Edited by Lourdes Benería, Shelley Feldman
From book "Unequal Burden."
Economic Crises, Persistent poverty and women's work"
Cornell University
Westview Press
1992
ISBN 0-8133-8230-0
The Mexican Debt Crisis: Restructuring the Economy e the household
In your countries those who own the banks are getting richer
with our debt while we are getting poorer and poorer.
-Doña A, owner of a small vegetable stop in Mexico City,
and mother of three children
The 1980s will be remembered as the decade in which the foreign
debt crisis and the policies that were followed to deal with it
had devastating effects on the lives of millions of people in
the Third World. In many countries, after some decades of economic
growth, the 1970s already represented a turning point in what
had been taken to be a gradual, even if slow, path to development.
The 1980s saw instead a desolated picture of negative growth and
rapidly declining living conditions, raising questions about the
ability of many social groups, and not exclusively the poorest,
to survive under minimal subsistence standards. The structural
adjustment that has accompanied the crisis has intensified the
chronic problems of labor absorption by the modern sector, which
cannot generate the employment necessary to provide an adequate
standard of living for a large proportion of the population.
Focusing on the case of Mexico, this chapter examines the set
of structural adjustment policies (SAP) that have been implemented
since 1982 to deal with the debt crisis, their impact on the process
of economic restructuring as well as on income distribution and
living standards, and on the dynamics generated at the level of
the household in order to deal with these changes.
One of the questions often posed, in Mexico and elsewhere, is
how the poor survive the crisis. Given the already precarious
conditions under which the poorest sectors of the population lived
before the crisis erupted, how have they managed to cope with
the new situation? What are their "survival strategies,"
or do the poor have any real choice between those strategies?'
Have collective strategies to deal with daily survival emerged?
How is the crisis lived within a specific household, and how does
it affect different household members? Does it have a differentiated
impact by gender and age? How has it affected women? What implications
for action and policy do the answers to these questions suggest?
These were the initial concerns behind the research done for this
chapter during the summer of 1988.
The chapter has two parts. The first briefly summarizes the main
aspects of Mexico's adjustment policies designed to deal with
the debt crisis, with particular emphasis given to policies that
have had an impact on the distribution of resources and living
standards. The second part deals more specifically with the coping
mechanisms that have been followed at the household level. The
empirical data used for this analysis provide the basis for my
main argument, namely, that the profound restructuring of the
Mexican economy has been accompanied by a parallel reorganization
of daily life in the area of reproductive as well as productive
activities, with specific gender dimensions that make the distribution
of the burden of survival among household members unequal.
DEBT AND "MODERNIZACIÓN"
The most salient facts about the Mexican debt crisis are well
known: an outstanding debt of S108 billion in 1989, seven years
after its severity surfaced in the summer of 1982 when the IMF
and the U.S. government "rescued" Mexico from international
insolvency with loans of $3.5 and 31.8 billion, respectively;
the second largest debt in Latin America after Brazil; one of
the heaviest long-term debt-service ratios taken as a percentage
of exports; a burden of debt payments for foreign and domestic
debt that, on the average, has represented close to 60 percent
of the federal budget; and a declining economic performance that
saw a decrease of 3.1 percent in real GNP during the 1982-1988
period and a debt/GNP ratio of over 95.
Yet Mexico is viewed by the U.S. government and the international
financial community as a showcase of debt management and restructuring.
It is for these reasons that it was the first country to benefit
from debt reduction and renegotiation through an agreement announced
in July 1989 as a result of the Brady initiative. To back up this
program of debt reduction, Mexico received new loans of $3.6 and
$1.5 billion from the IMF and the World Bank, respectively, during
the spring of 1989. By the time the final results of negotiations
were announced in February 1990, the debt had been reduced to
$80 billion, the first to be completed under the Brady Plan.
This expression of support on the part of the international financial
community represents the seal of approval for the very orthodox
adjustment policies initiated with the August 1982 "rescue"
and that continue up to the present time. These IMF-type adjustment
policies also launched Mexico into a process of economic restructuring
that has had a profound effect on Mexico's economic landscape.
The key features in this process, typical of most SAP, can be
summarized as follows:
1. A process of devaluation of the peso throughout the period,
which resulted in its depreciation from 23 pesos to $1.00 in the
summer of 1982 to 2,500 pesos in the summer of 1989. The price
increases that followed resulted in a rapid deterioration of real
wages; during the 1981-1988 period, the urban real minimum wage
decreased by 46.4 percent, the largest decrease (together with
Ecuador) in Latin America during that period (CEPAL 1990).
2. An austerity program that began with drastic cuts in government
spending and subsidies and that decreased the amount and quality
of government services to severe limits. These cuts in basic areas
such as health, education, and social security resulted in unemployment
among previously well-paid government employees, with its corresponding
impact on other sectors. For those employed, real wages over the
period fell to unprecedented low levels. Such was the case for
teachers, over half a million of whom joined a wildcat strike
in April of 1989 while asking for a 100-percent wage increase.
