Politics in Mexico
Roderic Al Camp
ISBN 019512412X
May 1999
Oxford Univerity Press
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Chapter 3
Contemporary Political Culture: What Mexicans Value

What is problematic about the content of the emerging world culture is its political character. Although the movement toward technology and rationality of organization appears with great uniformity throughout the world, the direction of political change is less clear. But one aspect of this new world political culture is discernible: it will be a political culture of participation. If there is a political revolution going on throughout the world, it is what might be called the participation explosion. In all the new nations of the world the belief that the ordinary man is politically relevant-that he ought to be an involved participant in the political system-is widespread. Large groups of people who have been outside of politics are demanding entrance into the political system. And the political elites are rare who do not profess commitment to this goal.

The political culture of any society is partially a product of its general culture. Culture incorporates all the influences-historical, religious, eth:, political-that affect a society's values and attitudes. The political culture is a microcosm of the larger culture, focusing specifically on those values and attitudes having to do with a person's political views and behavior.

In the Mexican society, as in many societies, the intensity with which someone holds certain values is related to religion, level of education, income, age, gender, place of residence, and other variables. Their impacts will be examined in the following chapter and are important to understand. Equally important for comparative purposes is to evaluate beliefs that may influence Mexico's politics and Mexican attitudes toward the system.

LEGITIMACY: SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND SOCIETY

One of the most significant explanatory variables regarding a political system's stability is its legitimacy in the eyes of the society. Of course, any political model consists of a variety of institutions, some of which have been accorded greater respect than others. Level of respect permits a comparison of the standing of political and other types of institutions.

When Mexicans evaluate their institutions, it is apparent that those most closely associated with the state are held in lowest regard. Only three institutions are widely esteemed: family, church, and schools. The selection of family is not surprising because a culture with strong values generally ranks family and tradition highly. Of course, if loyalty to family is excessive, it makes transferring loyalty to governmental institutions difficult. This appears to be the case in Mexico, for Mexicans express some serious reservations about the trustworthiness of governrnental institutions and institutions as a whole. The same pattern is found in Japan, where levels of trust in institutions is lower than in Mexico.

The confidence Mexicans have in the church and schools is significant. In the first place, as suggested in the previous chapter, both the liberal tradition and the revolution encouraged anti-church sentiment. Nevertheless, although we will discover that Mexicans developed sentiments supporting the separation of church and state, secular criticism has not done away with respect or sympathies for the Catholic Church, particularly in a society in which at least 85 percent of the members are Catholic. Regard for the church as an institution may be a partial reaction to state suppression. It may also follow from the church's being one of the most autonomous institutions in the society, operating outside the control of the state despite severe constitutional restrictions. And it may well be that the church largely earned its standing among Mexicans by its deeds. When Mexicans are asked to rank the most estimable persons in their society after heir parents, priests and schoolteachers are well above any others.

It is noteworthy that Americans also give high marks to the church as an institution, indicating both their respect and, implicitly, the importance of religion and religious values in the U.S. culture. In England, on the other band, where religion's influence is less controversial and less encompassing, churches are held in high esteem but closer to that found in Mexico.

Mexican attitudes toward education, borne out in survey after survey, are usually quite positive. The significance of this for the legitimacy of the political system is perhaps more important for Mexico than for the United States and England, where schools are also viewed very positively especially in the former. The school system in Mexico is largely public, although Catholic schools do play an important role. Unlike in the United States, however, the public schools are operated by the regional government, and so the teachers are its employees. Although they may not be perceived as doing so, they could serve as a positive, indirect means of reinforcing the state's legitimacy-especially because texts in elementary schools are selected by the government. Most important, Mexicans' satisfaction with the school system is one of the few consistent pluses for the government.

