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Edited by Michael L. Conniff
Populism in Latin America University of Alabama Press 1999 ISBN 0-8173-0970-5

Populism in Latin America

INTRODUCTION
Looking back upon Latin American politics in the past century, we can see certain patterns in leadership styles. In some countries, military dictators predominated. In others, old-fashioned parliamentarians rose to commanding positions. Occasionally a reformer or socialist gained dominance in the political arena. In all, Latin America displayed a wide variety of leaders of all stripes.
In the long view, populists were the most characteristic leaders of the last century. From the earliest years in the La Plata region until the end of the 1990s, populists proved amazingly successful at gaining high office, holding onto power, maintaining their followings, and renewing their careers. Their imprint will continue for decades to come.
In this book you will find a lively introduction to some of Latin America's outstanding leaders-the populists. These men, and sometimes women, stood out from the ranks of the ordinary politicians. They displayed flair, daring, broad appeal, and uncanny timing. They campaigned for public office early, often, and almost always successfully. They constitute one of the most important groups of leaders in twentieth-century Latin America. Their impact on politics has been profound yet not fully recognized.
By "outstanding", we do not necessarily mean moral, wise, constructive, or representative leaders. Some corrupted their countries, others manipulated their followers, and still others disgraced themselves. Still, they were extraordinarily effective in reaching masses of voters, whom they convinced to cast ballots for them. And some left positive legacies for generations to come. Later in the text we offer a working definition of just who these people were.
We designed and wrote this book with the general reader in mind, especially college students and the intellectually curious. We set aside many social scientific debates in the field in order to keep our focus on the leaders and their followers. In particular, we have steered clear of the argument that populists were simply irresponsible big spenders who used public moneys to win mass support. Rather, we see populism basically as a political phenomenon: a question of who gains public office and how they govern. That is subject enough for one book.
Since our purpose is to introduce the subject to readers, we have limited our footnotes in number and length, providing references only to the most important sources. We give preference to those in English and Spanish that are likely to be available in university libraries.
The literature on Latin American populism has grown large in recent years, so the epilogue provides a separate treatment on the evolution of major writings, theories, and methodologies in the field. The essay covers the whole continent but emphasizes the countries studied in this book. Readers wishing to pursue approaches other than the political one used in this work may look for leads in the bibliographic essay.
The authors of these chapters have devoted many years to studying the populists and the countries they governed. Here, they survey the populist experiences in those nations most profoundly influenced by this distinctively Latin American way of conducting the people's business. Their intent is to provide authoritative accounts of the whole sweep of the twentieth century. They do so in ways that invite generalization and comparison, which we attempt to do in this introduction and in the epilogue.
In Chapter 2, Joel Horowitz examines Argentina's strong legacy of populism, beginning with the remarkable Hipólito Yrigoyen, moving through the archetypal Juan and Evita Perón, and ending with President Carlos Menem. He finds that these leaders built upon others' careers, using and improving methods of mass politics. They were particularly adept at creating images, myths, and rituals that furthered their own careers. Horowitz's treatment of Evita Perón, in particular, brings to life Latin America's best-known woman. His main finding is that populists divided society and antagonized those who dissented, creating strong feelings of anger. He concludes that although the era of populism may be ending in Argentina, its effects remain.
The chapter on Brazil by Michael Conniff picks up the story in the late 1920s, when metropolitan Rio de Janeiro reached a million inhabitants. That country's first populist, who served mayor of Rio in the mid-1930s, showed that leaders could win elections by convincing the common people that he cared about their interests and well-being. He abandoned the old-style boss politics and created a mass following that might have led to the presidency itself had he not run afoul of the military. Others followed suit, in particular Adhemar de Burros in Sao Paulo and Getúlio Vargas, when he campaigned for president in 1950. During the next fifteen years, which historians call the Populist Republic, this style dominated state and national politics. Even when the military took power in 1964 and attempted to eradicate populism, they were unsuccessful, because the political culture had embraced the ballot box and accountability of leaders. In the 1980s and 1990s, the populist tradition revived in the person of President Fernando Collor, whose brief and disastrous term foreshadowed the end of an era.