3. A process of economic restructuring that includes privatization
of state-controlled firms, reduction of public investment, trade
liberalization, the promotion of foreign investment, and an aggressive
policy of export promotion as a means of financing the debt. This
is what is often referred to in Mexico as modernización,
a process very much supported by Salinas de Gortari, as current
president of Mexico and as secretary of the Department of Planning
and Budget (SPP) under the previous presidency of Miguel de la
Madrid. Privatization has been intended to increase productivity
and competitiveness through the economy as a result of the new
emphasis on "rationalization" and reorganization of
the public sector, the introduction and update of modern technologies
in the public and private sectors, and the high priority given
to the rationality of the market-all of it very much along the
orthodox IMF model of SAP.
This process initiated a new period for the Mexican economy
following a neoliberal model that is similar to that followed
by other countries. Debt-related adjustment policies have been
used to shift Mexican capitalism to a new stage of higher integration
with the global economy, including the opening of doors to international
trade and finance and setting the stage for Mexico's participation
in the proposed North American Free Trade Association. As Rendón
and Salas (1988) have argued, these changes amount to a shift
from a model of accumulation based on the domestic market and
import substitution to one oriented toward the international market.
They also amount to a major shift in Mexico's orientation toward
the United States, with a profound impact on Mexico's foreign
policy.
Given that exports have increased and that Mexico has faithfully
kept up with debt interest payments, together with the orthodoxy
with which the IMF-style adjustment policies have been followed,
Mexico is viewed as the model that other countries should follow
to deal with their own debt crisis. As Martin Feldstein (1987)
put it at a conference on world economic restructuring held in
Mexico City in 1987, "current changes in Mexico are part
of a process of economic restructuring that will modify and wake
up the entire world."
THE SOCIAL COSTS OF ADJUSTMENT
As observed in other countries as well, these policies have
been implemented at high costs and devastating consequences for
a large proportion of the Mexican population. Rising unemployment,
price increases, the reduction of services, and the reorientation
of the economy away from the domestic market have resulted in
a persistent deterioration of living standards, particularly for
those whose living depends on wages and salaries and on casual
earnings. This is what some authors have referred to as the "crushing
of labor" as the relative share of GNP going to labor fell
drastically over the decade. The disparity between price and salary
increases had an impact on most social classes, as we will see
below, although it is obvious that the poor have been the most
affected, given that their very subsistence was threatened.
To illustrate, according to a study released in August 1988,
a standardized basket of twenty-eight products considered absolutely
indispensable for survival (Canasta Obrera Indispensable or COI)
was estimated to cost 12,924 pesos per person daily, almost 5,000
pesos above the daily minimum wage. Many poor households, of course,
did not even have anybody earning a minimum wage-their survival
depending upon the pooling of income among different household
members.
To be sure, severe problems of poverty existed in Mexico before
the debt crisis erupted. The poor have traditionally included
peasant and agricultural workers as well as urban households outside
of the formal economy (Lustig 1987; Benería and Roldán
1987). It is well known that, despite its relatively good economic
performance during the post-World War II decades, Mexico maintained
a very skewed distribution of income and resources, which often
resulted in welfare indicators below those of other countries
with a similar per capita income. This has been the case for health,
nutrition and education as well as housing (Lustig 1987).
All indications seem to suggest that the redistribution of resources
generated by the debt crisis and the implementation of SAP intensified
these inequalities. In particular, the diminishing proportion
of income going to labor and the drastic cuts in government expenditures
contributed to this trend. As the modernization process and cost
reduction policies to meet international competition continued,
the pressure to reduce real wages and weaken labor organizations
intensified. This affected precisely a sector of the working population
that previously had enjoyed relatively high wages and stable employment,
namely, the stable working class and middle class, whose relative
position deteriorated over the decade.
Income distribution seems to have deteriorated overall. Rudiger
Dornbusch (1988), for example, has stated that "there is
little doubt that distribution has worsened over the 1980s."
Official statistics for 1977 show that the richest 20 percent
of the population controlled 54.4 percent of the income, whereas
the poorest 20 percent received only 2.9 percent; more recent
private surveys suggest that the tendency has been toward higher
inequality (Quick 1989). At the same time, some sectors of the
business class benefited considerably from the economic changes
associated with the restructuring of the economy, particularly
those connected with the export sector, the internationalization
of the Mexican economy, and the deregulation of economic activity.
The financial sector has been one of these sectors. Thus the Mexican
stock exchange, like others in many countries during the period,
had been booming previous to the Wall Street crisis of October
19, 1987. Brokerage houses (casas de bolsa) reported net profits
as high as 88.4 percent of capital in 1987 and an average of 53.1
percent for the 1986-1988 period (Lissakers and Zamora 1989).
For some sectors of the population, drastic reductions in living
standards have been quite well documented. However, the details
of this reduction are still a matter of controversy. Lustig (1987:245),
for example, had argued that, regarding basic food consumption,
"it is possible to say that the crisis has not resulted in
problems of food availability, nor has it resulted in a clear
deterioration of the average daily diet." Yet, as Lustig
herself also points out, average aggregate figures can be very
misleading. All indications suggest that, at least for the poor,
the decrease in food consumption during the decade was drastic.