Mexicans' confidence in other institutions is not prepossessing. What one notices immediately when comparing it with that of Americans is the generally lower levels of favorability. The weaker positive responses are not necessarily an indication of extreme frustration with the Mexican system; rather, Mexicans are likely to have lower expectations of their institutions, given their institutions' past performances, than Americans have. Nevertheless, the fact that police, politics, and congress tail off in the rankings indicates a lack of confidence in as well as alienation from these institutions. In fact, in a 1987 study with additional categories, only 23 percent of Mexicans gave government bureaucrats a favorable rating.

Attitudes toward the police are an important indication of basic trust in government. On the local level, police are the most likely representatives of government to come in contact with the citizenry. Therefore, a good opinion of the police is generally seen as an important grassroots indicator of trust in government. A sense of personal security is often a variable in one's evaluation of government performance. In both England and the United States the police achieved the highest level of confidence; in state and local surveys throughout Mexico, the police consistently rank lowest. Explanations usually include the perception that they are dishonest, often involved in criminal activities, and abuse their authority, especially among lower-income and rural groups.

When Mexicans are asked about the quality of specific government services, they point most often to education and health care. Generally speaking, they are most concerned on the local level, with education, health care, transportation, and sanitation. Agencies associated with the government render services that win widespread approval, thus contributing to the legitimacy of the government and, as in the case of the police and the security apparatus, offer services that the average Mexican views as inadequate. For example, during the Salinas administration (1988-1994), most Mexicans believed that the quality of their educational system improved. Specifically, by 1994, 48 percent thought that it was better; 29 percent believed that it was the same; and only 17 percent felt that it had become worse. In contrast, in regard to personal security, as the Salinas administration completed its term, precisely the reverse proportions of Mexicans viewed security in a negative light, with 46 percent describing it as worse, 32 percent as the same, and only 19 percent as improved. The government connection is not the deciding variable in the evaluative process.

Mexicans' assessment of their most prominent institutions is unflattering as a rule, with the exception of church and school. Unlike Americans Mexicans do not highly regard private-sector institutions. This is partly because private-sector values and the business community have not received positive attention in the schools or from public leaders. Indeed businessmen are often denigrated. As one private-sector notable remarked many Mexicans "use terms related to business, businessman, and entrepreneurs in a pejorative sense." The ratings given to the private sector and to other institutions in 1991 are lower than in the mid-1980s, but the rank order is unchanged. The distrust is manifest.

The attitude toward institutions may be explained in part by the grim economic and social conditions of Mexican life in the 1980s. A study in the early 1960s showed that urban Mexicans felt little pride in government institutions. Yet the 1980s were a decade of economic ups and downs, and confidence in government fell in many countries. In fact, if Canada, Mexico, and the United States are compared in this regard, it is the United States that experienced a major drop.

Although Mexicans' confidence in their government is half that of Americans and Canadians in their respective governments, its decline is minimal relative to the extent of economic crisis and the economic conditions Mexicans faced during the 1980s. In 1986, 50 percent of Mexicans told interviewers they thought a revolution might occur by 1991. Nearly half also described their own economic situation in a mid-1980s New York Times poll as bad, and 11 percent as very bad. Nine of ten respondents believed the national economy was bad or very bad, and more than half thought ~t would not recover. Mexican attitudes toward government have remained remarkably stable. That confidence slipped no more than it did might be attributed to the high level of popularity achieved by President Salinas by 1990, reversing somewhat the decline in legitimacy of his predecessors' administrations. In other words, confidence in governmental institutions probably dropped below its 1990 level at some point between 1981 and 1990.

Although Mexicans faced a number of political crises in the last year of the Salinas administration-beginning with the uprising of indigenous groups in Chiapas in January 1994, followed by the assassination of the government party's presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio in March-confidence in the country overall continued to remain relatively stable. But the assassination of Colosio, an unprecedented event in recent Mexican politics, did begin to initiate some doubts about both their personal economic future and their governmental institutions. Then, a few months after Ernesto Zedillo tock office in December 1994, their confidence as a whole began to erode dramatically with the economic devaluation and harsh austerity policies-combined with an untested cabinet and president. In February 1995, just two months into the Zedillo administration, 46 percent of urban Mexicans agreed that the cabinet changes suggested administrative incompetence.