Paul Drake examines several key episodes in Chile's modern history, finding elements of populism that nevertheless do not develop into a strong tradition. The first presidency of Arturo Alessandri, the socialist interlude of Marmaduke Grove, and the front government of Pedro Anuirre Cerda might have evolved into a dominant style of electioneering and governance. Yet Drake finds that Chile's strong party system prevented such a development. Moreover, ideological platforms ranging from conservative to Marxist grabbed voters' attentions and loyalties, leaving little room for populist appeals. Thus Chile was exceptional among the larger countries of the region in not sustaining populism.
In Mexico, according to Jorge Basurto, the formative experience of populism was the extremely powerful administration of Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s. While drawing on revolutionary goals and rhetoric, Cárdenas forged a populist coalition that allowed him to sideline the military and dedicate his resources to helping the masses. That legacy was revisited by President Luis Echeverría in the 1970s, yet the latter could not prevail over the conservative forces that had emerged in the 1950s. Instead, populism failed, and since 1980 Mexico politics have been controlled by antidemocratic leaders. Basurto sees populism as a redemptive force in his nation whose only hope for revival lies with Cárdenas's son, Cuauhtémoc, who lost two presidential bids but now governs the metropolis of Mexico City.
Steve Stein's chapter on Peru finds a long, often rocky history of populism in that country, beginning with the rise of the APRA party in the 1920s and the clash of young titans in the 1930 presidential election. APRA's longtime populist leader, Haya de la Torre, epitomized the drive, style, appeal, and staying power of populism, yet he never won the presidency due to military opposition. Another Peruvian, Victor Andrés Belaúnde, chose the mantle of populism when campaigning in 1960 and 1961 and for a time enjoyed some success, with U.S. support. Amazingly, however, a military government adopted many of the techniques and appeals of populism after taking power in 1968. Without a charismatic leader, or even a strong vocation for leadership, this unique experiment in "military populism" failed. Haya de la Torre's protégé, Alan Garcia, led APRA into the presidential palace only after Haya died, yet he made a mockery of administration. The most extraordinary twist to the story was the triumph of Alberto Fujimori, a Peruvian of Japanese descent, as president in the 1990s. Stein finds that Fujimori is a textbook case of the neopopulist of the 1990s.
Venezuelan populism began with Rómulo Betancourt, who led his party to power in 1945, according to Steve Ellner. A forceful, charismatic figure, Betancourt almost single-handedly forged alliances and fostered democratic procedures that would drive Venezuelan politics for another generation.
Ximena Sosa-Buchholz provides a fascinating view of populism in Ecuador, a country often overlooked by students of modern politics. Two leaders, Velasco Ibarra and Abdalá Bucaram, deeply influenced national affairs from the 1930s to the 1990s. Others arose to challenge them. Besides engaging portraits of these leaders, Professor Sosa-Buchholz supplies background and analysis for understanding politics in her country.
Panama's sole experience with populism came during the career of Arnulfo Arias, three-time president, according to Frank Robinson in chapter 9. Active from the 1930s to the 1980s, Arnulfo continues to influence Panama through his widow and heir to his Arnulfista Party, Mireya Moscoso.
Kurt Weyland challenges the notion that neoliberal, or monetarist, economic policies are incompatible with populism. Instead, as he argues in chapter 10, several figures in recent history have adroitly used neoliberal economics to strengthen their appeal, thereby becoming neopopulists. He examines Carlos Menem in Argentina, Fernando Collor in Brazil, and Alberto Fujimori in Peru as prototypes of this new leadership.
A GENERAL DEFINITION
Populism was an expansive style of election campaigning by colorful and engaging politicians who could draw masses of new voters into their movements and hold their loyalty indefinitely, even after their deaths. They inspired a sense of nationalism and cultural pride in their followers, and they promised to give them a better life as well. Populists campaigned mostly in the big cities, where tens of millions of people gained the franchise and exercised it at the ballot box. The vast majority of these new voters belonged to the working classes, which gave some of the populists a decidedly pro-labor image. Yet populists also attracted middle-class voters, who applauded the social and economic programs these leaders championed and who also obtained jobs and benefits from them. Even some wealthy and powerful citizens joined with the populists, believing that their programs and leadership would be good for their interests and the national destiny. Put simply, the populists raised more campaign money, got more voters to the polls, and held followers' allegiances far better than traditional politicians.