Social indicators also point toward diminishing health and educational
standards as toward a deterioration of the quality of life-as
suggested by an increase in the crime rate and by the dramatic
deterioration of public transportation problems and pollution
standards (Lustig 1987; Rohter 1989). In addition, some negative
consequences of economic restructuring have been felt with particular
intensity in specific areas and sectors, as illustrated by the
retrenchment in steel towns affected by government divestiture
and the pressure of "modernization."
It is no wonder, therefore, that many of these changes resulted
in a progressively more open public discontent and generated also
drastic political changes. The appearance of Cardenismo as a serious
threat to the governing party in the 1988 elections is an illustration.
Cardenismo responded to that discontent and to the class recomposition
taking place in Mexican society and that was parallel to similar
changes in other countries (Cypher 1988). The political significance
of these changes as a potential shift to the left was not underestimated
at the time and explains the continuous and strong U.S. interest
in Mexico as an economic and political partner and as a model
for handling the debt. In the next section, I illustrate in more
detail the effects of SAP and their corresponding social costs
at the level of the household.
A SAMPLE OF MEXICO CITY HOUSEHOLDS
The research on which the following analysis is based was
carried out in Mexico City in the summer of 1988. In addition
to posing the questions listed earlier in this chapter, the study
responded to a concrete interest: How had some of the households
that we had visited during a study of industrial homework in 1981-1982
(Beneria and Roldán 1987) survived under the severe burden
of the crisis? Fieldwork began at the time when many Mexicans
were still questioning the results of the presidential election
in which Carlos Salinas de Gortari had been declared the winner.
The political truce between government, business, and workers
created by the pre-1988 election wage-and-price freeze (Pacto
de Solidaridad) was starting to wear thin, and Mexicans seemed
to be caught between the massive demonstrations in which Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas became the central figure/symbol of the opposition
and the expectations created by the new presidential term.
The empirical analysis in the chapter is based on interviews
with members of a nonrandom sample of 55 households scattered
in different areas of Mexico City. Generalizations from this sample
should be viewed with caution. However, the case study is illustrative
of the type of responses generated by the crisis among urban households,
and its findings are quite similar to those reported by other
researchers in Latin America-(Moser 1989; González de la
Rocha 1986). The interviews, which took place, with only two exceptions,
within the homes of those interviewed, were carried out in a variety
of colonias or neighborhoods. In most cases, the questions were
answered by women-usually by the housewife/mother but also by
others such as a grandmother, sisters, and daughters-although,
in the few cases in which the husband/father was present, he often
took an active role in the exchange.
The average household size in the sample was 5.72, slightly lower
than that reported by studies carried out in the early 1980s (Benería
and Roldan 1987). Variations by income category are reported in
Table 4.1 and suggest a negative correlation between household
size and income. Nuclear family households represented the large
majority in the sample, with only 12.7 classified as extended
families, and 14.5 percent headed by women. Average biweekly income
was 338,712 Mexican pesos or about US$147. As expected, practically
all households had more than one income earner-the average being
2.3-and 50.3 percent of those working for an income did so in
some form or other in the informal sector.
Table 4.1 includes a breakdown of households categories that
were estimated to represent: (1) extreme poverty, (2) subsistence,
(3) poor but with basic needs covered, (4) lower middle-class
range, and (5) middle-class standards. The majority of households
in the sample were poor, with the largest proportion classified
within the ranges of extreme poverty or bare subsistence levels.
A similar picture emerges from data on housing: The great majority
of the households were living in very poor housing, with the largest
proportion (46.3 percent) living in dwellings with tin roofs and
tenements under very precarious conditions, 24.1 percent in "poor
but adequate" dwellings, and the rest (close to 30 percent)
in apartments and residential homes.
Similarly, Table 4.2 presents a breakdown of consumption indicators
by income categories, which shows that the possession of telephone
and car was the most visible sign of a middle-class standard.
On the other hand, a high proportion of poor households owned
radio and TV sets, even though, as will be seen below, the crisis
had made many of them useless for lack of repair.
HOW HOUSEHOLDS COPE
The effects of the crisis were felt strongly by all households
included in the sample, although there were differences across
income levels. "Great difficulties" in making ends meet
were reported by the great majority (over 80 percent) of the poor
and lower middle class and by almost 50 percent of the middle-class
households, with drastic adjustments made in their budgets and
consumption habits. Even those that did not fall in this category
reported that they had "some difficulties" and had made
"important adjustments" in their daily expenses. Unemployment,
housing, and debt were also among the problems causing great difficulties,
even though the proportion of households mentioning them were
significantly lower. On the other hand, unemployment and debt
were reported by households in all income categories as having
caused "some difficulties"-the proportion ranging between
17 and 20 percent for unemployment and between 33 and 62 percent
for debt. Belt-tightening, therefore, has been felt deeply across
households in different socioeconomic categories.
Interestingly enough, very few households complained about the
availability of food or other basic goods. Only in a few cases
there was mention of occasional difficulties finding some products
in the market. During the time of fieldwork, long and tense lines
developed in some colonias in front of shops that distributed
government-subsidized food (Canasta Básica) at lower prices.