Mexicans expressed a much more favorable opinion of society in general than they did of specific institutions, governmental or otherwise, indicating a much higher level of trust in societal responses to problems. Scholars cite the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City as an example. Although criticism abounds of government efforts to save persons trapped in the rubble, neighborhood volunteers' efforts are looked upon as exemplary. The same pattern was repeated in 1992 in the aftermath of a devastating explosion in Guadalajara's storm sewers.

The government's inadequacies after the quake produced a groundswell of popular movements that together pressed demands on the government. One analyst had this to say about their cooperation:

In the aftermath of the disastrous Mexico City earthquake in 1985, a coalition of urban organizations successfully forced the Mexican government and the World Bank to alter housing relief plans, accelerate the process of reconstruction, and reverse several fundamental urban policies. The coalition achieved this by uniting scores of neighborhood organizations. Hundreds of thousands of earthquake victims joined other urban poor to wrest concessions through deft media manipulation and political bartering.

Another explanation for the government's faring poorly in the minds of most Mexicans is their perception of its goals. Asked in a survey in the late 1980s if government officials were working for their own interests or the interests of the majority, nearly two-thirds of the respondents said the former was the case. Cynicism characterized the replies.

Mexicans believe their society's qualities to be equal or superior to those of the U.S. society but are less certain concerning people. According to a recent comparison of Mexican views of their political system between 1959 and 1991, positive evaluations of their model actually increased. For example, in 1981 Mexicans had little confidence in their fellow human beings, about one-third that of Americans and Canadians. When asked if one could trust the majority of people, fewer than one in five said yes.

Interestingly, Mexicans' confidence in their fellow human beings almost doubled during the 1980s. (A slight increase also was found among Americans and Canadians.) It is difficult to know to what this can be attributed. Dynamic social, economic, and political changes in recent years obviously influenced Mexicans' trust in different ways: trust in institutions especially political institutions, declined; trust in society remained stable and trust in individual people surged.

In terms of political behavior, trust in people is an important measure of the potential for democratic political institutions. Mexicans have expressed greater interest in democratizing their political institutions, sharing in the wave of democratization occurring elsewhere. To survive, democratic institutions rely on the high levels of personal trust necessary to effect compromise and operate within the rules of the political game. On a personal level Mexico has moved in that direction.

PARTICIPATION: ACTIVATING THE ELECTORATE

Trust in institutions and in fellow citizens is also related to political interest and participation. At least since the early 1960s, interest in political affairs in urban Mexico has been lower than in the United States and England. Today, according to much better survey data, interest in politics remains relatively low. In 1986, 30 percent of all Mexicans expressed no interest in politics; 34 percent, little interest; and 36 percent, some or much interest. Differences between Mexico and the United States might be explained by differences in media, communications systems, and political competitiveness.

People generally move from an interest in politics to political activism when they believe they can affect outcomes in the system. One way to test peoples' attitudes toward outcomes is to examine political efficacy. This measures the degree to which a person believes he or she can participate in politics and the responsiveness of the system to their involvement. When Americans were asked whether or not they have a say in what government does, somewhere between 33 and 41 percent, from 1980 to 1988, replied that they do. A similar but more specific question was posed to Mexicans: When asked whether they could do something about election fraud, 56 percent thought not. It is not surprising that more than half of all Mexicans believe they cannot affect the outcome of government policy; they live under a semiauthoritarian political model in which control over decision making is concentrated at the top. After all, if a third of all Americans described themselves as ineffectual politically in a system where honest elections are the norm and competition is regularized, the higher Mexican response should be expected.