The populists exhibited charisma-that is, special personal qualities and talents that, in the eyes of their followers, empowered them to defend the interests of the masses and uphold national dignity. The masses no longer trusted the church, oligarchical families, political parties, established newspapers, or business elites. Previously, these privileged sectors selected presidents and legislators by giving them their blessing. When the privileged classes could no longer confer legitimacy, however, charismatic figures could claim the right to exercise power on behalf of the people.
The special attributes that made the populists charismatic varied widely: they exhibited such diverse traits as great intellect, empathy for the downtrodden charity, clairvoyance, strength of character, moral rectitude, stamina and combativeness, the power to build, or saintliness. Qualities such as these set the populists apart from and above the ranks of common politicians.
As the populists' successes and fame grew, their followers became even more devoted, convinced that their leaders could bring salvation in troubled times. Faith in their leaders' special attributes helped followers imagine that personal bonds joined them, transcending the limits of space and time. It is no exaggeration to say that at times a mass hypnotic state united leader and followers. Upon the populist's death, his or her charisma often metamorphosed into myth, becoming a legend that lived on for decades. Charisma, though hard to define, was a crucial element in populism.
The populists promised to reform their societies and to improve the lives of the masses. They stood for change and betterment, both material and spiritual. The slogan for Juan Perón's Justicialismo was simply, "economic growth and social justice." Psychic rewards were important, especially during adverse times, when sacrifice was required. Populists could not be easily categorized as to ideology, however, because their programs rarely fit existing doctrinal schemes (for example, conservatism, liberalism, socialism). In fact, the most common label for their programs derived from simply adding ismo to their names: Peronismo, Getulismo, Adhemarismo, Velasquismo, Gaitanismo, etc.
The populists drew from existing sociopolitical models, like socialism, communism, democratic capitalism, fascism, and corporatism, for example. No single doctrine prevailed among them, however, and many recombined ideas inconsistently. Not a few changed their approaches sharply over time. Populists' ideas, then, were eclectic and flexible, designed to appeal to the largest number of voters at any given time.
National pride also infused populist rhetoric. Panama's three-time president Arnulfo Arias even called his credo "Panameñismo," the ultimate patriotic appeal (see chapter 9). The populists preached that the state should be strengthened in order to fulfill a great national destiny. The individual could take pride in being a citizen of this nation. By the same token, populists held themselves up as defenders of the popular sovereignty against foreign pressures and exploitation. Major international companies, in particular, came under attack by the populists, who claimed they squeezed the workers and bled the country of resources, with little commitment to economic development. National pride could turn xenophobic in times of general hardship, because foreign enemies were easier to blame than domestic ones.
The populists promised, and sometimes delivered, a better life for the masses. To do so, they used a variety of mechanisms to distribute favors (called patronage) and raise the general standard of living (which they termed economic development). They created government jobs, financed neighborhood improvements, authorized easy loans, subsidized food staples, set low fares for public transportation, decreed new and higher employment benefits, spent lavishly on charity, supported free education, and stoked economic growth with deficit spending. When they achieved positive results, the populists were revered by the masses for redistributing income in favor of the working class. Cárdenas, Perón, and Vargas did so during parts of their administrations and were credited with economic miracles.
Expansive economic policies often led to inflation, indebtedness, and charges of malfeasance, however, and the populists as a group have been blamed for irresponsible borrowing and spending. In fact, among same economists the term populist has come to mean opportunism and fiscal mismanagement exclusively. It is certainly true that many populists took unorthodox directions and committed economic errors. They were not alone, however, because many traditional politicians also embraced innovative theories and actions and likewise failed at times. In fact, throughout much of the industrializing world, new economic concepts took held in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Known generally as structuralism, these ideas led to government intervention, increased spending, public ownership, property reforms, and price regulation. By these means, government leaders sought to catch up with the economic powerhouses of North America and Europe.
The seeming triumph of more orthodox economics in the 1990s, variously known as neoliberalism, monetarism, or business capitalism, should not lead us to accuse populists alone for taking unorthodox paths a generation ago. Nor should we assume that they always did so for corrupt or irresponsible motives. Highly respected economists in the Keynesian tradition-for example, Galbraith, Hirschman, Prebisch, Sunkel, and Furtado-gave respectability to structuralism. The important point to remember is that expansive economic policies, legitimized by structuralist theories, served populist leaders especially well by offering both an expanding GDP pie-more for everybody-and more equitable distribution. It was a win-win economics that, unfortunately, did not succeed in the long run.
