From the book: "The New Politics of Inequality
in Latin America"
Edited by Douglas A. Chalmers, Carlos M. Vilas, Katherine R. Hite,
Scott B. Martin
March 1997
ISBN: 0198781830
Oxford University Press
Targeting the Poor: The Politics of Social
Policy Reforms in Mexico
By Kerianne Piester
During the 1980s, economic crisis ant ensuing austerity and structural adjustment policies provoked a dramatic rise in poverty and inequality in Latin America.1 Despite the promise of renewed economic growth through marks reforms, few believed that such growth alone 0uld reduce poverty and inequality in the region. Fiscal constraints, the turn away from state interventionism, and the crisis of the welfare state motel, meant that Latin American governments had to find new ways to provide for the most basic needs of broad sectors of their population. Confronted with the urgency of reform, many governments in the region redefined their social welfare policies to emphasize poverty alleviation and create targeted programs that relied heavily on the increased involvement of the poor and other private actors.
Mexico has witnessed this redefinition of social policy first-hand. Faced with the dilemma of Learning' to do more with less' in order to resolve increasing social demands at a time of profound political changes, the governments of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-8) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) created social programs specifically designed to promote poor people's participation in the resolution of social problem. More than just promises to fight poverty, these targeted social programs have built ties between the state and a growing population of poor Mexicans.
The role these programs have played in establishing links between the state and the poor raises several questions: what links do these targeted social programs create between the state and the poor? Are these links distinct from traditional forms- both corporatist and clientelist? And if so, what form do they take? How effective are these "new" links in solving material needs and claims for citizen participation? And finally, do these links signify the emergence of a structure through which popular interests and demands are represented?
1 According to the World Bank, the percentage of the region's population living in poverty in creased from 16.8 per cent in 1980 to 23 per cent in 1989. 77leEc~ 11 Dec. 1993, p. 43.
The answers to these questions are critical to understanding the relationship between welfare restructuring, political change, and the representation of the popular sectors. One hypothesis which merits exploration is that-unevenly and with the possibility of reversal-a new mode of governance is emerging that places greater emphasis on the involvement, rather than the exclusion, of people in public policy decision-making and implementation. 2 Targeted social programs that stress community participation and the participation of other private actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) maybe an example of such an alternative governing strategy.
Whether targeted social programs in Mexico do, in fact, reflect a new mode of governance and whether this allows for effective popular representation in the social policy arena are the focus of this chapter. Particular consideration is given to the possibility that these programs are not producing new kinds of links between the state and the poor in Mexico, but rather are sustaining; the traditional clientelist and corporatist forms. Indeed, this chapter presents strong evidence that this result has occurred despite the government's stated objectives. There also is evidence, however, of new forms of linkage that allow the poor to interact with public officials without requiring the political loyalty the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI). Moreover, the participation of the poor in sonic instances goes beyond making demands to include participation in program management and project design. And, more recently, Mexican NGOs and the state have taken steps toward the formation of policy networks that minimally will open up policy discussions to societal-based actors, including the popular sectors. By examining the kinds of interaction that occur between state and societal actors, particularly through targeted social programs, the chapter seeks to provide an analysis of the process by which the state becomes embedded, or re-embedded, within socieq.3
The chapter begins with a discussion of the factors that resulted in a shift to a poverty alleviation strategy in Mexico during the 1980s. The crisis of the traditional mechanisms for representation and control, combined with new thinking on the part of state and societal actors, are viewed as producing new but limited opportunities for the popular sectors to bargain with state officials over the use and management of state social welfare resources. Focusing on targeted social programs created during the administrations of Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the chapter analyzes the links established and the outcomes achieved in reaching the targeted population and promoting their participation. This analysis is guided by the view that solutions to poverty and inequality are very likely to depend on strengthening the poor's capacity to make claims and influence social policy-making either through their own organizations or through alternative organizations such as NGOs that may provide a voice for popular interests. In other words, the state's capacity to achieve its public policy objective of poverty alleviation will depend on the level of organization and participation of the poor (Kohli 1987, Putnam 1993).
2 Current discussions of governance emphasize the necessity of coordination, cooperation, and connectedness between state and societal actors to formulate and cur, out effective polices. In the area of social policy see, among others, Atkinson and Coleman 1992, Hyden 1992, Malloy 1991b, and Nagel 1994.
3 While Peter Evans utilizes this tern to examine how state-labor relations shape industrial policy, it is extended here to look at social policy as an important arena where embedded ness occurs (see Evans 1995).
Mexico's Institutional Crisis and the Shift to Poverty
Alleviation
During the 1980s, various factors account for a shift in Mexican social policy toward an emphasis on poverty alleviation and the creation of targeted social programs for the poor. The debt crisis, austerity policies, and market reforms imposed severe costs on broad sectors of the population and profoundly undermined the living standards of the popular sectors. In this context, the question facing neoliberal reformers throughout the region concerned how to make economic restructuring politically feasible without abandoning fiscal discipline. Some governments responded to this dilemma-frequently owing to support from the World Bank- by targeting social assistance. For these governments, targeted social programs were viewed as the most effective instrument available to reduce the likelihood of mass mobilization against austerity and market reforms (Hausmann 1994, Nelson 1992). In Mexico, the creation of social programs to alleviate poverty was driven by these concerns which were intensified by the increasingly apparent crisis of the traditional institutions for representation and control.