Most citizens in political systems where elections occur become involved through voting. Therefore, their ability to affect the outcome of government policy is influenced by their perception of the integrity of the voting process. Mexico has had a long history of voter fraud in the twentieth century. Disputes over electoral results have occurred after every presidential election since 1920, and at the state and local levels as well. In 1929, 1940, and 1988 large numbers of Mexicans believed that the opposition candidate for president actually won the election.

Before 1988 the accusations of wrongdoing were based solely on observation and political commentary, but shortly before the presidential elections that year Mexicans were asked for the first time in a nationwide pill if their vote would be respected. More than half the interviewers thought their votes would not be counted honestly. Only a fourth believed in the integrity of the electoral process, and an equal number were unsure.

The question was repeated shortly before the off-year elections in August 1991, when many governors, half the senate, and all congresspersons were elected. Although the "don't knows" remained the same, those who viewed the elections as honest increased by 83 percent. Despite intense election battles and evidence of election fraud since 1989, the government successfully allayed the doubts of some Mexicans in the 1991 elections. By the spring of 1994, after several political crises had led to a number of structural reforms in the electoral process, including the presence of international observers, Mexicans again were asked if they thought the forthcoming presidential elections would be fair. Their response, which had fluctuated considerably throughout 1994, remained fairly consistent with the 1991 responses. Two weeks before the election, in mid-August, a nationwide poll revealed that 41 and 17 percent, respectively, thought the elections would be clean or reasonably clean. Only 30 percent thought that fraud would be considerable or widespread.

To test the assumptions about the relationship between citizens' perception of fraud and their willingness to vote, Mexicans were asked in 1989 their reasons for not voting. In Mexico, as in the United States, a person cannot vote unless he or she is registered before the election. Approximately half of all Mexicans eligible to vote were not registered. Although the government attempted to increase the number of registered voters by means of a voter identification card system instituted before the 1991 elections, many remained unregistered. The same situation obtains in the United States: In 1988, 33 percent of all persons eligible to vote were unregistered. By August 1994, the government had succeeded in registering the largest percentage ever of eligible voters. What was even more surprising to analysts is that a record 78 percent of the voters actually cast their ballots, the highest percentage ever recorded.

The second most common reason that Mexicans offer for not voting is they forgot or were too busy. Using the sample in the Los Angeles Times August 1989 poll, if we exclude the percentages of persons not voting because they were unregistered or forgot to vote and then collapse the percentages directly pertaining to the integrity of the electoral process (fraud, don't trust the process, and to protest election/candidate), the latter percentages would constitute 57.5 percent of the responses. In 1993, however, only 32 percent gave fraud as an excuse, and 19 percent were not registered. The largest group, 40 percent, were not interested. lt is also possible that a large percentage of those who never vote refrain because they believe that casting a ballot is meaningless.

Indeed. according to a 1994 poll published in etcétera, only 41 percent of Mexicans responding believed their vote to be very important.

People's proclivity to participate in the electoral process is affected to some extent not only by confidence in their political efficacy or by the integrity of the institutions and the process itself but also by their level of activism in general. Mexicans' involvement in organizations is not high. Among the most important organizations are religious organizations and unions, followed by charitable and youth groups. Fifty-eight percent of all Mexicans belong to no organization. With the exception of unions, membership is voluntary, which is a measure of level of interest in involvement. Slightly over half of all Mexicans who belong to organizations belong to voluntary groups. Only 2 percent of Mexicans in the late 1980s belonged to political parties or political organizations, suggesting a relatively low level of interest in politics.

The simplest form of political participation is voting, if it is one of the characteristics of the political model. A somewhat higher level of participation is indicated by membership in political organizations. Political organizations in Mexico have been constrained by the characteristics of the dominant government-party system and its control over the electoral process. In other words, most organizations expressing political goals or affiliated with a political party, especially at the national level, have ties to the political establishment. Two-thirds of all Mexicans do not belong to any political organization. Most of them belong to unions and professional organizations that are automatically incorporated into the institutional Revolutionary Party (PR1). The most important of these are the party's sectorial organizations representing labor, peasants, and professional groups. Thus, working-class Mexicans are most likely to belong to the Mexican Federation of Labor (CTM) and the National Peasant Federation (CNC), and professionals and white-collar workers to the National Front of Organizations and Citizens (FNOC). Others belong to such PRI organizations as youth or women's groups. Among Mexican activists who join political organizations, government employees account for 86 percent.