Not only were populists in step with the new political economy of the mid-century, they were also moderate in their application of it. When it came to redistributing wealth, power, and prestige to achieve the maximum benefits for all, populists did not go overboard. None advocated genuine revolution or the violent overthrow of the existing government followed by radical restructuring of society. Instead, they insisted on coming to power through elections and on changing society by the rule of law, according to the will of the people. Popular sovereignty, in fact, became something of an incantation for the populists.
Latin American populists promoted democracy even though they did not always behave in democratic ways. The very definition of the populists as representatives of the people required election and public approval of the leader. Still, many exhibited autocratic traits and abused their powers. While lawfully elected, some did not abide fully by the laws. In their quest for high office, they sometimes infringed others' rights of political expression and office. This seemingly paradoxical relationship between the leader as people's choice and as locus of authority is explored later in our discussion of elections.
The populists appealed to the common men and women, to the poor and working classes, and to the humble and downtrodden not only for votes but for legitimacy. To gain acceptance, they appropriated elements of folklore to show their nearness to the masses, and they were in turn embraced by popular culture. Haya de la Torre and Arnulfo Arias expressed pride in Indian heritage; Perón and Vargas evoked the ethos of the gaucho; Adhemar de Burros posed as a caipira, or country bumpkin; and Jorge Gaitán and Leonel Brizola always stressed their own poverty as youths to explain their identification with the poor. The most vivid examples of the folk acceptance of populists were their celebration in popular verses and songs throughout the region-sambas, cordel, tangos, corridos, and other forms. This cultural approval of the leader, while impossible to quantify, was crucial for the lasting success of the populists.
The closest we will come to a synthetic description of Latin American populism may be expressed thus: Latin American populists wore leaders who had charismatic relationships with mass followings and who won elections regularly. Reducing it to a formula, it might look thus:
populism = leader <----> charismatic bond + elections <----> followers
THE SETTING
Populism arose in Latin America during the early twentieth century in response to deep-going socioeconomic changes. In most countries, the huge expansion of exports to European markets of that era provided capital for urban reforms and growth, infrastructure development, and industrial expansion. Capitals and port cities, in particular, underwent major improvements complemented with massive redevelopment programs. Rio, Buenos Aires, Lima, Caracas, Santiago, Mexico City, and Bogotá all became major metropolises in the early years of this century, and dozens of other cities grew rapidly as well. Manufacturing and population growth went hand in hand, concentrating people and resources in big cities.

Migrants and immigrants crowded into these cities-as workers and employees or simply a new generation of young people-and they became available to activists of all sorts. Labor organizers, evangelists, military enlisters, retail hawkers, politicians, and myriad others recruited these newcomers for their movements and products. For those recently arrived, urban life was liberating and invigorating yet also dangerous and sometimes oppressive. Slums burgeoned with urban poor, riots erupted, services broke down, workers struck, and people began to feel out of touch with their families and regional origins. A generalized sense of rootlessness and malaise, that sociologists call anomie, afflicted many city dwellers.
The generalized sense of alienation in big cities affected virtually all groups. Workers toiled in sweatshops for meager wages, with little hope of sharing the fruits of the booming economies. Children of immigrants felt ostracized because of their foreign surnames and family traditions. Youths growing up in the cities could not expect to live as well as their parents. People of color-mestizos, Indians, and Afro-Latinos-experienced discrimination in schools, workplaces, government offices, and even commercial establishments. Women suffered multiple disadvantages, except for those who belonged to upper-class families. Migrants from rural areas found limited chances to advance in the cities. These sectors shared nothing but their common lack of opportunities, and they often fought among themselves for minor benefits. In short, although it offered advantages over rural and small-town existence, life in early-twentieth-century cities was harsh.
About the time large numbers of poor people began to experience anomie, political elites increased their control over the lives of middle- and working-class people. They rigged elections to stay in power and then used the police to regulate day-to-day life in the cities. They developed corrupt organizations to gather votes on election day and to preserve their power. A veritable rogues' gallery of election riggers ran early-twentieth-century Latin American politics. Nowhere was the popular will expressed through honest elections.