Until the mid- 1960s, Mexico's networks of patronage based on corporatist organizations and local bosses successfully incorporated and processed the demands of social groups, including the growing urban popular and middle classes, through the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares (CNOP) the popular sector umbrella organization affiliated with the PRI. However, during the 1980s, there emerged mounting evidence of the erosion of these mechanisms which had guaranteed relatively stable one-party rule for more than fifty years. The PRI was encountering increasing political competition from opposition political parties on both the right and left which indicated that the corporatist organizations and local bosses were less capable of mobilizing support for the PRI.4 In addition to this sign of erosion, grassroots organizing around issues tike housing, health care, urban services, as well as the environment and women's issues to the creation of new popular organizations that were independent of the PRI and the state. From the point of view of popular sector activists and leaders, the traditional corporatist organizations were ineffective and only sought to control the popular sectors.
4 Increased political competition came first from the right opposition party, the PAN, at the state and Local levels in the mid-1980s and subsequently from the center- left party, the PRD, with the challenge mounted by Cárdenas in the 1988 presidential elections.
While corporatist organizations and local bosses have not disappeared, their ability to channel demands, secure control, and mobilize support for the PRI declined dramatically. Moreover, the fiscal constraints imposed by structural adjustment only served to exacerbate this 'crisis of representation' (Cornelius et al. 1989).
Nowhere was this institutional crisis more evident than in urban areas. Weakened by its heterogeneous composition, the National Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP) became more a structure for the domination, rather than the representation, of urban residents. This was particularly the case for the urban popular sectors which were poorly integrated and under-represented within the CNOI relative to the middle classes.5 The proliferation of autonomous urban popular organizations centered around land tenure, housing, and urban services demand highlighted the COP's inability to express the needs of the growing ranks of the urban poor or negotiate for their benefit.6 While initially the Mexican state combined tactics of repression and co-optation to address these popular organization the economic crisis during the 1980s made this position less tenable given the costs associated with the traditional practices of clientelism and co-optation and the declining legitimacy of the regime reflected in high rates of voter abstention in urban areas. By the late 1970s, independent popular organizations began to form coalitions to link popular urban struggles throughout Mexico and coordinate protests against the state's austerity policies (Prieto 1986: 75~94). Even though those I efforts did not result in the construction of a unified mass movement or sustained I popular mobilization, they did call the attention of state elites. As these elites became more aware of the crisis of traditional mechanisms, they sought new ways to build links with an increasingly independent society.
Another factor shaping the new poverty alleviation strategy was new thinking on the part of state and societal actors. Within the state, a new current of thinking among state officials, particularly hose within the federal social welfare agencies, criticized the traditional role of corporatist organizations in the distribution of social welfare benefits and services. These state officials concluded that technical criteria had to replace political criteria in the provision of these benefits and services and new ways needed to be developed to make social welfare provision more cost-effective (Ward 1993). With the onset of the economic crisis, Mexico's corporatist welfare state was criticized increasingly for its corruption, politicization, and incapacity to read~ the poorest sectors of the population in need of social assistance (Aspe and Sigmund 1984). In order to improve the cost-effectiveness and administration of social programs, some reform-minded state officials even advocated bypassing the corporatist organizations in favor of organizations independent of the state and the PRI-though how much political independence they were willing to risk remained a question. While it is difficult to measure how
5 On the failed incorporation of the urban poor within the CNOP, see M. Bassols (unpublished manuscript).
6 For a complete chronology of the Mexican urban popular movements, see Bennett 1992; Schteingart and Perl6 1984:105-25.
influential this current has become within policy-making arenas,
it certainly played a role in Shaping the design of new targeted
social programs.
This new thinking more reform officials was reinforced by ideas
recommending the involvement of the poor and NGOs in anti-poverty
project promoted by many international actors, including international
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter American
Development Bank, the Unite Nations, and international donors
and developed specialist. While these international actors were
not involved actively in Mexico's targeted social programs, their
ideas on community participation and poverty alleviation probably
influenced thinking on these issurs.7
This period also witnessed the rise of new ideas and practices
among the popular sectors and their allies, including NGOs in
Mexico. In addition to protest strategies, popular organizations
added more proactive strategies to their repertoire of collective
action. Working together with NGOs, these popular organizations
learned ways to resolve local problems through self-managed (autogestionarios)
projects. For these popular actors, access to public resources
facilitated the development of self managed projects in which
the poor of often exercised some control over their design, management,
and execution. According to Martha Schteingart, this practice
of self-management differs dramatically from traditional conceptions
of poor people's participation, whereby the poor only contribute
their labor and some resources, but lack a voice in decision-making
about the projects (Schteingart I 991: 113-28). While self managed
collective projects had been limited in Mexico, during the 1 980s
they grew in number with the shift to targeted programs and the
proliferation of non -governmental or organizations. Protest sod
mass mobilization still remained important strategies for gaining
access to state resources but marshaling information, debating,
and proposing projects -in other words, increasing proactivism-emerged
as important new strategies to be utilized by social actors.
When combined, these actors shifted social policy an emphasis on poverty alleviation. This new emphasis began to emerge during the administration of President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-8) with various targeting experiments focused primarily on poor urban neighborhoods. During this administration, the strategy included efforts to build links with independent popular organizations and even some non-governmental organizations by encouraging their participation in the implementation of targeted social programs. During the administration of President Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) poverty alleviation rapidly came to occupy a central place on the President's reform agenda. Through the National Solidarity Program (El Programa Nacional dc Solidaridad, PRONASOL), the government actively sought to reshape state-society relations by building new institutional links.
7 One explanation for the relative absence of NGOs from targeted social programs in Mexico compared with similar programs, in other countries is the lack of involvement by international actors promoting ____ even conditioning their financial support on-NGO participation.
Targeting during the Miguel de la Madrid Administration.
