in crisis. The sudden collapse of a petroleum-led economic boom in 1982 produced a sharp reversal in popular expectations and raised new concerns regarding Mexico's political stability. Yet none of these challenges led to a breakdown of the established regime.

Despite these contrasts, Mexico's contemporary process of political liberalization parallels political transitions in other countries in Latin America and Southern Europe. The liberalization initiated by the López Portillo administration's 1977 political reform increased the number and ideological diversity of officially registered political parties participating in the electoral process. It also altered the rules governing elections, augmented opposition parties' representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies and in state and local governments, and expanded opposition parties' access to mass communications. (A more detailed summary of the major provisions of the 1977 reform law appears below)

Political liberalization in Mexico has been more gradual and less conflictual than many other political transitions examined in this volume, in part because the well-institutionalized and broadly inclusive Mexican regime is a less severe form of authoritarian rule. As a result of its revolutionary origins and a long-standing commitment to balance diverse interests in a governing "revolutionary coalition," the Mexican regime has historically offered a number of opportunities for the expression of interests within the established system. Yet Mexico's liberalization experience is interesting from a comparative perspective precisely because it involves an authoritarian regime whose historical origins and evolution are distinctive. The Mexican case offers an opportunity to examine both the general characteristics of political change in an authoritarian regime and the specific factors that shape the process of political liberalization.

Political liberalization in the Mexican case thus involves the expansion of alternative mobilization channels through legalizing additional opposition parties and creating new opportunities for political competition and representation in the electoral and legislative arenas. This chapter examines four aspects of Mexico's liberalization experience. The first section analyzes the origins of the contemporary liberalization, considering both the broad challenges that the established regime faced in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the particular factors that motivated the regime-sponsored political reform. Second, the chapter evaluates the formulation of the 1977 political reform law and the impact of the regime's sociopolitical bases and institutional structure on the characteristics of the reform process, drawing attention to efforts by conservative elements in the governing "revolutionary coalition" to limit the reform measure's scope. The third section examines the consequences of the 1977 political reform for the registration of new political parties, election results, opposition party representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies, and the problems of voter abstention and electoral fraud. Finally, the broader implications of the liberalization process for future regime change in Mexico are considered. The López Portillo administration's political reform opened significant new opportunities for opposition forces and altered the national political map in important ways. However, the federal government has retained close control over the liberalization process. The challenges posed by Mexico's economic crisis and the continuing resistance on the part of conservative elements in the established regime, constitute important obstacles to more extensive political liberalization. For these reasons, the future prospects for regime change in Mexico remain uncertain.

Origins of the Contemporary Liberalization Process

Characterizing the Mexican system as an authoritarian regime underlines the importance of the state's active intervention to regulate and limit sociopolitical pluralism, mass political mobilization, and socioeconomic and political demand articulation.' The governing "revolutionary coalition" is a heterogeneous grouping of sociopolitical actors and competing interests that, despite considerable internal competition and frequent conflict over policy issues, has been linked over a relatively long period by an overarching consensus on broad norms regarding political action and by the shared goal of national economic development. As part of the heritage of Mexico's 1910-17 social revolution, organized labor and peasant movements constitute the regime's principal mass base. Their inclusion in the government-affiliated Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) is an important source of political legitimacy. (Organized business has never formed part of the party, although business interests and the military are both important elements in the broader revolutionary coalition. However, broad state controls on labor and peasant organizations substantially restrict their actions and significantly limit opposition leaders' opportunities to mobilize mass groups competitively. Thus the Mexican authoritarian regime is both elite dominated and mass based.

Several other elements are also important in characterizing the Mexican regime. Elections play a significant legitimating role as a formal validation of popular consent and as a means of periodically mobilizing public support for government activities, the party system, and "official" party candidates. The electoral process represents a continuing elite commitment to regular leadership succession, and it offers some opportunity for the presentation of citizen demands to future of office-holders. The "official" PRI provides a major institutional forum for intra-elite competition and serves as a mechanism for leadership selection. In addition, a reliable system of office rotation (including a constitutional prohibition against presidential reelection) creates opportunities for the expression of a comparatively wide range of sociopolitical tendencies. The formal guarantee of liberal political rights (such as a relatively free national press) in a civilian-ruled system and the presence of legally recognized opposition political parties also contribute to the comparative openness of the regime. Nonetheless, the dominant position of the PRI and its close ties to the state have traditionally insulated the governing political elite from effective electoral competition and the possibility of major electoral defeat. The Mexican regime is a strongly presidential system in which major political initiatives remain under the firm control of the federal executive.

The Mexican regime has generally been relatively restrained in its use of repression against opposition political groups and individual dissidents. Although major challenges to the existing socioeconomic and political order have been forcefully suppressed, the governing elite more frequently combines selective repression of regime opponents with negotiation, compromise, and policies designed to address protesting groups' demands. The comparatively low level of repression in Mexico is largely due to the effectiveness of regime control over mass actors such as labor unions and peasant organizations through a combination of state administrative controls on mass political participation and these more flexible strategies of governance.

Regime-initiated attempts at political restructuring in Mexico have generally responded to a combination of particular events or crises and the broad consequences of sociopolitical change. The 1977 political reform followed this pattern. The regime-sponsored liberalization measure addressed three closely related problems.

First, during the early 1970s, liberal elements in Mexico's governing revolutionary coalition became increasingly convinced that the regime suffered from a substantial erosion of its political legitimacy. The 1968 student strike and "Tlatelolco massacre" (in which police and army troops killed or wounded many protesting students) were watershed events in this regard. The significance of the 1968 crisis for subsequent political developments was largely due to the nature of political legitimacy in the Mexican system. Because the regime had originated in a revolutionary transformation rather than through an inclusive and widely accepted electoral process, public perceptions of regime legitimacy depended more on overall evaluations of government performance and the fulfillment of a comprehensive revolutionary program than on government adherence to particular procedural requirements. Despite the governing elite's use of selective repression to silence political opponents and suppress popular movements that threatened the entrenched position of "official" mass organizations, until the late 1960s the established regime received widespread public support as the embodiment of the 1910-17 revolution's commitment to the progressive achievement of social equity and political democracy. Mexico's rapid economic growth between the 1940s and the early 1970s substantially reinforced the governing coalition's position.

The 1968 crisis significantly affected public perceptions of the established regime's revolutionary credentials and revealed broad sociopolitical pressures for change. Perhaps most important, the crisis demonstrated that the rapidly growing urban middle class could not be easily incorporated into the existing political system by traditional means. The protest movement called for democratization and the creation of new participatory opportunities: it did not immediately challenge the regime's labor and peasant bases, but it did pose a serious potential threat to the regime in its effort to link a radical middle-class leadership with opposition elements in the organized labor movement and among urban marginals. The violent attacks of the Díaz Ordaz administration (1964-70) on student protesters shocked the urban middle class-the ruling elite's most politically articulate constituency. The mass public protest that followed the Tlatelolco massacre condemned the govemment's action as a violation of accepted governing practices.