Given the fact that in Mexico, government-controlled unions and professional organizations are part of the corporatist political structure, it is not surprising that the government workers dominate political organization membership and that membership is high. Few Americans are members of strictly political organizations. For example, a member of the AFL-CIO (a major labor confederation) is not automatically a member of either major party, although each party attempts to obtain labor's support for its candidates and programs.

If we move higher up the ladder of political participation, from membership in an organization to some type of action, it is possible to obtain a good sense of citizens' attitudes toward political involvement and of their level of commitment to direct political participation. One way to measure such participation is to ask citizens about their attitudes toward modes of political action. In other words, to test receptivity to greater political involvement, people are asked whether or not they favor such highly visible and committed activities as boycotting, legal demonstrations, illegal demonstrations, and occupation of buildings or factories.
As confidence in the institutions of government has declined in Mexico, the United States, and elsewhere, the legitimacy of other forms of political behavior has risen. People favor these actions because they believe them to be effective means to convey political demands and, more important, that the regular channels are inadequate. In the past decade, in the United States and Canada, roughly a 70 percent increase occurred among those favoring less orthodox actions. Mexico experienced an even more remarkable upsurge in that Mexicans traditionally have not favored such activity. Among the many explanations of their quiescence is that their more authoritarian system would not be likely to respond to the activity or that it might respond repressively. Over time, the political culture came to see such activity as unacceptable and illegitimate. Whatever the explanation, only half as many Mexicans as Americans and Canadians favored such approaches in 1981, but the numbers approximated one another a decade later In fact, when Mexicans were asked in 1994 if they thought that demonstrations were a good response to electoral fraud in the presidential elections, an overwhelming 70 percent agreed.

The dramatic increase among Mexicans accepting unorthodox political activity is indicative of the weakness of the Mexican system in coping with important demands, its loss of legitimacy, and perhaps its increased tolerance of such demands and its response to them. The percentage of change in actual engagement in the unorthodox political activity is even more remarkable for the change it suggests in Mexican behavior. There has been a substantial increase of those willing to involve themselves directly in political activity in all three countries, even though the overall numbers remain small, fewer than one of six citizens. Still, Mexico's 700 percent gain is extraordinary. What explains this behavior, and what does it mean?

The greater competitiveness of the national political game in Mexico beginning with local elections in 1985 and culminating in the national elections of 1994 had major repercussions on the nature of political activism. During the nine-year period, public opposition to electoral fraud reached new highs. It was given legitimacy in the media through announcements and advertisements by intellectuals and leading clergy. In fact, the clergy threatened after northern elections in 1986 to cease celebrating masses, something that had not happened since the 1920s if a recount did wt take place. The claims of fraud attracted international attention, and the U.S. media helped legitimize the claims of the domestic opposition. The rise of Mexican participation in unorthodox political activity to a level beyond that found in the United States suggests a major change in the political culture and in political efficacy. Although most Mexicans still think of themselves as ineffective politically, far greater numbers than before think they can induce change through non-government-controlled channels.

Another provocative explanation was offered in recent research on Mexican political stability. Linda Stevenson and Mitchell Seligson presented the hypothesis that "over the past sixty years, negative memories of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 have sparked fear of a return to the violence of that period, which in turn inhibited the willingness of Mexicans engaged in anti-system political actions." They believe that this collective memory has faded with the passage of time and that the surviving generation of the revolution has passed from the scene, thus eliminating an important source of inhibitions toward high-risk political actions, which they predicted would increase after 1994. The uprising of the Chiapan Indians in early 1994 sparked sympathy movements throughout Mexico, and in early 1995, within weeks of imposing austerity measures, thousands of Mexicans, including numerous middle-class professionals, demonstrated in front of federal agencies in the capital their anger toward government policies.