However, the same products for which women stood in line were
readily available, often in the same shop, although at higher
prices. The "great difficulties" mentioned in many households
therefore were not caused by food scarcity or deficiency in distribution
but by insufficient income to buy iy. The problems implied were
clearly summarized by a 23-year-old energetic mother: "When
our income can't pay for what I need to buy every day, I feel
desperate and I ask myself whether we can survive this situation."
As the mother of four children and housewife of a household classified
under "extreme poverty," the situation she was referring
to actually meant that there were no chairs in the house for the
interviewers to sit, the children did not wear shoes, the roof
leaked, the floor was not paved, the inside walls were extremely
dirty by any standard, the house had only three small rooms (kitchen,
dining room, and a bedroom) while some extra space, with very
poor conditions, was rented to another large family for very little
money. Job insecurity for the father and only occasional paid
work for the mother were a constant source of anxiety and even
despair. Yet, despair was not exclusive to extremely poor households.
Tension and anguish about making ends meet was found among better-off
households as well. In all cases, the depth of the crisis was
felt in a way that escaped statistics and analytical quantification.
What kind of adjustments have been made to deal with this situation?
One of the overwhelming impressions during fieldwork came from
the observation that, in the absence of a welfare state and of
collective efforts in daily survival at the neighborhood and community
level, it was at the level of the household where the fierce struggle
was centered. The majority of households were surviving, even
if at a very high cost. In our sample there were, in fact, two
types of families. A small proportion (just over 5 percent of
the total) were practically disintegrating under what seemed to
be insurmountable problems: unemployment, inability to generate
the income necessary for bare survival, domestic violence, housing
deficiencies, absence of any community support, abandonment, and
so on. These were cases often associated with a drunken husband,
prostitution, drugs, or some other forms of criminal behavior;
the economic crisis is likely to have intensified rather than
created these problems.
The large majority of households, however, had reorganized their
lives to cope with the problems brought about by the crisis and
were succeeding in various degrees. In what follows, the different
coping mechanisms observed are classified under three basic categories:
labor market adjustments, budget changes, and restructuring of
daily life.
Labor Market Adjustments
A common response to the crisis was the increase in the number
of household members participating in the labor market in order
to contribute to family income. Two groups in our sample were
the most affected by this response. One was the population of
teenagers who had to discontinue their education in order to earn
an income, particularly by not moving to higher levels of schooling
or by reducing it to evening classes. This was found to be common
among teenagers finishing secondary education in public schools.
Given the duration of the crisis, interruptions in schooling are
likely to be permanent, therefore leaving a lasting negative impact
on the educational and skill levels of the population.
Women constitute the second group affected; their initially lower
involvement in the labor pool on which the household can rely
at a time of crisis. Although increased participation in paid
activities was typically observed among women without children,
mothers with male partners were the last family members to engage
in paid work and have remained at home to a relatively high degree
(34 percent in our sample)." Still, the large majority, that
is, 66 percent of the mothers with a male partner in the sample,
earned same income, two-thirds of them working in the informal
sector either continuously or sporadically and under the poor
working conditions associated with this sector. The other third
had jobs in the formal sector, but this was confined particularly
to middle-class women.
The importance of the informal sector for women's earnings was
therefore obvious and due to at least two reasons. First, it was
difficult for poor women to find employment with any degree of
job security. Second, women tended to prefer work that can be
done either in the home (as in the case of industrial homework)
or in the surrounding community in order to better integrate it
with reproductive activities. This preference, however, was highly
determined by the lack of alternatives to deal with child care
and domestic work because it confined their ability to earn an
income to these activities.
The increase in women's participation in paid work as a result
of the crisis in Mexico and elsewhere has also been pointed out
by other studies, which have also underlined the corresponding
reduction of time dedicated to domestic activities and leisure
and the intensification of their work (Oliveira 1988; Moser 1989;
Safa and Antrobus, this volume; Pérez-Alemán, this
volume; and Tripp, this volume). That this increase was found
to be smaller, at least in the Mexican case, among mothers with
a husband or a male partner is not surprising. There seemed to
be three main reasons for this. One was the prevalent division
of labor that assigned to the mother the primary task of child
care and domestic work, that is, the main responsibility for reproductive
activities. This division of labor, with the notion that the mother
should stay at home, particularly if children are small, is still
deeply ingrained in the Mexican family and reinforced by the lack
of day-care facilities. Related to this was the still rather prevalent
opposition of the husband or male companion to the mother's paid
work. This explains, for example, the case of some women who,
despite serious financial difficulties and their desire to earn
an income, were not in the paid labor force because the husband
"would be humiliated" or "would not let her work
outside of the home. Finally, women tend to be the least schooled
family members, a fact that makes them less able to find formal
employment requiring even a minimum of literacy skills.
A different labor-market strategy was found among those who worked
overtime or had more than one job. This normally involved the
more "established" workers in the formal sector as,
for example, nurses and carpenters and other construction workers.
For unskilled workers, the precariousness of employment conditions
made it difficult to find extra work in the formal market. On
the other hand, some skilled workers had become self-employed;
given the possibility to increase prices for their services, they
were among those who could cope best with the crisis.