The 1968 crisis also initiated a sustained national debate on the shortcomings and contradictions of Mexican development. Although the events of 1968 did not challenge directly the underlying political-economic pact between the state and the private sector, they seriously undermined the "myth of the Mexican Revolution" and the assumption of the progressive achievement of socioeconomic and political justice officially associated with Mexico's post-1940 development model. Public attention subsequently focused on issues such as the shortage of productive employment opportunities for urban workers, limited access to public services, increasing relative income inequality and stagnating agricultural production in rural areas, problems caused by the high rate of rural-urban migration, and the declining ability of the national education system to meet the needs of the expanding urban middle class. Most of these problems were not new, and in some cases they took on important dimensions only after the 1968 crisis in public confidence. Nonetheless, growing concern with government policy performance on issues such as these contributed to public disillusionment with the established regime. One goal of the 1977 political reform was to reverse this tendency.

The emergence of several new opposition political parties outside the officially recognized party system constituted a second major motivation for the 1977 political reform. The Díaz Ordaz administration's violent suppression of the 1968 student movement drove many leftist political groups underground. In the next few years, leftist opposition to the established regime often took the form of urban and rural guerrilla actions, including bank robberies, kidnappings, and political assassinations. Violent attacks by paramilitary groups on student demonstrators in June 1971 further fueled guerrilla movements in several areas of the country, convincing many leftist groups that peaceful reform efforts were futile. The response of the Echeverría administration (1970-76) to this challenge combined systematic (and generally successful) efforts to repress urban and rural guerrilla movements with a more liberal government policy toward nonviolent political opposition, frequently providing political support and material assistance to nonviolent opposition elements as part of a "democratic opening" policy designed to reduce sociopolitical discontent. In this more open national political environment during the t early 1970s, opposition movements among urban marginals, peasants, workers, and university students took on a new importance.

The opposition political organizations that appeared during this period represented forces on both Left and Right and in many eases their formation reflected the same sociopolitical pressures for regime change that had surfaced in 1968. The most important of these opposition organizations were the Mexican Democratic party (Partido Demócrata Mexicano, PDM, 1971), Socialist Workers' party (Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, PST, 1973), Communist Left Group (Unidad de Izquierda Comunista, UIC, 1973), Movement for Socialist Action and Unity (Movimiento de Acción y Unidad Socialista, MAUS, 1973), Mexican Workers Party (Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores, PMT, 1974), Mexican Popular party (Partido Popular Mexicano, PPM, 1975), Revolutionaty Socialist party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario, PSR, 1976), and Revolutionary Workers' party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores, PRT, 1976).

The opposition political organizations that appeared during this peried represented forces on both Left and Right and in many eases their fommation reflected the same sociopolitical pressures for regime change that had surfaced in 1968. The most important of these opposition organizations were the Mexican Democratic party (Partido Demócrata Mexicano, PDM, 1971), Socialist Workers' party (Partido Socialista de Los Trabajadores, PST, 1973), Communist Left Group (Unidad de Izquierda Comunista, UIC, 1973), Movement for Soeialist Action and Unity (Movimiento de AcciGn y Unidad Socialista, MAUS, 1973), MexicanWorkers'party (PartidoMexicanodelosTrabajadores, PMT, 1974), Mexiean Popular party (Partido Popular Mexicano, PPM, 1975), Revolutionaty Socialist party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario, PSR, 1976), and Revolutionary Workers' party (Partido Revolucionario de Los Trabajadores, PRT, 1976).

With the exception of PDM (the most recent political manifestation of a conservative, Catholic agrarian movement dating from the 1930s), these were all leftist political organizations of various ideological tendencies. They joined the opposition Mexican Communist party (Partido Comunista Mexicano, PCM, 1919) outside the official party system. The emergence of these opposition political organizations underlined the increasing difficulties that the PRI and established opposition parties had in incorporating important mass publics. The liberalization program initiated by the 1977 political reform sought to bolster the established regime's claim to political legitimacy by incorporating these elements of the political opposition into the officially recognized party system.

The third motivation for the 1977 reform was the governing political elite's increasing concern over the institutional health of PRI. A decline in electoral competition had eroded PRI's mobilization capacity and weakened its internal organization. During the 1960s and early 1970s the traditional registered opposition parties-especially the Socialist Popular party (founded in 1948 as the Partido Popular and reorganized in 1958 as Partido Popular Socialista, PPS) and the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana, PARM, 1954)-became less and less viable as independent opposition political forces. PARM, formed by military veterans of the revolution in part as a reaction against the increasing centralization of Mexican politics, never operated as more than a factional electoral vehicle with limited regional support. It never nominated its own presidential candidate; instead, it regularly supported PRI's nominee. PPS was originally formed as a progressive alternative to the "official" PRI, but after 1958 it also regularly backed PRI's presidential candidate. Disillusionment with PRl's fraudulent electoral tactics and the impossibility of winning national office limited these parties' interest to competition in state and local elections. In part owing to these factors, the conservative National Action party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN, 1939) took on new importance as a catchall opposition party. However, PAN did not field a presidential nominee during the 1976 presidential campaign because of a growing abstention movement within the party and severe internal division among party leaders. PRI then faced a presidential election without the participation of a legally recognized opposition candidate.

PRI had also encountered considerable difficulty in adapting to changing sociopolitical conditions. The gradual loss of its more easily mobilized rural support base due to continued rural-urban migration and the need to represent an increasingly urban, often middle-class electorate posed new challenges to the "official" party's organizational structure. Furthermore, liberal elements in PRI were concerned that the party's traditionally closed internal nominating procedures produced candidates without the broad-based political experience necessary to respond successfully to the demands of a changing electorate. They hoped that increased electoral competition would compel PRI to adopt internal reforms that would improve the party's ability to confront this problem.

Growing public disillusionment with the established regime, the decreasing viability of traditional opposition parties, and the erosion of PRI's mobilization capacity contributed to a steady decline in voter participation in the electoral process. The historical political agenda set by the 1910-17 revolution's promise of "Effective suffrage; no reelection" gives the electoral process special importance in the Mexican authoritarian regime as a legitimating mechanism. Yet between 1961 and 1976 the percentage of registered voters not voting in congressional and presidential elections rose steadily from 31.7 percent to at least 38 percent.4 In addition, large numbers of citizens either failed to register or invalidated their ballots. Although the regime places important restrictions on independently organized mass mobilization, growing citizen apathy toward the electoral process was seen as a significant threat to the viability of the PRI-dominated party system. The 1977 political reform sought to revitalize the electoral process, reinvigorate PRI, and reverse the trend toward rising voter abstention by increasing the effectiveness of opposition electoral competition.