One of the most imaginative Mexican leaders of this new set of political techniques is "Superbarrio," a masked version of superman who is a wrestler. Sheldon Annis described him as "a colorful good guy sworn to oppose the bureaucracy, greedy landlords, and political hacks. Dressed in yellow tights, red cape, and mask emblazoned with 'SB,' Superbarrio led tens of thousands of people in street protests over renters' rights, housing cades, construction credit, and low-cost housing." Collectively, among the most interesting and active organizations which emerged from the changing electoral process in the 1990s, and performed a crucial role in the 1994 elections, was Acción Demacrática (AD), an umbrella organization of civic organizations designed to observe and publicly certify elections. Although not engaging in partisan politics, AD provided national coordination to dozens of civic groups, developing stronger linkages among various social organizations, and demonstrating the potential for exercising policy influence, national and internationally, to its thousands of affiliated members. Organizations like AD, through their involvement in the day to day process of participatory politics, expand the potential pool of Mexican activists.

Most Mexicans, as do most Americans, however, participate politically through voting. Most Mexicans, on the other hand, do not support a political party. In fact, more than half of all Mexicans are what Americans label independent or uncommitted. In the United States in 1988, only 37 percent of all Americans considered themselves independent or uncommitted; 35 percent, Democrats; and 28 percent, Republicans. The higher percentage of Americans affiliated with a party is a consequence of a higher level of knowledge about the two major parties, which have operated during the entire century, and the fact that Americans have a choice.28 Among Mexicans, 44 percent sympathized with specific parties in 1991, and 57 percent did in 1994.

Most analysts describe the ideology of the three major parties as follows: PAN, right of center; PRI, center right; and PRD, left of center. PRI would not always have received such a label. The breadth of its centrist posture allowed it to incorporate fairly radical populist views and presidents, such as Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), as well as more conservative positions. Ideologically speaking, within their respective political systems, the United States and Mexico share certain similarities. Mexicans have been more conservative politically, as has the United States electorate. But Mexicans are more strongly in the center ideologically than are Americans. Whereas 45 percent of Americans described themselves as conservatives, 38 percent of Mexicans are sympathetic to the right. Mexico has a large group in the center, 44 percent; 31 percent of Americans placed themselves in this category. Liberals, who would not correspond precisely to Mexicans who lean to the left, account for 23 percent of the American electorate but only 18 percent of Mexicans.

Ideologically, people tend to select parties and other groups that reinforce their political views. For example, nearly half of all American conservatives are Republican, and half of all liberals are Democrats. Thirty eight percent of all Mexicans are conservatives, and nearly two-thirds identify with the PRI; more than half of those professing leftist views favor the PRD, the left-of-center party.

Although citizens tend to vote for political parties that they believe subscribe to their views, often ideology is not an important determinant of why people vote for a candidate. In fact, candidate ideology or program has very little to do with Mexicans' reasons for voting. Most Mexicans are interested in a particular candidate because they believe he or she will change things. One study concluded that large numbers of Mexicans could not distinguish, in terms of policy issues, among the three major candidates in the 1988 elections. The same author also noted that such issues, including the voter's economic welfare, affected partisanship only when the economy's future was tied explicitly to the fate of the PRI.30 The candidate's party is not important except for how the voter might perceive it as having a bearing on the candidate's ability to bring about change. In order of importance in supporting a candidate, Mexicans' reasons ranked as fo110ws in 1989: to change things, 46.6 percent; ability, 14.7 percent; party, 8.4 percent; ideology, 8.0 percent; and other, 6.7 percent.

POLITICAL MODERNIZATION: AUTHORITARIANISM OR DEMOCRACY?