As part of an emerging strategy to confront the economic crisis, particularly the problems of inflation and the public deficit, the government of President De la Madrid drastically reduced social spending, cutting the education and health-care budgets and eliminating or diminishing subsidies for basic products and public services. The magnitude of the reduction is reflected in the social spending data. In 1981, social spending represented 17.2 per cent of total spending; by 1987, that figure had declined to 9.2 per cent (Carrasco and Provencio 1988: 9-7). Less visible, though, were the reforms in social policy introduced during the crisis to compensate for declining social spending and deteriorating living standards.
In the areas of basic foods, housing, and service sectors such as health care, new programs were created and some existing programs were reorganized to target subsidies and services to the poorest sectors of the population.8 'Two social programs, the Popular Housing Fund (FONHAPO) and the National Food Distribution Program to Popular Urban Zones (PAZPU), are important examples of targeting experiments. The analysis of these programs highlights that a few independent popular organizations did gain access to public resources to develop self-managed projects in areas where there had been a history of independent popular organizing at the community level. Support from reform-minded officials within state agencies was a necessary condition for providing this opening. However, the analysis suggests that opening from above frequently generated tensions below, particularly among independent popular organizations, concerning how to respond to state overtures. Many popular organizations feared losing their autonomy through targeted programs.
THE POPULAR HOUSING FUND (FONDO DE HABITACIONES POPULARES-
FONHAPO)
Created in 1981 to finance low-income housing for citizens ineligible for support from other public housing institutions, the Popular Housing Fund (FONHAPO) introduced important innovations in public housing policy. Breaking with the existing system of assigning credits to individuals for finished public housing, FONHAPO adopted a system of collective credits to allow groups of individuals with less than a family income of double the minimum wage to develop housing projects themselves. State officials recognized that the traditional system of assigning credits to individuals through the corporatist organizations had led to inefficiencies and corruption. FONHAPO's objective of assigning collective credits to
8In terms of income level, individuals without salaried employment or families that earned less than twice the minimum wage were the sector of the population most often designated to receive targeted benefits and services through these programs.
Organized beneficiaries-housing cooperatives or legally constituted organizations of solicitantes de vivienda-outside the corporatist institutions was meant to promote community participation and preclude the kind of clientelistic relations that plagued other housing institutions (Casanueva and Diaz l991 198).
In addition to this objective, the Fund was designed to provide amore integrated solution to the housing needs of poorer communities by providing credits to support the various stages of low-income housing development. FONHAPO credits allowed for the purchase of land with public services, the purchase of building materials to make improvement on existing housing or for self-built new housing, and to cover the costs of technical assistance (Casanueva and Diaz 1991:197-9). As will be discussed further below, the success of the Fund in achieving its objectives has been limited. In the case of FONHAPO, programmatic outcomes, particularly reaching the targeted population, have depended on the type of organization that in practice received the credits.
Before evaluating how the Fund performed, it is important to recognize why these innovations were introduced into the Fund. During the 1970s, the escalation of sociopolitical conflicts centered around housing and urban services problems led to the formation of urban popular organizations and the emergence of urban popular movements. In response to increasing urban conflict, FONHAPO was created to channel the housing demands of the urban popular movements in the hopes of reducing these conflicts (Ramirez 1992: 174, 175).
In addition, many of FONHAPO's innovations in the area of low-income public housing are associated with the emergence of a housing cooperative movement in Mexico in the late 1970s. Seeking to develop an alternative to the anarchy associated with self-built housing, NGO´s working on housing issues established housing cooperatives as a way to involve collectively low-income, often non-salaried workers in the resolution of their housing needs (Romero 1986: 371-407). These NGC´s sought some recognition and support from the state for housing projects managed by poor Mexicans that did not have access to existing public programs (Connolly 1993: 72-7; Romero 1986). State officials instrumental in the creation of FONHAPO had worked with these cooperatives while in other housing institutions, particularly INDECO, the National Institute for Community and Popular Housing Development, and learned from their experiences. These officials recognized that the state was unable to provide for the enormous housing needs of this sector of the population, but rather could offer some financial support for beneficiary organizations to construct their own self-built housing.
By supporting the participation of the beneficiaries in developing their own housing projects with the assistance of non-governmental organizations, FONHAPO represented a more cost-effective way to increase the production and improvement of low-income housing. The state embraced the idea of promoting self-constructed housing by individuals and cooperatives through FONHAPO programs that provided sites with public services, construction materials, and remuneration for technical assistance from housing NGOs. Yet, despite the commitm0t of state officials to popular participation in this policy area, in practice FONHAPO has had limited success in achieving its objectives.
In its first year of operation, the Fund failed to reach the target population, nor was it able to promote community participation or housing cooperatives. In 1981-2, most FONHAPO credits were granted to the state housing institutes established to decentralize the Fund's administrative structure. These state housing institutes often fall under the control of state governors who had little interest in promoting housing projects developed by independent community organizations or housing cooperatives. According to FONHAPO, 80 per cent of the credits for this period were assigned through state housing institutes. Of the total credits assigned, 73 per cent were assigned to families with incomes greater than 1.5 times the minimum wage, and of this total, 45.2 per cent went to families with an income of more than two times the minimum wage. Moreover, the data shows that state governors preferred to promote finished housing projects through private housing contractors over projects that involved self-built housing; groups affiliated with the PRI over these affiliated with the opposition or that were independent; and beneficiaries with two times the minimum wage over those with no fixed income (Aldrete-Haas 1991:126).