The Mexican regime has over time relied on a combination of strategies to respond to political problems and changing sociopolitical circumstances. In addition to negotiation and compromise, elite rotation, the cooptation of opposition leaders, and the selective use of repression against political opponents, the governing elite has engaged in massive fraud to deny opposition parties an electoral victory on those occasions when they have posed threat to PRI's dominance. Various forms of electoral fraud (stuffing ballot boxes, intimidation of voters, violence against opposition parties and their candidates, and so forth) are widespread at the state and local level. On several occasions PAN has been denied what appeared to be a clear electoral victory when the government invalidated the vote returns. PAN has succeeded in winning some important local victories, but PRI's government ties and its ability to shape the outcome of the electoral process have proved powerful obstacles to electoral challenges by opposition political forces. For example, PRI's candidates for the presidency, the federal Senate, and state governorships have never been defeated.

The established regime has also demonstrated considerable flexibility over time in reshaping the formal rules governing the electoral process in order to accommodate diverse groups and adapt to change. Although serving somewhat different purposes at different times, several presidential administrations have reformed legislation regulating elections and political party registration so as to structure opposition parties' representation in elected positions. Electoral legislation enacted in 1946, 1949, 1951, and 1954 set requirements concerning party registration procedures and the minimum size and distribution of party membership that reinforced the position of PRI by making the formation of local and regional political parties more difficult. In a partial reversal of this trend, electoral reforms enacted in 1963, 1972, and 1973 attempted to revitalize a party system in which registered opposition parties (PAN, PPS, and PARM) played an increasingly marginal role by guaranteeing these parties representation and a national political presence in the federal Chamber of Deputies.

The 1963 reform (like the López Portillo liberalization measure) sought to defuse accumulated sociopolitical discontent following the government's repression of strikes by teachers and railroad workers in 1958-59, and to direct the internal political opposition sparked by the Cuban Revolution into established institutional channels. The reform provided minority political parties winning more than 2.5 percent of the total national vote with a minimum number of Chamber deputies (five each, plus one for each additional 0.5 percent of the vote, up to a maximum of twenty). And when PPS and PARM failed to win even this minimum percentage of the national vote in the 1964, 1967, and 1970 congressional elections, the national electoral college acted "in the spirit of the law" to grant them Chamber representation in any event. In 1972 the Echeverría administration enacted additional constitutional reforms to reduce the minimum required percentage to 1.5 percent. At the same time, the maximum number of "party deputies" was increased to twenty-five per party. A 1973 reform of the electoral law also reduced the minimum membership requirement for party registration. However, none of these measures succeeded in transforming existing minority parties into a credible political opposition.

Given the diverse political problems confronting the Mexican regime in the late 1960s and early 1970s, one might ask why the Echeverría administration (1970-76) did not undertake a more extensive electoral and party reform. The governing elite's ability to delay broader political liberalization was due largely to the established regime's continued overall strength. Accumulated pressures for regime change remained diffuse; they did not constitute an immediate threat to regime stability. Although some response was clearly necessary to reduce existing tensions, the political elite retained the capacity to control and direct the liberalization process.
HASTA AQUI. RAOUL.
In addition, three other factors influenced the specific timing of a more extensive regime-sponsored liberalization program. First, from the political elite's perspective, insufficient time had passed since the 1968 crisis. A major reform that greatly expanded the political presence of the leftist opposition would have signaled regime weakness by drawing too direct a causal link between an attack on the established regime and its response to demands for change. Second, the status and organizational structure of the leftist opposition that emerged after 1968 were not conducive to a more extensive party reform. At the time of Echeverría's reforms, the government had not yet succeeded in suppressing leftist guerrilla groups. It was not until the second half of the Echeverría administration that the bulk of these new opposition forces had regrouped into reasonably stable party organizations. Although the Echeverría administration could co-opt opposition leaders individually in order to respond to changing political circumstances, emerging leftist opposition forces had not yet evolved to the point at which they could be conveniently integrated into the existing party system according to established rules of the game.

Finally, a more extensive political reform might not have been possible at the time for reasons associated with Echeverría's own political career. As minister of the interior during the Díaz Ordaz administration, Echeverría had been the cabinet official directly responsible for the violent suppression of the 1968 student movement. Given the serious reservations that a number of leftist opposition parties expressed regarding participation in the López Portillo liberalization policy, it is possible that any major reform initiative by Echeverría would have been tainted by his own association with it. The reforms enacted in 1972 and 1973 sought to reinvigorate the political party system, but they were essentially limited modifications of the existing party deputy arrangement. The intended beneficiaries of these measures-PAN, PARM, and PPS-were unlikely to boycott Echeverría's reforms, as more radical opposition parties might have done.

Formulation of the 1977 Political Reform Law

Thus when the López Portillo administration (1976-82) took office in December 1976, several factors favored a broad reform of the political party system and the electoral process. López Portillo had actively discussed this possibility with his close advisers during the 1975-76 presidential campaign, and more detailed discussions concerning the general characteristics of a political reform measure continued after the July 1976 general election. Between December 1976 and March 1977, Minister of the Interior Jesús Reyes Heroles conducted high-level, confidential consultations with diverse groups regarding the content of the reform initiative. However, the first offficial announcement of the government's intention to implement a "political reform" came in a 1 April 1977 address by Reyes Heroles. López Portillo was personally convinced of the need for such a measure, and liberal elements in the established regime actively supported the initiative. The fact that López Portillo had recently been inaugurated enhanced the administration's ability to present the measure as an important departure from previous electoral reforms.

Political reform constituted a basic part of the López Portillo administration's plan to confront Mexico's 1976-77 economic crisis. The end the Echeverría administration saw massive capital flight as the private sector expressed its discontent with developments such as government-authorized emergency wage increases, heightened labor mobilization, inflation, and increased economic uncertainty. At the same time, rural violence and the incidence of land invasions rose sharply, and there was unprecedented public speculation regarding a military coup d'état and the armed forces' renewed open involvement in national politics. In order to restore political balance in the revolutionary coalition, the López Portillo administration forcibly suppressed some opposition movements and implemented a series of economic policies designed to regain the private sector's confidence (including severe wage restraint and close government control over labor mobilization, the relaxation of price controls on basic commodities, tax and investment concessions, and a reduction in the number and importance of state-owned enterprises). By simultaneously opening the party system to new forces on the Left, liberal elements in the regime sought to counterbalance the resurgence of conservative groups and the overall conservatism of López Portillo's early socioeconomic policies. The prospect of renewed national economic growth on the basis of Mexico's recently announced massive petroleum resources may also have increased the administration's willingness to engage in political experimentation.