If ideology is not very important to how Mexicans vote, how their values related to other issues plays a critical role in the country's political development. Many Mexicans have loog desired a more competitive political process, hoping to democratize the system. Desire, alone, of course, is not the only prerequisite of democracy. Democratization implies the importance of certain values. Some observers have remained skeptical because

though there are few (and small) instances and spaces that are truly democratic in Mexico, these are exceptions to the overall trait of political life. The political culture, from its precedents in the Aztec world and through the times of the Spanish colonial period, is characterized by values of subordination and authoritarianism. In the structure of the prototypical Mexican family, the father figure is authoritarian; children develop in an environment of domination that goes well beyond the natural figure of authority of parents over children in any family. These values are reproduced at the work place, at school, in the unions, in businesses, in political parties. In each and every realm of life, the individual members often criticize the authoritarianism of the government, even though they behave the same way in their own firms; unions complain about the hierarchical structures of firms and the government, though it would be hard to find a more hierarchical scheme of domination top-down than the corporatist structures of the labor sector. Most cases in which individuals carry out negotiations and transactions-which can be properly termed political-tend to be characterized by schemes of an authoritarian nature where there is always an implicit structure of domination.

One of the most essential of these democratic values is a commitment 63r more than half of all Mexicans to expanding the role of opposition in Mexico. Only one in four Mexicans believes the PRI should remain strong, about the same proportion that identifies themselves, as firm supporters of the PRI. Other than PRI diehards, then, the typical Mexican is open to opposition-party growth. Although shortly before the 1994 presidential election a majority of Mexicans believed the PRI could better institute change, 55 percent thought that an opposition party could win.

Although the desire to see an expansion of opposition in Mexico is essential to political reform, an even more central feature of the actual functioning of a democratic political culture-as distinct from the institutions necessary to make it possible-is support for democratic liberties. Although not much research has been done on this variable in political liberalization, some comparative data are available.

A 1978 survey of urban Mexicans and New Yorkers suggested that although Mexicans' beliefs in democratic values were not, in most cases, at the level of New Yorkers', they did strongly support most of the values. The researchers examined three variables important to rejecting authoritarianism and supporting democracy: participation, political liberties, and dissent. Not surprisingly, they found levels of support for participation, such as petition signing and demonstrating equal to those found among New Yorkers. The findings anticipated those discovered in the World Values Survey in which Mexicans reached a level of support for such activities similar to that found in the United States Regarding defense of political liberties, Mexicans scored in the democratic range, although not nearly as high as New Yorkers did. In other words, Mexicans were not yet as tolerant of critics of the system. The most interesting results of this survey appear in connection with dissent. The ultimate test of a democratic system is allowing a critic to run for public office. Neither New Yorkers nor Mexicans scored well on this measure.

When Americans were asked in another survey if everyone should have an equal right to hold public office, 91 percent replied yes.35 But when they were asked in still another survey if Communists, with whom most Americans disagree intensely, should have an equal right to speak, only 64 percent said yes.36 Although precisely the same questions have not been posed to Mexicans, one study asked whether they would be bothered by someone's having different values and beliefs, and 87 percent said no. But when asked whether they would like a leftist living near them, the response indicated much less tolerance.

In terms of political values, Mexicans share attitudes that are both conducive and resistant to democratization. Although some aspects of democratization may become integrated effectively into the culture, others ate likely to be more difficult. Nevertheless, survey data do suggest a trend in Mexican values shifting strongly in a direction supportive of democratic behavior since the 1980s.

CONCLUSION

Values play a significant role in the evolution of a political system and the behavior of its citizens. Political values, as a component of general cultural values, are most important. In particular, three categories are central to the interrelationship between societal values and political behavior: legitimacy, participation, and authoritarianism.

Mexicans have high levels of respect for and trust in certain institutions, especially churches and schools, but Mexicans have very low levels of respect for political institutions of any son and the persons associated with them, such as bureaucrats and police. Their appraisals reflect a general lack of trust in government. Mexicans are unusual, compared with Americans, for the low levels of respect they give to most societal institutions. This is likely to change as their own involvement in and respect for civic and social organizations grow.