A clear conclusion to be drawn from this information is that,
despite the effort at increasing the participation of diverse
family members in paid production, there remained a good proportion
of untapped labor that was underemployed or working at the margins,
including men and women of all ages that could not find a full-time
job and others looking for better job opportunities and working
conditions. One of the consequences of the crisis has been that
the absorption by the informal sector of this labor reserve has
taken place under increasingly deteriorating conditions (Roberts,
forthcoming). In addition, the debt crisis intensified the problem
of labor absorption, thereby further facilitating the process
of labor flexibilization, a very important component in Mexico's
modernization.
Budget Changes
It is probably no exaggeration to say that the austerity programs
altered the budgets of practically all Mexican households. Budget
adjustments gradually turned drastic for a large proportion of
the population. In our sample, 69.4 percent of the households
regularly bought less food, clothing, shoes, and other daily expenses
such as transportation, drinks, and snacks than during the pre-1982
period. What exactly had been cut, however, varied according to
household income and class background. Thus, although practically
all households had curtailed meat consumption, poor families had
eliminated it altogether from their diet. Similarly, the poor
had completely eliminated other products, such as canned foods
and a rather large number of fruits and basic foods, such as milk,
unless they were subsidized. Most poor households were no longer
buying new clothes and shoes nor could they afford to replace
any household equipment that, in some cases, had been sold for
cash.
Middle-class families had a thicker cushion to start with. Their
budget cuts concentrated primarily on nonessential goods such
as olives and wines, photography related expenses, gifts, domestic
service, clothing, trips, particularly trips abroad, and parties.
For many, this appeared as a shift down the social ladder that
for some households was a source of great anxiety.
For households under extreme poverty or at subsistence levels,
the pressure to concentrate on the most urgent needs implied a
continuous neglect of other expenses such as home upkeep. Unpainted
walls, unpaved floors, leaking roofs, and broken tables and chairs
were a common sight not just in the poorest homes but in others
that had regularly taken care of these tasks. We found several
homes with a variety of broken household items (refrigerators,
TV sets, washing machines, radios, mixers) that could not be used
because repairs were not affordable. As one mother with five school-age
children put it, "our priority is to buy the minimum of school
supplies that we can afford and to postpone repairs." This
implies that the infrastructure of households was deteriorating,
leading to an underestimation of the negative impact of the crisis.
Likewise, some households had sold their consumer durables and
had recurred to indebtedness as the only means to obtain urgently
needed cash.
Our data also suggest that the crisis has had an effect on fertility rates; 46.7 percent of the families in the sample had decided either to stop or to postpone having children during the 1982-1988 period. Perhaps as a result, and in comparison with the fieldwork carried out in 1981-1982, women were much more open to talk about birth control and family planning. Although it is difficult to sort out the effects of the crisis in this respect from those resulting from longer-term fertility trends, its connection with the economic crisis was often pointed out. Among poor women, the most common form of birth control was the operación or tying of the tubes, often performed under stress after a birth and, in same cases, without consultation with the husband or male companion.
The Restructuring of Daily life
Budget adjustments had generated many changes in the way households
organized themselves and lived their daily lives. The following
changes were typical among these readjustments.
Changes in Purchasing Habits. Close to 73 percent of the households
in our sample stated that they were shopping in cheaper markets,
most of them regularly. For poor families, this often meant buying
daily supplies from street vendors whose products tend to be of
lower quality than those in regular shops. The tightness of budgets
and the difficulties of storing food-such as with cases of unrepaired
refrigerators-also reinforced this tendency; in such cases only
small quantities can be bought at a time, therefore making shopping
a daily chore, with the corresponding intensification of time
spent on this aspect of domestic work. Among households that could
afford weekly shopping, trips to the large central market were
common in order to obtain better food at lower prices. Given the
size of Mexico City, these trips could be done only with a car
or by organizing several family members to help with the shopping,
usually on Saturdays; the latter required a planning effort that
only a few households could manage.
For middle-class families, the search for lower prices often
meant shopping in markets away from their neighborhoods. In some
cases, it also meant the coordination of shopping with other family
members, including the use of extended family networks. A young
middle-class woman who had married in 1985 explained, "my
aunts know where the bargains are; I see them and my mother more
than I ever did." In any case, the greater availability of
private transportation, and also of cash, for middle-class families
made it more possible for them to benefit from shopping in large
quantities and in the less expensive markets outside of their
communities.
Intensification of Domestic Work. The crisis had resulted in
an increase in the number and often length of activities that
make up domestic work- from daily shopping due to more restrictive
budgets, to the need for increased cleaning and tidying when spaces
are reduced, to more cooking, fixing, mending, and sewing at home.
Although all family members participate in these tasks, a large
proportion of this work fell upon women, regardless of whether
they were also working in the labor market or not. Thus, in 68.8
percent of the households in which the crisis had generated changes
in domestic work, it wes perceived that women's work had increased.
For some middle-class housewives, this was accompanied by a reduction
in domestic help, with the subsequent perception of isolation,
loss of social status, and downward social mobility. The intensification
of work for women was therefore a significant factor in their
daily life, an aspect still in need of quantification.