However, the revolutionary coalition was divided internally regarding the desirability of a political reform measure. Various conservative elements (including some representatives of the private sector) expressed reservations about the proposed liberalization project, but the most active opposition came from two principal sources. First, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM)-PRI's labor sector and the single most important representative of the organized labor movement-opposed a major reform in the electoral process and the existing party system because such a measure threatened its own privileged position. Political negotiations in PRI involved bargaining among the party's three sectors. In comparison to the heterogeneous agrarian sector and the even more amorphous "popular" (middle-class) sector, CTM's more easily mobilized membership, its greater organizational coherence under the strong leadership of Fidel Velázquez, and its comparatively closer ties between leaders and rank-and-file members provided it with important internal political leverage in PRI. To the extent that the electoral process became a major arena of political competition and the principal source of regime legitimacy, CTM's own political role would be diminished. Although CTM was apparently the first sector to voice its opposition to the political reform, conservative elements in PRI's other two sectors (the National Peasant Confederation, CNC, and the National Confederation of Popular Organizations, CNOPI soon lined up behind CTM on this issue.

The CTM leadership also feared the impact that the legalization of additional opposition political parties might have on its own membership. With the exception of PDM, the minority parties most likely to win official registry under the political reform were leftist political organizations advocating a more aggressive, combative role for labor unions in economic negotiations and in the national political process. During the early 1970s opposition political groups had actively attempted to undermine CTM's control over its affiliates, especially in those more modem manufacturing activities where structural changes in labor force characteristics and limited competition from other "official" labor organizations for the allegiance of these relatively highly paid workers already threatened CTM's position. Quite predictably, then, CTM did not welcome the prospect of legal recognition for these same opposition political groups and their more active public organizational activities. Although the CTM leadership was divided over the likely consequences of the political reform, the most intransigent opposition came from leaders of large industrial unions, who feared that the reform would reduce their access to political patronage (especially their share of PRI elective positions in federal, state, and local government) and expose their membership to increased competition, as opposition parties expanded their national political presence. Because these leaders controlled some of the most influential unions in the confederation, their reservations regarding the liberalization initiative accounted for CTM's opposition to the measure.

The second group in the governing coalition that sought to limit the scope of the political reform included state governors and local and regional political bosses. Their principal opposition to the initiative focused on the possible extension of the reform to state and local governments. In the past PAN, PPS, and PARM had been most effective in challenging PRI in local and state elections. Opposition party activities and mobilized citizens' groups at the local level often posed delicate political problems for state governors. Because guaranteed opposition party representation in state legislatures and local governments would have constituted a major expansion in these parties' political role, it was vigorously opposed by a large number of state governors, whose political power depended on PRI's continued domination of state and local politics. PRI sector organizations such as the CTM joined the state governors and traditional political bosses in opposing the extension of political reform below the federal level. These same groups also opposed liberal efforts to extend the political reform to the federal Senate because minority party representation there would have involved an important change in the balance of political power in the states affected.

The prospect of participating in a regime-sponsored liberalization project that maintained important state controls on the political process also posed a divisive issue for many opposition groups. Thus Reyes Heroles and the reform's liberal supporters faced an early challenge in the need to win previously unregistered opposition party participation in the reform process through formal participation in the 1979 elections for the federal Chamber of Deputies. Several of these political organizations (especially Marxist-Leninist groups and parties) had been founded on the basis of their ideological opposition to the governing revolutionary coalition, the established socioeconomic and political order, and PRI. Some favored participation in the 1979 congressional elections as the best available opportunity to advance their political cause. Despite its limitations, political reform would create a more open national political environment in which they could articulate alternative programs and expand their organizational bases. Advances such as these might open the way to broader political change at a later date.

However, other opposition organizations feared that participation in the reform would result in their cooptation by the established regime. They were fully aware that minority representation in the executive-dominated Chamber of Deputies offered limited opportunities to effect substantial change. Furthermore, they had misgivings concerning the corruptive effects that access to government resources and opportunities for individual political advancement might have on opposition leaders. This possibility was a particularly serious issue for parties with major internal factional divisions and for political organizations with a heterogeneous membership and no rigorous ideological orientation. Some opposition groups were also concerned that their participation in the official party system would strengthen the established regime's position and make fundamental change more difficult. In the end, however, PMT was the only major unregistered opposition party not to participate in the 1979 election, as a result of deep internal divisions regarding the relative merits of the political reform proposal.

Despite resistance from conservative elements in the established regime and objections by several opposition parties, the federal executive retained close control over the political reform process. The López Portillo administration had defined the principal characteristics of the reform measure through confidential consultations held before Reyes Heroles's April 1977 address, but it was important to keep the reform process formally open-ended and subject to influence by the political opposition in order to maintain the spirit of the initiative. The Federal Electoral Commission held special public hearings to permit broad-ranging discussion of the issue by political organizations, academic institutions, and private citizens. These hearings began only four weeks after Reyes Heroles announced the administration's intention to implement a political reform. PAN, PMT, and MAUS had for some time advocated reforms in the existing law regulating electoral procedures and in the requirements for political party registration, and they were prepared to discuss these matters in some detail. But most opposition party presentations before the electoral commission were limited to an overall critique of Mexico's socioeconomic and political problems. There is no evidence that opposition party participation in the hearings had any significant effect on the final draft of the political reform law. Various opposition proposals for broader political reform-including full proportional representation rather than an expanded "party deputy" system, and opposition political representation in the federal Senate-were turned aside.

Conservative elements in the governing coalition were more successful in influencing the reform initiative's scope in exchange for their final support. Because of López Portillo's personal commitment to the political reform and the federal executive's tremendous political power, these groups could not flatly reject the proposal or publicly oppose it. But they did engage in active behind-the-scenes negotiations and internal bargaining in an effort to limit the impact of the measure. CTM's ability to bargain for concessions was greatly enhanced by Mexico's 1976-77 economic crisis. Wage restraint was a major element in López Portillo's economic stabilization program, and CTM's commitment to limit its demands was the key to controlling wage increases on a national scale. The CTM leadership argued that its support for the stabilization program merited special consideration for the confederation's concerns regarding possible consequences of political liberalization. In addition, CTM formulated a list of broad-ranging economic reform proposals against which it sought to negotiate concessions in the political reform.

As a result of these internal negotiations, the final reform proposal did not automatically extend minority party representation to the federal Senate. It also allowed each state to decide individually whether or not to provide guaranteed opposition party representation in state legislatures and local governments. Moreover, in a clear effort to protect PRI's rural support base from the organizational activities of opposition groups, the reform measure limited opposition party representation to municipios (local political-administrative units roughly equivalent to counties) with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants. These were important limitations on the scope of the liberalization project. López Portillo and Reyes Heroles's commitment to reform the electoral process and the political party system was realized, but the reform was not as comprehensive as its most liberal supporters had envisaged.