Since the first year of FONHAPO s operation coincided with elections, PRI state governors demanded access to credits, utilizing them to obtain electoral support by offering to provide housing, or the promise of housing, to segments of the electorate, The governors controlling the state housing institutes did not apply the technical criteria for selecting beneficiaries established by FONHAPO officials in Mexico City. Rather than defining a new relationship with the popular sectors, provision of FONHAPO credits at the state level reinforced patron-client relations in which access to public resources was exchanged for political support for the PRI.9 Due to the absence of democracy at the local level-or even political competition- the decentralization of the Fund did not provide for more pluralistic access to state resources.'° Despite these initial failures, the capacity of FONHPO to achieve its objectives improved with the arrival of a new director willing to recognize and support the autonomous organization of program beneficiaries.
In 1983, with the arrival of a new administration, FONHAPO was reorganized to create a new subdepartment for social promotion to support the incorporation and formation of housing cooperatives and independent popular organizations and to assure their participation in the development and implementation of housing projects (Aldrete-Haas 1991: 13-1). The new administration was more willing to encourage and support the formation of housing cooperatives and to
9 For a detailed discussion of the traditional form of clientelism associated with the urban popular classes, see Cornelius 1975, Jorge Montano 1976, and Eckstein 1977.
10 Decentralization was a major initiative of the De la Madrid administration, including existing social welfare programs in health care and education and new programs. Decentralization often led to conflicts among state actors that negatively affected the implementation of these social programs. For a more complete discussion of decentralization, see Torres 198S, Gonzalez 1991: 67-90; Rodriguez 1 992: 1 27-44
grant some credits to independent popular organizations. While the state conditioned access to the fund on there registration of popular organizations as civil associations or on their constitution, as housing cooperatives, it did not formally require affiliation with the PRI or a PRI-affiliated Organization. In practice, independent popular organizations, primarily those located in Mexico City which had greater central agency, were able to negotiate for housing credits with FONHAPO officials. In 1983, 23 per cent of the families that received credits earned between 0.75 and one times the minimum wage. The percentage of credits that went to independent popular groups increased from 7.8 per cent to 16.4 per cent with 1' per cent of this total granted to housing cooperatives (Aldrete-Haas 1991: 132).
Why were Fund officials willing to reach the targeted population by granting credits to independent popular organizations? The answer concerns the relationship between several FONHAPO officials and individuals active in housing NGOs. The director of the Fund during the mid- 1930s, Enrique Ortiz, worked in COPEVI (Centro Operational de Vivienda y Poblamiento, AC), a Mexican housing NGO that pioneered the formation of housing cooperatives during the 1970s.11 Under Ortiz's direction, FONHAPO supported more housing cooperatives and independent popular organizations than at any other time. In addiction, a housing NGO was contracted by the Fund to train its personnel to work more cooperatively with the target population (Connolly 1993: 74). For those popular organizations that were able to obtain credits, the Fund provided technical support for self-managed housing projects Yet, despite these developments within the Fund, independent popular organizations and housing cooperatives were only able to capture a smell percentage of the credits.
According to FONHAPO sources, from 1981 to 1986, 48 per cent of the credits were distributed to the social sector rather than state housing institutes. Of those credits, 34 per cent went to groups formally affiliated with the PRI, one credit went to groups associated with the opposition, and the rest went to groups without any political affiliation. Moreover, the value in terms of pesos assigned to PRI affiliated groups represented 70 per cent of the total invested in the social sector (Aldrete-Hass 1991: 136). While many independent groups applied for housing credits, only a small percentage received them. Pressure from governors for credits and intra-bureaucratic conflicts within FONHAPO between officials in social development and finance resulted in the majority of credits assigned to either state institutes or PRI-affiliated organizations (Aldrete-Hass 1991:132,133). The only exception was the Housing Renovation Program (E5l Programa de Renovación Habitacional) created to rebuild housing destroyed or damaged by the earthquakes which struck Mexico City en 19 September 1985.
The Housing Renovation Program received 80 per cent of its financing from FONHAPO to provide support for new housing or to repair damaged housing for
11 This point was brought to my attention during an interview with a member of the housing NGO, CENVI (Centro de Vivienda y Estudios Urbanos, AC), 3 May 1993, Mexico City.
families earning less than two times the minimum wage or for those that worked in the informal economy. Following a period of significant conflict with the De la Madrid government and increasing independent popular mobilization, the program was opened to the participation of various independent popular organizations. Following the earthquake, many popular neighborhood organizations united to form a common front, the CUD, to protest the government's initial response.12 The domestic and international attention received by the damnificados disposed the government to negotiate with the movement of damnificados and resulted in the signing of the Convenio de Concertaci6n Democrática para la Reconstrucción de Vivienda de Programa de Renovación. Despite this success, independent popular organizations were not able to secure through FONHAPO continued support for their self-managed projects during the Salinas administration. The success of this program in terms of coverage and access for independent popular organizations depended on the ability of those that needed housing to bring pressure on the state.
THE NATIONAL FOOD DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM TO URBAN POPULAR
ZONES (PAZPU)
The policy of providing low-cost basic food to the urban poor experienced similar changes to those introduced in the area of low-income housing. In 1982, DICONSA, the agency responsible for guaranteeing the distribution of subsidized basic food products, was restructured and the National Food Distribution Program to Urban Popular Zones (Programa National de Abasto a Las Zonas Populares Urbanas-PAZPU) was created. Through this program, DICONSA administrators attempted to target more effectively food subsidies to poor urban residents by .establishing CONASUPO food stores in marginal popular neighborhoods (colonias populares) (Appendini 1992). As in low-income housing, achieving effective targeting of limited state resources was attempted by increasing community participation in the administration of the program.