For working daughters, the pressure to participate in domestic
work had contributed to what seemed to be a rising consciousness
regarding a gender-based asymmetry in the division of labor, thus
creating new tensions between them and, in particular, their brothers.
Thus, in 53.1 percent of the households in which the crisis had
generated changes in domestic work, it was felt that daughters
had to help more. Older daughters in particular felt this burden
most intensely; even when they held a full time job, they were
expected to take a great deal of responsibility in the home-responsibility
not expected from their older brothers or fathers. In comparison
with their mothers, the daughters' higher level of skill made
them more likely candidates for the labor market and raised expectations
regarding their contribution to household income ("they expect
that I can solve all their problems"). This "oldest
daughter syndrome" resulted in a few bitter complaints by
some daughters, leading to "defensive" strategies on
their part, such as an early marriage or threats of migration.
In the case of households headed by women, the burden on the
mother (or grandmother) depended on the age and composition of
other family members: Although the burden could be heavy if children
were smell, it was alleviated when they, and particularly daughters,
were old enough to contribute some income and share responsibilities.
The absence of an adult male income in any case explains why all
women who headed a household in our sample were engaged in paid
work; the choice between work at home and work in the market was
even less possible in their case.
Changes in Social Life. A different type of adjustment resulted
from the need to save on transportation and other daily expenses.
Thus, almost 51 percent of the households in our sample had decreased
or eliminated trips to visit relatives and friends and attendance
at family parties and religious holidays. This applied to intracity
visits as well as to traditional annual or semiannual trips to
other parts of Mexico, such as for those associated with Christmas
and other religious holidays, vacations, and other family gatherings.
Recent immigrants to Mexico City complained bitterly of their
inability to return to their hometowns "as they were used
to before the crisis." Others pointed out that, as new immigrants
to Mexico City, they had not been able to fulfill the promises
of remittances to their aging parents and other family members.
For some sectors of the middle class, the curtailment of travel
abroad as an important reduction in their expenses represented
a drastic change in their living standards and also a source of
bitter complaints.
Social life had also been affected by the reduction or elimination
of expenses associated with parties and other social activities.
The traditional and important "fiesta" organized for
the fifteenth birthday of daughters in Mexico could no longer
be afforded by many families. In one neighborhood, at least one
of the churches had begun to organize parties to honor several
15-year-olds at the same time. This was, in fact, one of the few
coping mechanisms encountered that represented a semicollective
form of dealing with the crisis. Finally, the need to reduce expenses
had changed the way different household members organized leisure
time. For example, some parents of teenagers pointed out that,
on Sundays, they no longer went anywhere outside of their neighborhood
("weekend movies have been cut to a minimum") and preferred
to let their children go out.
THE PRIVATIZATION OF SURVIVAL
AND THE FAMILY
During the time of our fieldwork, the Mexico City daily El
Excelsior published an article emphasizing the role of the Mexican
family as the main pillar in the effort dealing with the crisis.
Our study confirms this thesis. The 'culture of ingenuity"
around which daily life was being organized for daily survival
was indeed centered in the family. There had been a major gathering
of forces at the household level together with a privatization
of the struggle; in the absence of a welfare state and in the
face of decreasing governmental services and subsidies, the family
had become the only source of support and of alternatives for
survival. Its role in this respect is best understood as being
facilitated by the traditionally close Mexican family ties; although
it may have parallels in other Latin American countries, it should
not be generalized to other culturally specific contexts.
An initial question in our research was to investigate the extent
to which some collective efforts had been developed, as had been
the case with Peru's comedores populares, or soup kitchen, and
with the olla común, or common pot, in Bolivia and Chile
(Sara-Lafosse 1986; Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart 1987). Despite
the fact that much collective organizing at other levels had developed
in Mexico City and elsewhere, the virtual absence of such efforts
at the level of daily life provided a sharp contrast. The private
household, therefore, had been left facing the crisis alone, with
some help received only from the extended family. However, given
the nuclear character of the urban household in Mexico City, this
help was found to be minimal-the most common in our sample being
the grandmother's help in domestic work and child care so as to
allow the mother to participate in paid work.
To be sure, this predominantly private struggle for survival
was devastating for the households that were disintegrating. However,
for the large majority, the gathering of forces and pooling of
resources represented a heroic effort, described by some of our
interviewees as resulting from greater family unity ("we
are more united now because we can't risk fighting among ourselves")
and ability to plan ("we have to plan everything and our
level of communication has increased"). No family member
could evade this effort, particularly in poor households. This
is not to say that tensions did not develop within the family
but that a conscious effort was made to avoid them in order to
deal with the most pressing issues.
Tensions in fact did develop because this unity and resourcefulness
came at a cost and the burden of survival was distributed unequally.
First, the continuous struggle of each household seemed to be
accompanied by mistrust and hostility toward outsiders. Thus,
interviewees often complained about the behavior of their neighbors
and community members ("They stole chickens from our backyard"
or "we cannot rely on them for help"). A question inquiring
about the extent to which the neighborhood organized around common
needs often was met with a smile and a sarcastic comment about
the absence of such an effort. Likewise, feelings of frustration
were often expressed as aggression toward outsiders ("when
I am upset, I don't want to take it out on my sister, so I push
people when I get on the bus").