Thus the reform measure enacted on 31 December 1977 as the Federal Law on Political Organizations and Electoral Processes had the following principal characteristics:

1. Liberalized procedures for political party recognition. Political organizations that presented a declaration of principles, program for action, and statutes could seek official registry as parties through one of two methods. A "conditional registry" could be validated if the party received at least 1.5 percent of the total national vote in the election during which registry was sought. This was a particularly significant change in existing electoral legislation because it substantially eased the registration process for opposition parties. "Definitive registry" could be achieved if the party officially enrolled the minimum required party membership (at least three thousand members in each of at least half of Mexico's thirty-one states and the Federal District, or at least three hundred affiliates in each of at least half of all single-member electoral districts, for a total of at least sixty-five thousand members) through a series of party assemblies. The reform law also recognized "national political associations"-groups with at least five thousand members throughout the country, a national directorship, delegates in at least ten states, and at least two years' political activity prior to requesting official registration-and it allowed electoral alliances to be formed for a particular election.

2. Reform of the federal Chamber of Deputies. The political reform law increased the size of the Chamber of Deputies to four hundred members and created a two-tier electoral structure: three hundred deputies elected by a simple majority of votes cast in single-member electoral districts, and one hundred deputies elected by proportional representation in party-list circumscriptions. These one hundred seats were reserved for minority political parties, but minority parties could also compete in single-member districts.

3. Changes in electoral procedures. Registered opposition parties were first granted representation on the Federal Electoral Commission and state and district electoral committees under the 1973 electoral law. The 1977 reform extended representation to conditionally registered parties, although this did not include voting rights until the party in question won its definitive registry. Conditionally registered opposition parties did receive the right to name representatives to the supervisory committee at each polling place, with the authority to challenge questionable conduct throughout the electoral process. Political parties also became eligible to receive modest material support from the electoral commission to offset their campaign expenses, including financial assistance for campaign literature, meeting halls, and transportation.

4. Expanded party access to mass communications. Political parties were first permitted access to mass communications media during election campaigns under the terms of the 1973 electoral reform. The 1977 reform law granted parties permanent regular access to television and radio. The López Portillo liberalization measure also provided for support from the Federal Electoral Commission for party publications and retained the 1973 electoral law's provisions allowing parties free access to postal and telegraph privileges and exempting them from all taxes and duties.

Consequences of Political Liberalization
The 1979 election for the federal Chamber of Deputies and the 1982 general election were the first major tests of the regime-sponsored liberalization program. The registration of new political parties created additional opportunities for the articulation of alternative programs and the expression of diverse ideological perspectives. Opposition parties increased their total level of electoral support in 1979 and 1982 in comparison with previous elections. The opposition's expanded presence in the federal Chamber of Deputies after 1979 renewed the Chamber's political importance and created a new forum for opposition party activity. The 1982 general election results also indicated that the presence of new parties increased citizen interest in the electoral process and helped reduce the rate of voter abstention. Nonetheless, opposition parties differ considerably in their size and importance. Their electoral support often varies greatly from one area to another, and the electoral strength of many opposition parties is concentrated in urban areas, where PRI's support base was already eroded. Although the participation of new opposition parties in the electoral process reduced the incidence of fraud, both the 1979 and 1982 elections demonstrated that this problem remains a serious obstacle to opposition political activity.

Registration of New Political Parties
Several new political parties won official recognition on the basis of their showing in the 1979 and 1982 elections. The Federal Electoral Commission granted conditional registry to the Mexican Communist party (PCM), the Socialist Workers' party (PST), and the Mexican Democratic party (PDM) for participation in the 1979 federal Chamber of Deputies election. All three parties won definitive registry by gaining more than the 1.5 percent minimum share of the total vote required by the political reform law. (See Table 6.1 for a summary of 1979 and 1982 election results.) The Social Democrat party (Partido Social Demócrata, PSD) appeared in 1981, primarily representing middle-class professionals who had previously participated in other civic and political organizations.

Tabla 6.1 (Pag. 172)

PSD recognized that it was not a mass-based party, and it encountered some difficulty in translating its programmatic statements into a clearly identifiable political position between the PRI and leftist political organizations. The PSD and the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers' party (PRT) both received conditional registry to compete in the 1982 general elections, but only PRT won enough support to gain definitive registry.

The formation of the Mexican Unified Socialist party (Partido Socialista Unificado de México, PSUM) in November 1981 was the most significant development in this area following the passage of the political reform law. PSUM formally joined the Mexican Communist party with the members of its 1979 electoral coalition (the PPM, PSR, and MAUS) and the recently organized Political Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Política, MAP, 1981). Although the PCM and other leftist political organizations had engaged in various forms of cooperation and had discussed several unification projects since the early 1970s, the creation of PSUM was the first major step toward uniting long-established leftist groups such as PCM with the opposition forces that emerged after the 1968 student movement. The PRT and the Mexican Workers' party (PMT) participated actively in discussions preceding the formation of PSUM. However, as a result of ideological differences and organizational and personal rivalries, neither joined in the creation of the new party. PSUM won its definitive registry in the 1982 general elections.

Although the 1977 political reform permitted the registration of several new parties, in January 1982 the López Portillo administration modified the original reform law so as to raise the barriers to electoral participation and prevent the formation of a large number of small political parties. The 1977 version of the reform law stipulated that an officially recognized political party lost its registry only after failing to win 1.5 percent of the national vote in three consecutive elections. But the 1982 modifications specified that any party failing to receive at least 1.5 percent of the total party-list vote in any given election would automatically lose its registry. López Portillo's introduction to the 1982 legislation noted that it was unlikely that this change would affect political parties then registered, or those likely to be formed in the immediate future. Nonetheless, the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM) and PSD did lose their definitive and conditional registries, respectively, following a weak showing in the 1982 elections.

1979 and 1982 Electoral Results
The participation of new opposition parties in the 1979 and 1982 elections reduced somewhat PRI 's total electoral support. PRI officially won 69.7 percent of the valid votes cast in simple majority voting for the federal Chamber of Deputies in 1979 and 69.3 percent in 1982; PRI received 68.4 percent of the 1982 presidential vote. (See Table 6.1.) The opposition's total share of simple majority votes for the federal Chamber of Deputies rose from 20.1 percent in 1973 and 13.9 percent in 1976, to 24.3 percent in 1979 and 30.7 percent in 1982; opposition parties together won 27.0 percent of the 1982 presidential vote. PRI's percentage of the 1982 presidential vote was the smallest since its founding in 1929, smaller even than in 1940, 1946, and 1952, when the "official" party faced major opposition movements. Nonetheless, PRI remains by far the most important force in the Mexican party system. PRI's reduced share of the total vote in 1979 and 1982 reflected the combined impact of various opposition parties rather than a significant erosion of its electoral position. Most of the support for opposition parties came from areas in which PRI's strength was already in decline.