With the new program for subsidized food distribution, the state set out to establish new CONASUPO stores, referred to as CEPACs (Centros Populares de Abasto, CONSUPO), administered by committees of residents of popular neighborhoods. The committees were to provide sufficient space to install a store and assume responsibility for its administration. The program granted credits for the purchase of equipment and a commission for the management of the stores.13 Based on the idea of coparticipation by the state and the beneficiaries, this program encouraged communities to organize to obtain a store and manage the distribution of subsidized food products.
12 See Marvan and Cuevas 1987: 111-40, for a complete description of the formation of the CUI \ (Cordinadora de Tlaltelolco a la Cordinadora Unica de Damnificados), its demonstrations and the process of negotiations between the CUD and the government.
13. The description of the way in which those stores were meant to function suggest that they we conceive of as food cooperatives(see Appendini 1992: 186, 187).
Similar to the case of FONHAPO, some independent popular organizations managed these community stores. According to a study carried out by Carlos Hoyos, by 1990 three different types of stores (CEPACs) operated in Mexico City: ( I ) those promoted by independent popular organizations, representing 30 per cent of the total; (2) those promoted by organizations or individuals affiliated with the PRI or by the city delegations, representing 50 per cent of the total; and ( 3 ) those promoted by individuals with no organizational base or affiliation, representing 20 per cent of the total (Coulomb and Sánchez 1992: 178,179). Among the stores promoted by independent popular organizations, the evidence reveals a generally high level of community participation in the store's administration. In addition, several of these popular organizations received assistance, both technical and financial, from non-governmental organizations.14 Among the other types of stores, the urban poor were unable to gain a voice in the management of the stores, nor were they able to make demands regarding the De la Madrid government's low-income food policies. The type of committee managing the store, therefore, strongly influenced the level of community participation the state's capacity to reach the targeted population, and whether or not it served as an effective channel for popular concerns about food issues.
As the government moved to more selective forms of subsidy end even to eliminate subsidies for many products in 1985 and 1986, urban popular organizations mobilized to defend subsidies and to protest the political manipulation of subsidies. In 1986, the government began to distribute coupons, called tortibonos, to families with an income equal to or less than two times the minimum wage for subsidized tortillas from different centers for basic food distribution, including the CEPACs (Appendini 1992: 199). Through their management of basic food stores, same independent popular organizations established control over the assignment of these coupons, providing them with a valuable resource. The enormous demand for this subsidy by an increasingly impoverished urban population led the De la Madrid administration to negotiate agreements (convenios) to provide other autonomous popular organizations with access to these coupons (Coulomb and Sanchez 1992: 180). While access by popular organizations to the assignment of these coupons did not signify an end to the clientelistic distribution of this subsidy, it did indicate an important, though limited, shift away from this form of management of social benefits.
Similar to the low-income housing arena, non-governmental organizations also emerged and grew in this ores of social policy during the 1980s.Thoughtheywerc not as influential as the housing NGOs, the NGOs concerned with food issues were significant in terms of the assistance they offered to popular organizations. Beyond offering technical and educational assistance, they acquired international financial assistance for projects which they jointly sponsored with urban popular.
14 For example, El Movimiento Popular de Pueblos y Colonias del Sur located in Mexico city worked with the NGO Enlace, Comunicación y Capacitación, AC, to establish and administer several stores in popular neighborhoods in the southern pan of Mexico City.
organizations 15 In addition to the various forms of assistance provided, several NGOs concerned with popular food Issues brought to get her popular organizations and groups to demand changes in the state's food policies (Coulomb and Sánchez 1992: 183-ó).
As the analysis of both programs illustrates, innovations were introduced in the areas of low-income housing and subsidized basic foods by state officials confronted with the necessity of 'doing more with less' Measures adopted to target soda~ benefits to the urban poor opened up opportunities for the participation of independent popular organizations willing to negotiate with the state. Institutional openings, however, depended heavily on the support of reform-minded state administrators and the capacity of independent popular organizations to pressure the state and demonstrate their capacity to develop cost-effective projects. In many cases, the development of such projects was facilitated by non-governmental organizations that offered technical and organizational assistance. In both programs, targeting was more effective when carried out through independent popular organizations.
Overall however, the capacity of independent popular organizations to obtain and manage state resources and projects was limited. Proximity to state reformers mattered; independent popular organizations in Mexico City were more successful at negotiating their participation in programs than elsewhere due to the growing political competition the PRI faced within Mexico City. In addition, the sociopolitical contexts in which those programs were implemented made a difference. The change in the political context after 1988 with the creation of the center-le* party, the PRD, following the successful electoral challenge Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas posed to PRI hegemony, also affected policy. Beyond subsequent reductions in subsidies during the administration of Carlos Salinas, the tendency to eliminate intermediaries, particularly independent popular organizations, from the distribution of the remaining subsidies for low-income housing and subsidized food suggests the vulnerability of these types of targeted programs to political manipulation. Yet, despite the imposition of a series of anti-popular policies, some social welfare reforms adopted by the De la Madrid government opened channels for the urban poor to participate through their own organizations without affiliating with the PRI.
Targeting During the Salinas Administration: The National
Solidarity Program (PRONASOL)
Throughout the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, poverty alleviation occupied a central place on the national agenda and community participation
15 Servicio de Desarrollo y Paz(SFDEPAC), Enlace y Capacitación, Equipo Pueblo, Centro de Estudios Ecumenicos, and Instituto Maya are among the NGOs that work in this area to develop basic foods projects, popular kitchens, and breakfasts for children (see Coulomb and Sanchez 1992: 183-6)
became an integral element of the state's social policy through the President's National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL).After taking office on 1 December 1988, Salinas aimed to re-establish the state's commitment to social justice and build popular support for his reform initiatives. At the national level, social policy was redefined to address the dramatic rise in poverty in Mexico. Salinas declared that the state's new social welfare role was to combat poverty and devote the productive capacities of the impoverished sectors of the population (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social l993: 4). No longer envisioned as solely the responsibility of the state, social welfare prevision was envisioned as the shared responsibility of the state and society. In this new conception of the state's social welfare role, a solidaristic state that works with and assists the poor in the resolution of their needs replaces a paternalistic state16. According to Salinas, this requires a transformation in the way the state assigned public resources and designated the beneficiaries of social policy.