Although governmental institutions receive lower levels of support, and therefore have less legitimacy in Mexico than in the United States, the universal decline in governmental legitimacy in most nations during the 1980s was less sharp in Mexico. It is likely that Mexicans reached an even lower level of support for institutions in the mid-1980s and, through the efforts of President Salinas, who personally achieved high levels of popularity in the early 1990s, recovered from that level, thus considerably reducing the overall decline in government legitimacy before 1994. Serious political and economic events throughout 1994 and the first half of 1995 reversed this pattern, destroying gains in legitimacy and bringing perceptions of the presidency and governmental institutions to new lows.

Mexicans also expressed less trust than did Americans or Canadians in their fellow human beings. Although their confidence in others rose dramatically during the 1980s, it is still substantially below that found in the United States. Nevertheless, Mexicans' remarkable increase in trust in one another is significant for their desire to increase participation and expand democratic institutions.

Other changes have also taken place in how Mexicans view their Political efficacy. Although many are cynical about the election process and consequently their ability to influence government policy or leader ship, a considerable shift occurred between 1988 and 1991 in the number of Mexicans who see the integrity of the process positively, stabilizing by 1994. Although more Mexicans view the election process as an accurate measure of their demands, the principal reasons for not participating, other than not being registered, relate to election fraud and lack of interest.

Not many Mexicans are highly active in voluntary social organizations. Even fewer are involved in political parties or organizations. Most of those who are politically involved are members of official party organizations-this is not surprising, given the politically interwoven corporatist structures discussed earlier. Of some surprise is Mexicans' increasing tolerance of informal channels of political participation. Not only do they fever, to a much greater degree than in 1981, direct and unorthodox political actions on par with the level of support found in the United States, but their actual involvement in such actions also jumped 700 percent in the past decade. As the legitimacy of the government fades, support for these alternatives is likely to increase toward the end of the century.

The average Mexican, however, is not in favor of radical social and economic change but prefers a peaceful, incremental approach. For example, poll after poll demonstrated public sympathy for the goals of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), but few agreed with its methods, specifically violence. In fact, most Mexicans consider themselves moderate or conservative ideologically. Ideology itself is not an important determinant of party choices. Mexicans are more concerned about a candidate's willingness to improve conditions and his or her ability to do so.

Mexico is also part of a universal cultural shift described by Ronald Inglehart, Neil Nevitte, and Miguel Basáñez:

[A] change from a world in which most people are absorbed in the tasks of sheer survival, to a world in which concern for the quality of life is becoming increasingly important. As we might expect, the peoples of Canada and the United States are well ahead of the Mexican public on this dimension, but during the 1980s, all three publics showed substantial shifts toward increasing emphasis on Post materialist concerns.

If Mexicans incorporate increased participation and the integrity of the political process in their definition of post materialist values, further interest in politics is likely.

Finally, many Mexicans are interested in democratizing their political system, including increasing the competitiveness of the electoral process. There is considerable evidence of support for greater political opposition. Less evidence is available regarding Mexican attitudes toward liberty, a crucial value in appraising the potential for successful democratization. Available data do suggest, however, the presence of many of the attitudes necessary for successful democratic behavior. They also show that Mexicans are still relatively intolerant of opposing views and of allowing persons holding with such views to participate politically and hold office. The crucial question remains, however, whether a delegitimized government can cope with the increasingly chaotic growing pains of political liberalization, economic deprivation, and familial and social insecurity. President Ernesto Zedillo, who demonstrated the ability of his party to recovery from a serious crisis-brought on by the assassination of its presidential candidate-has not demonstrated an equivalent capacity to govern Mexico. His image as a weak president and the perception of his cabinet-and therefore the executive branch-as uncoordinated and divided do not bode well for a gradual, peaceful political transition.

Political Efficacy:
The belief in one's ability to participate in or influence political affairs.