Political liberalization has not substantially affected PRI's internal candidate selection procedures. Between 1977 and 1979 political analysts frequently speculated that increased party competition might encourage PRI to reform its nominating procedures. There may have been some improvement in the quality of PRI candidates in 1979 and 1982, as the government sought to win convincing victories in the first campaigns against new opposition parties and to overcome the increasingly technocratic image of PRI candidates by nominating individuals with more diverse political experience. But the candidate selection process itself remains a series of closed negotiations between specific interests and political factions.

The 1979 and 1982 electoral returns also showed that the impact of the 1977 reform on opposition parties varied considerably. The National Action party (PAN) retained its position as the most important opposition party, winning 10.8 percent of the simple-majority vote in 1979 and 15.7 percent of the presidential vote in 1982. PAN was the only opposition party to win Chamber of Deputies seats in single-member districts-four in 1979 (two in the state of Nuevo León and one each in Coahuila and Sonora) and one in 1982 (in the state of Mexico). PAN's surprisingly large electoral showing in 1982 was largely due to its long-established role as a channel for urban middle-class discontent with the government/PRI apparatus. Although PAN's electoral platform called for structural change and a reduction in socioeconomic inequalities, most observers agreed that the campaign conducted by presidential candidate Pablo E. Madero was relatively colorless and uninspiring. Nonetheless, PAN won over 20 percent of the presidential vote in eight states in the Pacific North, North, and Center regions.

PAN's anti-corruption campaign found its widest audience in an urban middle class affected by rising inflation and sluggish economic growth. PAN may also have benefited considerably in some areas from the exhortations of Roman Catholic officials to vote against leftist opposition parties because of Marxism's presumed incompatibility with Christianity. Given the extensive propaganda campaigns conducted by PSUM and PRT, PAN may well have benefited from anticommunist sentiment among conservative factions of the middle class.

Other opposition parties fared considerably less well. Although the Mexican Communist party (PCM) won 6.7 percent of the proportional representation vote in 1979, it won no Chamber of Deputies seats by majority. The PCM was the only opposition party other than PAN to win more than 10 percent of the vote in a single state. The other parties' support ranged from 2.9 percent to 1.8 percent of the total national vote. In 1982, electoral support for these opposition parties ranged from PSUM's 4.4 percent of the Chamber of Deputies vote to 0.2 percent for the Social Democrat party (see Table 6.1). The Revolutionary Workers' party (PRT) won widespread attention in the 1982 elections principally because of its presidential candidate, Rosario Ibarra de Piedra-a woman and a long-standing critic of government repression against opposition political activists.

Finally, the 1979 and 1982 elections demonstrated that there is considerable regional variation in support for opposition parties. In both years, PAN's electoral strength was concentrated in the Pacific North, North, and Center regions. Similarly, the greatest support for PCM (1979) and the Mexican Unified Socialist party (1982) came from the Pacific North and Center regions. The vote for PDM and PRT was concentrated in the Center states. Although PPS, PST, PARM, and PSD showed less regional variation in these two elections, they also received far less overall electoral support. All the opposition parties mobilized quite heterogeneous backing in both elections, concentrated particularly in the principal urban areas.

Opposition Party Representation in the Chamber of Deputies

As a result of the political reform and the 1979 elections, opposition parties significantly increased their representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies. In the 1976-79 Chamber, the three opposition parties then registered (PAN, PPS, PARM) held 17.4 percent of the existing seats under the "party deputy" system. In 1979, with the inclusion of PCM, PST, and PDM, the opposition expanded its representation to 26.0 percent of the total four hundred seats. The proportional representation system used to distribute opposition positions (the Hagenbach- Bishov system) biased the final distribution of Chamber seats in favor of the smaller opposition parties; PARM, PST, and PDM benefited from this arrangement, while PAN and PCM were penalized. Nonetheless, an ideologically defined political opposition appeared in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time since the early 1930s. The representation of diverse ideologies and political tendencies enhanced the national political prominence of the Chamber. Opposition parties won a total of 101 seats 125.3 percent) in the 1982-85 Chamber.

Expanded representation in the Chamber of Deputies permitted opposition parties to play a more active role in congressional activities. The larger number of opposition deputies allowed them to participate on more committees and commissions. Opposition party deputies introduced new ideas and altered the character of Chamber debate. On some occasions the PRI majority modified legislative initiatives in order to avoid confrontations with the opposition. In the 1979-82 Chamber, the Mexican Communist party (leader of the Communist Parliamentary Group that also included MAUS, PSR, and UIC) pursued a strategy designed to generate maximum public awareness of PCM programs and the party's presence in the Chamber. Opposition activity such as this sometimes resulted in novel legislative alliances. For example, although leftist opposition parties have generally criticized the pro-government CTM's domination of the organized labor movement, PCM, PST, and PPS supported the confederation's 1980 demand for a general wage increase to counteract inflation.

However, Chamber representation holds its own challenges for opposition parties. Participation in the federal Chamber of Deputies constitutes a major change for those parties that developed followings and based their legitimacy on long-standing opposition to the established regime. Despite the Chamber's new role in national political debate, the opposition's expanded presence there is in the short run unlikely to affect strong executive control over the legislature. Opposition party leaders have been hard-pressed to show their constituents substantive results from legislative action. Opposition parties with limited personnel may also find that election campaign activity and legislative participation absorb scarce resources that might otherwise be devoted to base level organizational work and the expansion and diversification of party membership. Problems such as these have surfaced in several leftist parties, accentuating existing internal divisions and provoking debate on the appropriate focus of party activity.

The Problem of Voter Abstention
One goal of the 1977 political reform was to increase voter participation in the electoral process. However, voter abstention actually rose in the 1979 election for the federal Chamber of Deputies. The proportion of total votes cast as a share of total registered voters was officially only 49.3 percent, although the reported electoral results may have underestimated the true dimensions of the problem. The 1979 abstention rate (50.7 percent) was higher than that recorded in either the 1973 congressional election (39.7 percent) or the 1976 presidential election (31.3 percent), and the total number of abstentions exceeded the total number of votes cast for the first time. Observers attributed this outcome to the generally lower voter participation characteristic of congressional elections in Mexico and the lackluster, non-ideological campaign conducted by a number of opposition parties.

This situation changed dramatically in the 1982 general election. The national voter registration lists included 94.9 percent of all eligible citizens; 74.8 percent of all registered voters participated. Both rates were the highest officially recorded since 1946, and all major political parties participating in the election accepted their general validity. The unexpectedly large turnout was especially impressive because Mexico's growing economic problems (such as rising inflation) might have encouraged voters to boycott the electoral process as a form of protest.