The National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL), initiated at the beginning of Salinas's sexenio (1988-94), became the vehicle to carry out this new vision of Mexican social policy and was meant to built a new relationship between the Mexican state and society. Four new principles of social welfare provision were established to guide PRONASOL: ( 1 ) respect for local initiatives and community organizations; (2) participation of the community in all aspects of project design ant management; (3) cooperation between federal, local, and community-based actors; and t4) transparency in the use of resources (Consejo Consultivo del Programa Nacional de Solidaridad 1991: 30-1). In terms of its design, PRONASOL represented more than just another targeted social program, since it proposed not only 'doing more with less but a 'new way of doing things' The implementation of the program reveals a more complicated picture.
ORIGIN OF THE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM (PRONASOL'
According to Denise Dresser and others, PRONASOL emerged to overcome the dilemmas of governability' facing the Salinas administration following the 1988 presidential elections (Dresser 1992: 49-57; Cornelius et al 1994). More than the erosion of urban popular support for the PRI, these elections reveled the electoral force of a new opposition movement (Frente Democrático Nacional, F.DN) led by, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. While these elections wore marred by fraud, the doctoral results nevertheless reflected the capacity of a center-left political movement to capture the support of the urban popular sectors (Guillén 1989:243 64). Initially, therefore, one of the purposes of PRONA.SOL funds was to prevent an alliance from forming between the new center-left party, the P~D, and the urban popular
16 Salina's own words upon assuming the presidency reflect this aim. 'EI bienestar social en el Estado moderno no se indentifica con el paternalismo, que suplanta esfuerzos e inhibe el carácter. Hoy la elevación del nivel de vida sólo podrá ser de la acción responsable y mutuamente compartida del Estado (see quote Consejo Consultivo del Programa Nacional de Solidaridad 1991).
organizations, and the popular sector generally. The data reveal that the allocation of PRONASOL funds tended to support this thesis.
According to one study of PRONASOL allocation decisions during 1990, more funds were allocated to states with a combination of high levels of support for the FDN in 1988 and local elections scheduled for 1991 than to states with the poorest populations (Molinar and Weldon 1994). In addition to determining where funds were allocated, political criteria rather than technical criteria on poverty influenced how funds were distributed. During the first two yeas of the program, PRONASOL funds were primarily distributed through pre-existing organizations. PRONASOL officials negotiated agreements-convenios de concertación-with several urban popular movements over access to PRONASOL funds. Among the many agreements signed, the one negotiated with the Comité de Defensa Popular General Francisco Villa de Durango (CDP) received particular attention because it coincided with the CDP's decision to form a state-level political party (PT) rather than join the PRD (Haber 1990). This led to speculation that access to PRONASOL funds for urban popular movements had become conditioned on these movements' willingness to distance themselves from the PRD.
While negotiations with some urban popular organizations provided them with access to PRONASOL funds, the majority of these funds were distributed through the existing corporatist organizations of the PRI.17 This combination of support for several important urban popular organizations and the existing corporatist organizations was highlighted to explain the electoral recovery of the PRI in the mid-term elections of 1991. Yet, by the end of Salinas's administration, PRONASOL was increasingly criticized as a failure with the emergence in 1994 of the Zapatista armed popular movement in the state of Chiapas. The program's association with these divergent political outcomes suggests that its political impact may vary significantly depending on its implementation at the grassroots.
PROGRAM RHETORIC VS. REALITY
Beginning in 1992, the new emphasis on the distribution of PRONASOL funds through state and municipal governments to solidarity committees (comités de solidaridad) raised the possibility that the intention of the Salinas administration was more than defensive and involved forging new links between the state and the poor through the institutionalization of a new grassroots structure of participation. The creation of this grassroots structure for demand-based projects distinguishes PRONASOL from the previously analyzed targeted programs in this chapter in several ways.
One of the stated objectives of the solidarity committee is to provide a space where
17 In 1990, the CNOP of Durango received 75 per cent of the PRONASOL funds allocated for that state. In Oaxaca, the Confederation National Campesina Mexico (CNC) received 60 per cent of the funds (see Moguel 1992: 285).
state and municipal authorities work with beneficiaries to define, manage, and execute social welfare and public works projects. This coordination is meant to be guaranteed and promoted at the local level by a PRONASOL official, the delegado, who occupies an intermediate position within the program's organization at structure. At the national level, the Commission of the National Solidarity Program assisted by an Advisory Board (consejo Consultivo) defines PRONASOL objectives and strategies and the Ministry of Social Developed (SEDESOL) more generally manages the state's social welfare responsibilities. In this new structure though allocation decisions of PRONASOL funds remain centrally controlled, PRONASOL was set up to perform as a decentralized structure in which decisions over project development ware designed to occur at the grassroots. Conceived as a mechanism for both the representation and participation of the poor, the solidarity committee occupied an important place within this new social welfare framework for the alleviation of poverty.