Second, tensions resulted from the unequal distribution of the
burden of survival among family members. Although all household
members had to mobilize their effort as a result of the crisis,
women had been particularly affected due to their increased participation
in the labor market and the intensification of domestic work.
As shown above, this had affected women of all ages and had made
gender asymmetries within the household more visible.
In addition, the crisis did not visibly change previous inequalities
in income pooling and intrahousehold distribution of resources;
although this was not the focus of our research, we found no clear
change in previous patterns by which women's income is totally
used for household expenses while men's is pooled only partially
(Beneria and Roldán 1987). As in the earlier study, many
women received an allowance from their husbands or male companions,
often without knowing the men's total earnings. When the allowance
was viewed as very small, or when it was sporadic and uncertain,
it tended to be a source of bitterness and complaints. In households
at the verge of collapse, the burden on the mother tended to be
overwhelming; the usual problems of survival in these cases were
intensified by the tensions generated by domestic violence, inability
to meet the family's needs, and the awareness of sinking into
a world of despair.
In sum, the crisis intensified the contradictory forces within
the family. On the one hand, it was the only source of protection
for all members; there was nowhere else to turn. The family was
essential for survival, even for fun and social activity, for
warmth, love, and protection. The degree to which these functions
have been exercised in the midst of such difficulties is indeed
moving. The household represents the locus of this survival-realized
through the interdependency of its members. On the other hand,
this should not be perceived as a romanticization of the family;
the effort takes place within the context of a "forced"
unity, a patriarchal family structure and other existing tensions,
which are intensified by the sheer weight of the struggle as well
as from its unequal distribution among family members. As the
young married woman who reported seeing her mother and aunts more
often as a result of the crisis put it, this family unity resulted
out of need rather than out of choice (por necesidad más
que por gusto). Likewise, this should not be understood as an
"inevitable mechanical solidarity between members of poor
families" (Wolf 1990). Our sample suggests that, first, family
ties are being used by households across income categories and,
second, solidarity is different from the mutual dependency among
household members; it is the latter that gets intensified at a
time of crisis. This dependency might best be represented by a
model that includes ties of love and solidarity as well as bargaining,
tensions, and conflicts among family members. The fact that the
family might turn inward and behave aggressively toward outsiders
underlines the negative aspects of the family, as emphasized by
Barrett and McIotosh (1982) in The Anti-Social Family. However,
the picture emerging from this family dynamics is best captured
by a view of the family as contradictory and paradoxical.
Some family tensions generated by the crisis might be at the
root of future changes. For example, the pooling of work and income
and, in particular, the responsibilities taken on by women might
undermine some patriarchal privileges. As expressed by a man whose
relative contribution to household income had been declining while
that of his daughters and son increased, these changes might result
in his loss of authority ("they no longer pay attention to
me") and be at the root of bitter and unsuccessful complaints.
The outcome of those tensions will depend on a variety of factors,
including the length of the crisis.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS:
ADJUSTMENT, POLICIES, AND
TRANSFORMATIVE STRATEGIES
This chapter shows that the profound restructuring of the
Mexican economy resulting from the debt crisis and subsequent
SAP also forced the restructuring of daily life. The privatization
of the economy has a parallel in the privatization of survival,
which in Mexico City centered around the (mostly nuclear) household.
Although the cycle of social (and class) reproduction was indeed
shattered, most families have survived the crisis through a heroic
effort in which all members have participated through new combinations
of work for self-consumption and work for income. This increased
the involvement of different household members in market work,
but it also intensified work in reproductive activities, often
resulting in an unequal distribution of the burden within the
household. The irony of these "strategies" is that they
made possible the continuation of adjustment policies imposed
at enormous social costs.
Perhaps the most painful legacy of the past decade is that no
alternatives to the IMF-type policies of adjustment have emerged.
The Brady Plan of debt forgiveness and renegotiation might alleviate
the debt burden of a handful of countries but is unlikely to change
it significantly and to shift their development prospects. Even
if Mexico can overcome the most severe consequences of SAP and
embark on a new path of economic growth, the deterioration of
living standards of the 1980s will not disappear easily while
new SAP packages are being adopted in other countries. To be sure,
a series of alternative proposals have emerged that suggest other
adjustment paths aimed at overcoming the shortcomings of the orthodox
model (ECA 1989; ECLA 1990). Some of them include a gender dimension
as an integral part of the policies suggested (Commonwealth Secretariat
1990). How these general recommendations will be translated into
concrete policies and changes signaling the beginning of a truly
democratic and equitable development model remains the big challenge
of the 1990s.
In the meantime, what actions can be recommended at the level
of daily survival? What kind of "transformative strategies"
(Elson, this volume) are likely to help in the fierce struggle
under way for a large proportion of the population? A variety
of actions have emerged from different countries and others could
be recommended for the short run. The following are given as illustrations:
1. The implementation of national policies to counterbalance some of the most urgent problems generated by SAR The Ecuadorian government, for example, has initiated a program to set up open markets, collective kitchens, and neighborhood stores that would provide goods at relatively lower prices, thereby alleviating problems created by inflation (Lind 1990). Such a program could build on the various efforts that have already been initiated at the local level.