Two factors produced this abrupt reversal of a long-term historical trend toward growing voter abstention. First, the 1981-82 presidential campaign included an intensive government effort to raise citizen interest in the electoral process and mobilize voters on election day. Under the slogan " The Great Civic Action," the government-supported PRI conducted a long and costly mass media advertising campaign and used opinion polling techniques on an unprecedented scale. For example, PRI produced television advertisements focusing on issues important in particular areas. Some of these involved question-and-answer formats featuring PRI's presidential candidate, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado. PRI also used more traditional means to encourage voter participation, including the mobilization of the party's worker and peasant bases and the organization of large numbers of mass assemblies. Although PRl's ability to draw extensively on government resources makes it impossible to estimate the true cost of the campaign, its expenditures clearly dwarfed those of all other political parties.

Second, the presence of eight other political parties and six alternative presidential candidates (the PPS and the PARM once again supported the PRI candidate) stimulated voter interest in the elections. This was the highest number of presidential candidates in Mexican history. PAN, PDM, PRT, PST, and PSUM all conducted extensive campaigns to increase voter participation and expand their own electoral support. The Federal Electoral Commission divided some 500 million pesos (approximately $12.5 million) among all parties competing in the election in order to make this campaign effort possible. Although some small opposition groups called for voter abstention as a gesture of anti-government protest, PAN, PRT, PSD, PST, and PSUM all encouraged participation in the election. PAN, PPS, PST, and PSUM also ran complete candidate slates for the federal Chamber of Deputies and Senate races. Although there are no public opinion survey data available to evaluate voter participation in the 1982 general election, observers agreed that those citizens who had previously failed to take part in the electoral process distributed their votes among the different parties in rough proportion to their previously established strengths, with PRI and PAN benefiting most. This suggests that much of the previously high abstention rate reflected a generalized disinterest in the electoral process rather than a form of protest against the established regime.

The Problem of Electoral Fraud
The 1977 political reform also sought to discourage electoral fraud by permitting all parties participating in an election to designate representatives on the supervisory committee attached to each polling place and by providing parties with access to documentation regarding election results. Although errors in national voter registration lists continue to be a serious problem, most observers of the 1979 and 1982 elections agreed that the electoral process in the principal urban areas was comparatively free of fraud. Despite the formal opportunities to oversee the voting process, however, the large number of polling sites throughout the country (some 43,000 in 1979 and 50,408 in 1982) meant that opposition parties faced substantial logistical problems in actually placing a representative on each committee. In 1982, PSUM had more success in this regard than most other opposition parties, but it could supervise only about 60 percent of all polling sites.

Opposition party vigilance at the polls was thus important but not decisive in the conduct of the 1979 and 1982 elections. In many rural areas PRI conducted the elections much as it always had, mobilizing peasants en masse through local political bosses and engaging in various forms of electoral fraud. In addition, close collaboration between local government officials and PRI made it extremely difficult for opposition parties to document fraud, voter intimidation, and other electoral abuses. The opposition of local government officials to political liberalization and continued electoral fraud in many areas remain significant problems.

Prospects for Future Regime Change
The liberalization process initiated by Mexico's 1977 political reform has remained under close government control. Although the established authoritarian regime faced significant challenges in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the López Portillo administration undertook the reform from a position of strength. The political opposition's relative weakness and the diffuseness of pressures for regime change contributed to the federal executive's ability to determine the timing, structure, and speed of the reform process. Political reform removed an important potential source of instability by incorporating recently emerged leftist opposition forces into the existing party system under government-defined rules. The inclusion of new political forces and ideological tendencies in the existing party system expanded the regime's representative capacity and demonstrated its flexibility in response to sociopolitical change.

The 1977 political reform nonetheless marked an important departure in Mexican politics. The López Portillo liberalization measure acknowledged for the first time the existence of a legitimate opposition to the left of the PRI-led "revolutionary coalition." The registration of additional opposition parties expanded the mobilization channels available to opposition political forces, particularly on the Left. Increased access to mass communications (especially television and radio) and more active participation in the electoral process significantly improved the ability of opposition parties to articulate alternative public policies and widen their membership base. Expanded representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies gave these parties new prominence in a national political forum and offered them a chance to influence the legislative process. Whether opposition parties will be able to exploit these opportunities so as to promote broader sociopolitical and economic change remains to be seen. However, the liberalization that began with the 1977 reform has altered Mexico's national political map in ways that are not easily reversible.

Despite the importance of the 1977 reform, there are significant obstacles to further liberalization in the established regime. Mexico's continuing economic crisis constitutes the most immediate challenge to future progress in this area. The sharp 1981 down turn in international petroleum prices produced a sudden decline in Mexico's oil export revenues, cut short the 1978-81 economic boom, and contributed directly to the August 1982 debt crisis. These economic reverses produced tensions in the governing coalition and heightened public discontent with government economic policy performance. At the same time, the country's financial difficulties drastically reduced the resources available for government social and economic programs designed to resolve long-standing development problems and build popular support for the established regime. Although recent developments suggest that there is no linear causal relationship between economic downturn and political closure in the Mexican case, the challenge that economic crisis poses for the established regime makes further political liberalization more difficult.

The abruptness and severity of the 1981-82 economic crisis eroded the López Portillo administration's commitment to continuing political liberalization. Indeed, the administration attempted to use the 1982 general elections to reinforce the government's position at the expense of opposition parties in order to maintain firm political control as the economic crisis deepened. The administration perceived an impressive PRI victory and increased voter participation as necessary political components in the construction of a stabilization program to confront Mexico's growing national and international economic problems. The 1982 election offered an opportunity to prove the continued strength of the Mexican political system in order to retain the confidence of the U.S. government, the international financial community, and foreign investors. The PRI presidential candidate, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, had been criticized as a politically inexperienced technocrat whose career in the economic policy-making bureaucracy (he had never served as an elected public official) provided him with few ties to the traditional party apparatus. Many observers considered his candidacy and early campaign effort to be uninspiring and politically weak. A convincing PRI victory in the 1982 election was thus an important step in building a political base for the new de la Madrid administration. The Mexican government's effort to demonstrate continued national political stability and the viability of its single-dominant party took on special meaning in the context of escalating violence in Central America.

These considerations explain the attempt of the López Portillo administration to hold the opposition's 1982 electoral success to a minimum. There is convincing evidence that the National Action party (PAN) was the victim of significant electoral fraud in Nuevo León and some other areas. PAN won four single-member districts in 1979, but in 1982, despite a substantial increase in its share of the total national vote, the party failed to win any single-member seats in areas of traditional electoral support. Subsequent events underlined the relationship between the administration's conduct of the election and its plans to address a deteriorating economic situation. Four days after the Federal Electoral Commission provided preliminary official validation of PRI's convincing victory, the administration had announced a substantial reduction in government subsidies for basic commodities and the dramatic August 1982 devaluation of the peso.