While these committees are supposed to established democratically by direct vote of the beneficiaries, existing committees vary in terms of their origin and democratic practices. In reality, four types of committees wore created (1) committees organized by the members of the community, arising where no previous organization existed; (2) committees organized by municipal presidents; (3) committees organized by existing corporatist organizations such as the CNOP or the CTM (Confederación de Trabajadores de México) affiliated with the PRI; and (4) committees organized by pro-existing independent popular organizations.18 These distinctions are important among the committees because they strongly influence community participation, representation, and the likelihood that resources reach the target population.
In committees organized by PRI municipal presidents, for example, committee presidents are often selected, not detected, and community participation tends to be limited to the beneficiaries contributing their labor and some material resources. Where the solidarity committees have been superimposed on already existing organizations, the presence of democratic practices and the nature of community participation depends on the pre-exiting organization. In the ease of committees organized by corporatist organizations, clientelistic practices seem to predominate and the poor fell to obtain a voice in setting community priorities or selection of projects. Since the rules for establishing these committees are established by the state, it is difficult to view any of these committees as fully autonomous. For independent popular organizations, the requirement of participation in PRONASOL programs through a solidarity committee has been a dilemma. By meeting this organizational condition (i.e. joining or establishing a committee) these organization risk losing both their identity and their political autonomy. However, by deciding not to meet this condition, they lose access to critical public resources
Another significant aspect of the program's development has been the absence
18 See Méndez et al. 1992:60 72 for a similar typology.
-some would say he exclusion- of NGQs from its organizational structure. In contrast with other anti-poverty programs in Latin America, NGOs have not played a significant role m PRONASOL's strategy for combating poverty. The PRONASOL regional delegates serve as a kind of intermediary in the way that NGOs increasingly do in anti-poverty programs in other countries. Yet, given the politicization of the program, it seems unlikely that they act as a voice for popular concerns. Further research on intervention of these program officials locally and their incentive structure would help assess their impact on community organization and participation.
This brief analysis of PRONASOL's organizational structure reveals that PRONASOL does not represent a clear break with traditional patterns of representation and control in Mexico. While the objective of PRONASOL has been to institutionalize new links for demand-making by the poor and their participation in ether aspects of project development, the imposition of the solidarity committees as a condition of participation has sustained in some places,-such as Chispas, traditional corporatist controls. However, in a few cases, where committees w"e formed by existing independent community organizations, PRONASOL appears to signify a way to strengthen these organizations and provide them with a channel for demand-making. PRONASOL representatives can foster this process, but again this is likely to depend on whether the incentives they face encourage enhancing program coverage, political stability, or support for the PRI. The f ct that several delegates were PRI candidates for state governors suggests how these state officials may utilize the program's funds to build territorially based political machines in support of the PRI. PRONASOL does exhibit some corporatist features, such as the structuring of organizations by the state. However, it seems problematic to conclude that PRONASOL reinforces a corporatist system of interest representation.19 Solidarity committees tend to represent territorially rather than functionally bused interests and to date the state has not succeeded in organizing them into a few corporatist bodies at the national level.
Through the pronasolization of social policy, the Salinas administration placed limits on pluralistic access in some areas of social welfare provision where independent popular organizations had made inroads during the De la Madrid administration (Moyao 1991: 1). For example, this is evident in the area of low-income housing where several of the activities performed by FONHAPO have been taken over and transformed by PRONASOL. Under Salinas, public investment in FONHAPO decreased dramatically from 4.9 per cent in 1990 to 1.5 per cent in 1992 (La Jornada, 12 December 1993, pp. 16, 44). This drop eliminated some of FONHAPO's credit programs, including those for the purchase of sites with services and for technical assistance by NGOs, as well as a reduction in subsidized credits. In addition, FONHAPO credits for self-administration by popular organizations disappeared almost entirely and several credit contracts with independent
19 For an alternative point of view see Ramírez 1992:171-94.
popular organizations were suspended (Guillermo 1990). Replacing
the practice of granting collective housing credits to popular
organizations, the Salinas administration individualized credits
for self-constructed housing and housing improvements through
PRONASOL´s credito la palabra (Ramírez 1992: 183).
For independent popular organizations, the crisis of FONHAPO accompanied
by the move to individualize credits through PRONASOL eliminates
access to public financing for self-managed housing projects.
The move to individualize the distribution of social benefits is also evident in the area of subsidized foods policy. In 1990, CONASUPO moved to individualize the distribution of the tortilla subsidy by granting magnetic cards to qualified citizens. This was a move to replace the distribution of the subsidy through organizations, including independent popular organizations. This change indicated the elimination of control over basic food subsidies by independent popular organizations and contributed to the demobilization of collective efforts, such u the Pact Against Hunger (Pacto Contra el Hambre), to influence the government's subsidized foods policy (Coulomb and Sánchez 1992: 181, 182).
Given the changes in targeted social programs in these two policy areas, it appears that independent popular organizations and non-governmental organizations encountered a less favorable environment during the Salinas administration than the De la Madrid administration. Faced with increased political pressures, the Salinas government tried to limit the gains of the center-left opposition party, the PRD, by building new links with the poor through PRONASOL Yet, in many cases PRONASOL did not establish 'a new way of doing things because the traditional corporatist organizations and local bosses were able-without interference from the PRONASOL delegate-to derail the process, capturing control over the solidarity committees. As a result, even though the government emphasized its commitment to fighting poverty through targeted social welfare projects that promoted the participation of poor communities, it was unable to accomplish this objective. In a few cases, though, prior independent organizing of the poor was a variable explaining the achievement of same of the program's objectives in same places.