2. The setting up of policies to redistribute productive resources, such as expansion of credit programs of medium and small firms, creation of cooperatives, and self-help programs for peasants and small farms. Many of these policies can easily include a gender dimension specifically dealing with women.
3. A new set of tax policies to redistribute the burden of adjustment as part of a progressive tax reform.
4. An intensification of actions taken by political parties, unions, and other appropriate institutions that will exercise pressure toward establishing mechanisms to provide social services, such as child care, nutrition programs, health clinics, and training programs for different groups of workers.
5. The fostering of traditional self-help institutions and support mechanisms that, particularly in urban areas, might have been weakened by modernization, such as extended family networks and relations of compadrazgo (parent-godparent ties) that extend beyond the nuclear family.
6. The fostering of women's networks, many of which have begun or intensified their efforts to deal with crisis-related programs at the local and national levels.
Measures such as these will tend to alleviate the symptoms rather than deal with the roots of the debt problem. In the long run, they will only succeed if current trends in the flow of resources from the debtor to the creditor countries are reversed.
NOTES
This chapter has benefited from the work of a variety of people. I thank M. A. Díaz González for her research assistance and A. Bottum, E. Harber, and A. Lind for their help with computer work. My special thanks for W. Goldsmith, O. Hernández, and P. Olpadwala for their comments on the original draft.
1. As has been pointed out by other authors, the word "strategy" implies the possibility of choosing among alternatives. Yet, choices are very much reduced by the extreme scarcity of resources and precarious living conditions. In such cases, the expression "survival strategies" is therefore not very appropriate.
2. For more detail on these policies, see Benería 1991.
3. By 1982, this share represented 36 percent of GNP, down from 40 percent in 1987, and it declined further throughout the decade (Edel and Edel 1989).
4. The basket of 28 products was selected from a larger basket of 118 products or Canasta Obrera Básica (COB) considered to be basic for an adequate working class standard of living (Uno Más Uno, August 8, 1988).
5. The proportion of total income going to wages and salaries diminished from 42 percent in 1982 to less than 30 percent in 1987 (Lustig 1988).
6. Such is the case with the cities of Monterrey and Monclova in the northeast, which were rapidly affected negatively by the government's policies toward the steel industry, resulting in the loss of thousands of jobs, with their corresponding negative impact on the cities' economy.
7. Close to 50 percent of households were derived from an original list of 140 on which the 1981-1982 study had been based. This nonrandom sample included the first 27 households that were found living in the same address as in the first study. The rest were arrived at through a snowballing technique that included middle-class households for comparative purposes.
8. They concentrated in the following colonias: Palmitas, San Rafael, San Andrés de Atoto, Lázaro Cardenas, El Molinito, Moctezuma, Oriente, Candido Aguilar, Narvarte, Coyoacán, and Portales.
9. The tension was due to the fact that shops often run out of the subsidized product and those in line (overwhelmingly women) were fighting to be as close as possible to the head of the line.
14. By collective efforts I refer to community- and neighborhood-based strategies of dealing with the crisis, such as collective kitchens, which require an important organizing effort beyond the nuclear household.
11. This is a conclusion arrived at also by other observers (conversation with J. A. Alonso).
12. Some families survived literally with a few basic staples, namely, rice and beans, oil, tortillas, chiles, milk, and some inexpensive fruits. During fieldwork, we encountered anxious housewives worrying about how they would pay for the beans and rice that they needed for the day.
13. In her study of the effect of the crisis on households in Guayaquil, Ecuador, Moser makes a similar point and adds that this has a specific negative effect on the education of girls, given that they have less time to do homework than their brothers "causing them to fall in school and this in turn may affect their future educational potential" (Moser 1989:15).
14. One example is provided by the many groups that over the decade organized around housing and tenants' rights at the city level (symbolized by the popular figure of Superbarrio, who by 1988 had become a national figure). Similarly, other forms of organizing developed around food distribution and urban services issues at the community and neighborhood level (Ramirez 1986). Political mobilization intensified around issues connected with the crisis. Municipal election campaigns, for example, have been used to organize around basic needs and democratic rights. However, most of these efforts have been carried out at the political level, such as through political parties and numerous women's organizations, not at the level of daily life around the household, as has often been the case in other collective efforts in Latin America. During the past few years, however, many efforts have emerged, particularly among women's organizations, to organize collective projects around basic needs issues. I
15. Feminist analyses have criticized the concept of the household as a harmonious unit and have emphasized the need to focus on unequal gender relations and asymmetries within it (Beneria and Roldan 1987; Folbre 1988; Wolf 1990). However, much remains to be done to conceptualize the complexities of the contradictory nature of the family that is emphasized here. Amartya Sen´s theoretical insights into "cooperative conflicts" provide one of the most appropriate and useful models for capturing bargaining processes within the household (Sen 1990).
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