In contrast, in the first half of 1983 the de la Madrid administration felt compelled to recognize a series of local-level (municipio) opposition victories, marking the first time that the government officially recognized opposition party victories in major cities in the Pacific North, North, and Center regions. They included five state capitals (Chihuahua, Durango, Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, and Hermosillo) and a major border city (CiudadJuárez). All but one of these elections were won by PAN and the other (in Guanajuato) was captured by PDM in coalition with PAN. Furthermore, in the elections of a somewhat less important city of the Pacific North (Ensenanda, Baja California), the government recognized PST as the official victor. This support for opposition parties reflected widespread popular dissatisfaction with the government's harsh austerity measures rather than an endorsement of opposition parties' platforms or ideologies.

The de la Madrid administration's decision to respect local opposition victories in 1983 reflected its perception that a limited political opening was essential at a time of severe social and political tension. Like López Portillo's implementation of the 1977 political reform, de la Madrid's handling of the 1983 elections was part of an effort to balance stringent economic austerity measures with policies designed to diffuse widespread public discontent. However, volatile sociopolitical conditions in 1982-83 and the prospect that Mexico's economic crisis would persist for the indefinite future made more extensive political liberalization too risky. Instead, the de la Madrid administration attempted to restore public confidence in the established regime through a series of other measures. These included a widely publicized "moral renovation" campaign whose goal was to reduce corruption in the government bureaucracy and the police forces. A cabinet-level Comptroller General's Office was created to investigate suspected government corruption, and the anticorruption campaign resulted in the prosecution of several senior officials in the López Portillo administration (including the former director of the state-owned petroleum company and the former chief of the Mexico City police).

Although the Mexican regime's political response to economic crisis has varied over time depending on specific circumstances, the challenge posed by economic crisis has generally constrained the liberalization process. The government's 1983 decision to recognize opposition victories in major cities was an important precedent, but it did not imply a broader commitment to political liberalization. So long as the governing elite retains firm control over liberalization, specific decisions such as this are reversible. Opposition victories in 1983 occurred in areas of traditional opposition strength, and continued federal government control over local budgetary resources limited opposition parties' ability to use their position as incumbents to expand their local support base. Moreover, official recognition of conservative parties' electoral triumphs was balanced by a successful government effort to end by force PSUM's control over the municipal presidency in Juchitán, Oaxaca. In 1984 the de la Madrid administration granted conditional registry to the leftist Mexican Workers' party (PMT) and the conservative Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM, which had lost its registry after a poor performance in the 1982 election) for participation in the 1985 congressional and state elections in order to demonstrate its commitment to continued political opening. However, electoral results in 1984 state and local elections in Baja California, Michoacán, Oaxaca, Puebla, and Sinaloa may have been manipulated to guarantee PRI victories.

Even if the tensions resulting from Mexico's economic crisis eventually ease, conservative elements in the governing revolutionary coalition are likely to oppose further regime liberalization. From their perspective, the 1977 reform measure relative success in resolving several specific political problems reduced the need for additional political opening. The leverage that entrenched interests are able to exert in internal regime negotiations gives these groups a significant role in shaping regime-sponsored liberalization projects. The election of an opposition candidate as state governor or the loss of a major industrial union to opposition political control would probably increase conservative resistance to regime change. Developments such as these might challenge the existing system by introducing major new policy and leadership alternatives. The effectiveness of conservative opposition to future political liberalization would be substantially increased if heightened sociopolitical tensions resulting from prolonged national economic crisis and widening regional military conflict in Central America led to more active political participation by the Mexican armed forces.

Liberal elements in the governing political elite will therefore be challenged to maintain regime flexibility once to ongoing sociopolitical change. Flexible adaptation to change (including the possibility of more extensive institutional reforms) may be a particularly important means of addressing popular discontent in a period when the material resources available for coalition maintenance are severely limited. This approach will be especially significant if the commitment of leftist opposition groups to political participation through established institutional channels is to be preserved. Over the longer term, liberal reformers must also address the underlying tension between traditional political actors' vested interest in maintaining the existing system and demands for alterative political arrangements, including increased emphasis on broadly inclusive competitive elections as a basis for regime legitimacy.

Opposition forces will also encounter major challenges in their efforts to promote broader political opening. The 1977 political reform incorporated the most important unregistered opposition organizations into the existing party system without greatly increasing their real political influence. The direction of future political change will depend in large measure on their ability to press for further regime liberalization. The need to develop a broader political base is particularly urgent for leftist opposition parties, which have fared less well than conservative parties in recent elections. The governing political elite's continued commitment to maintaining an overall Left-Right balance in the liberalization process makes leftist parties' electoral viability especially important as a condition for additional political opening.

Opposition parties' first task is to develop coordinated strategies advancing alterative programmatic proposals and to increase their electoral support. In many cases strategy coordination may require opposition parties to establish innovative ties with local groups and organizations that increase their combined mobilization capacity and electoral strength. The 1979 and 1982 election campaigns provided important lessons in this regard. Opposition parties continue to experiment with tactical alliances that often cut across Left-Right political divisions, but factionalism, organizational rivalries, and personal jealousies often hamper these efforts.

More important, opposition political forces on both the Left and the Right must also substantially expand their mass organizational bases if they are to develop an effective national political presence. In well-institutionalized, broadly based authoritarian regimes such as Mexico, where the degree of political liberalization is still limited, opposition forces must challenge the established regime's sociopolitical support bases on a variety of fronts in order to push liberalization forward. Efforts by opposition parties to develop identifiable constituencies are especially important in Mexico because the inclusive nature of the established regime has made existing opposition forces heterogeneous and diffuse.

Opposition parties in general have made only limited progress in this area so far, but leftist parties have had particular difficulty in organizing a coherent membership base outside their traditional sources of support (university employees, the intelligentsia, teachers, white-collar employees, some industrial workers). Conservative parties have been much more successful at translating the sociopolitical discontent resulting from government austerity measures into electoral support. Indeed, leftist forces were to some extent disoriented by the economic crisis of the early 1980s and the conservative parties' relative electoral success. Leftist parties frequently disagreed with each other on appropriate responses to government austerity measures and the Left's relationship with the "official" organized labor movement. Leftist opposition groups were also divided over the government's 1982 nationalization of private banks and its implications for potential leftist alliances with progressive elements in the established regime. The emergence of coalition protest movements linking urban marginals, peasants, and some labor groups (which resulted in major popular protests in October 1983 and June 1984) for the most part occurred independently of leftist party efforts. Although the Mexican Unified Socialist party IPSUM) has had some success in establishing local political alliances in states such as Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Puebla, this work has been slow and subject to frequent reverses.

The lack of opposition-party access to significant resources and power the small probability that this situation will change substantially in the near future, and resistance by existing "official" labor and peasant organizations all make mass organizational work difficult. However, only the creation and consolidation of independent social bases and durable ties with popular sector organizations will allow opposition parties to develop the identifiable constituencies that can serve as a basis from which to work for the substantive fulfillment of formally guaranteed individual and collective rights. Progress in this area is also a prerequisite for opposition efforts to promote more far-reaching regime change.