State-NGO Relations and Popular Representation
As noted above, anti-poverty programs in most other Latin American countries encouraged the participation of NGOs in program design and project implementation. Mexican NGOs, however, were notably absent from participation in PRONASOL (Graham 1994). While their absence seems surprising given PRONASOL´s objective of promoting local community participation it reflects the antagonism and mistrust present in state-NGO relations. Cooperation between the state and NGOs was minimal during the Salinas administration due to the hostility in state-NGO relations. Provoked by changes in the fiscal laws regulating NGOs which allowed the state to treat NGOs as private profit-making corporations, NGOs mistrusted the Salinas government. Despite this mistrust, recent developments within the state and the NGO community suggest the possibility of greater cooperation in the future.
There are some indications of movement in the direction of greater state-NGO interaction. Rather than retreating from the state, NGOs increasingly have sought to engage the state in novel ways to bring about changes in public policy. This has not involved building a mass opposition movement-which NGOs lack the capacity to do even if they wanted to-but by organizing among themselves through the creation of networks (redes). During the 1990s, more than a dozen national, multi-sectoral networks were formed among Mexican NGOs and in some cases include popular sector actors (i.e. independent unions, popular neighborhood organizations, etc.). Similar to the national coordinating bodies referred to as consortia in other countries, these networks are facilitating the exchange of ideas and information among NGOs and the development of a practice of public policy advocacy.
While initially forming networks for defensive purposes, in particular to change the fiscal laws regulating NGOs like for-profit corporations, Mexican NGOs increasingly are engaged in activities to shape public policies. By providing an array of new services to NGOs as well as the popular sector actors, these networks hope to encourage the participation of an array of societal actors in public policy debates and decision-making. For example, the network organizations organize fora and campaigns on policy issues, provide information, formulate alternative public policies, establish ties with state officials and legislators of various political parties, ant even hold plebiscites to mobilize public opinion. Some, though not all, of these activities, suggest the possibility of the emergence of even broader networks that involve interaction between state and societal actors focused on specific policy issues.
The formation of policy or issue networks is not only being driven by the actions of NGOs, but most recently the state has also sought improved interaction with NGOs. State officials in the social ministries have organized meetings with NGOs, created a program to fund them, and under the new administration of President Ernesto Zedillo committed themselves to building a new framework to facilitate more coordinated interaction between the state and NGOs. 20 For a variety of reasons, including the current economic crisis, it seems likely that movement in the direction of increased interaction will continue.
If this trend toward increased state-NGO interaction does continue, what is it likely to mean for popular representation? It is clearly somewhat problematic to view NGOs as representatives in the strict sense of possessing some authority
20 In the spring of 1995, the Zedillo government consulted seven~ NGO networks on the National Development Plan. As a result of these consultations, the new Plan recognized the need to change the fiscal laws regulating NGOs and to promote the participation of NGOs in the formulation, execution and evaluation of public policies.
to speak for the popular sectors. Some scholars are concerned that NGOs tend to marginalize the popular sectors even further from decision-making (Arellano-López and Petras 1994). However, NGOs do offer the possibility of providing some voice for popular concerns at the national level as non-profit organizations do in many other countries, particularly where the political parties are unable to effectively perform this representational role. Moreover, as the descriptions of housing and food policy described here suggest, Mexican NGOs provide resources and training that help popular actors like neighborhood organizations develop the capabilities to play more proactive roles in the implementation, and even formulation, of social policies. The recent experience of Civic Alliance, an NGO originally formed to monitor the electoral process, which provided its expertise to hold ~ plebiscite in order to mobilize public opinion behind the peace process in Chiapas, illustrates how NGOs serve the popular sectors at the national as well as international level.
Conclusion: Toward an Alternative Pattern of Popular Representation in Mexico?
Analyses of targeted social programs like those discussed in this chapter tend to focus on their populist features, often missing or underplaying the processes of institution building that accompany these programs. In fact, some analyses view targeted social programs as contributing to the breakdown of institutional ties between state and society (Roberts 1995). In this chapter, the analyses of targeted social programs in Mexico show that links have been forged between the state and the poor through these programs Frequently, the links forged worked against achieving even the limited, though still important, objective of reaching the targeted population with benefits and/or services and tended to sustain more traditional forms of control and domination. However, in a few instances, new links wore built with social groups organized independent of the PRL
As this chapter reveals, establishing effective community participation is a difficult task that is often complicated by the actions of local elites who may want to derail this process. In the Mexican case, these elites -particularly state governors - were often able to capture targeted social programs locally and prevent the emergence of new links between the state and the poor. And, unfortunately, Mexican national elites infrequently intervened to break the hold of local elites and the traditional corporatist organizations. In addiction, the politicized nature of these programs created divisions among popular organizations over the issue of their participation in state-sponsored programs and contributed to the fragmentation of the urban popular movements. Despite such negative outcomes, these social programs did create incentives for popular organization centered on local issues and in some places links were built between the state and the poor that facilitated effective local participation in social welfare projects. Whether such new links-which allow for the effective expression of popular interests and concerns at the local level-will multiply is likely to depend on promoting democratic political reforms that guarantee communities the right to organize freely.
While it remains unclear whether PRONASOL will survive or whether the Zedillo government will replace it with another program, it appears that an emphasis on poverty alleviation through community participation will continue whatever name is given to the next program. Building effective community participation, at the local though targeted social programs is an important goal; however, it alone is unlikely to secure progress toward redistributive justice. Signs of increased state-NGO interaction raise the possibility of the formation of networks including both state and non-governmental actors focused on social policy issues at the national level. This development suggests an alternative link for achieving broad popular goals such as redistributive justice. As Mexican NGOs develop ways to shape public policy, research needs to continue focusing in the emerging links between NGOs and the Mexican state and then role of these links in securing popular representation.