Meanwhile, new methods of surveillance made it easier to police the masses. Automobiles, telephones, telegraph, recording devices, photography, automatic weapons, and espionage allowed police departments to monitor and control the citizenry as never before. Police watched for and suppressed any activities that threatened the monopoly of power wielded by the elites. The agents of law and order paid little attention to individual rights, because their actions were sanctioned by higher authority. Police targeted organizations as well as individuals, especially labor unions, student groups, radical parties, and leaders of minority groups in general. Persons suspected of disrupting the peace were routinely harassed and jailed, and foreigners were often deported.
After the turn of the twentieth century, then, most urban Latin Americans lived under what today would be regarded very undemocratic conditions. In earlier times, things had not been any more democratic, to be sure, but business owners were likely to be the agents of control and repression, not governments. Moreover, Latin America lagged behind Europe and North America in the gradual expansion of individual rights and self-governance.
Conditions were ripe in Latin America for leaders who could give the masses a sense of belonging, provide a semblance of representative government, and undertake changes that would improve daily life. These leaders did emerge and took the initiative in urban politics. Their style of campaigning and administration was later dubbed populism, after its earlier counterpart in the United States.
Urbanization and industrialization are often cited as causes of populism in Latin America, because they amassed millions in the cities and made them available to politicians who could appeal to them. We cannot, however, point to any direct causality, because urban and industrial growth did not always lead to populism and because populism sometimes arose in their absence. More accurately, we can state that these factors created sociopolitical conditions highly favorable to the rise of populist leadership.
THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
The general expansion of Latin American economies in the early twentieth century aided the rise of populist politics. It made possible new systems of transportation and communication, thereby allowing candidates to reach large audiences of potential voters more easily. The advent of streetcars, ferries, commuter trains, and buses made urban campaigning much more effective. Telephone and telegraph services helped party managers to schedule candidate appearances and bargain with local representatives. Gradually whole cities became single-voter precincts available to ambitious and adroit politicians. Skillful use of these new media was an important attribute of the populists.
In the 1920s and 1930s radio made its debut in politics. Radio not only reached tens of thousands but also broadcasted candidates' words and promises in appealing ways, with sound effects, music, background audience, and clarity unattainable otherwise. Candidates who mastered the radio seemed modern, competent, and appealing. Latin American cities became laboratories of campaign innovation using radio waves.
By the 1950s television began to appear in a few large markets, and populist leaders immediately embraced it. TV made the candidates' faces familiar, their gestures and expressions recognizable, and their slogans and symbols more immediate. Indeed, the advent of television brought on the marketing of candidates using the most modern techniques available.
In addition, long-distance transportation service and communications media brought politicians into contact with voters throughout their national territories. The airplane began to revolutionize campaigning after World War I. Populists barnstormed in small planes, and in many towns and villages it was the first time people had ever seen or heard a national politician, much less an airplane. Air travel also became a metaphor for modernization that enhanced candidates' images.
By the 1950s radio broadcasters developed national chains, and a decade later their television counterparts did the same. Truly national campaigns, while costly, could present candidates in appealing ways to audiences all over the country. Cadres of professional media experts came to manage elections. The populists were more talented in media communication than their competitors and hence were able to forge national followings drawn from the big cities as well as the small towns of the interior.
PHASES OF POPULISM
The sweep of nearly a century of populist politics in the region may be conveniently broken down into periods. The first two decades of the century saw the advent of early populism by precursors like José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903-7, 1911-15) in Uruguay and Guillermo Billinghurst (1912-14) in Peru. In addition, Hipólito Yrigoyen in his 1916-22 administration pioneered the style later dubbed populist.
During the 1920s and 1930s populism became more widespread as the conditions for it matured and newly available media made it feasible to amass large electoral followings. Yrigoyen's politics in and out of power confirmed his place as a leading populist. Arturo Alessandri's election and first administration (1920-25) revealed populist elements. Air force colonel Marmaduke Grove, briefly leader of a Socialist government in Chile during 1932, aspired to a populist leadership. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre launched his career in Peru during these years, although he did not win any elections. The mayor of Rio de Janeiro from 1931-36, Pedro Ernesto Batista introduced populism into Brazil, where it was adopted later by Adhemar de Burros during his first term as governor of Sao Paulo (1938-41).
Lázaro Cárdenas, the president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940, was a populist, albeit a subdued one due to constraints imposed by his predecessor. Cárdenas campaigned vigorously for his election, despite the official backing provided by the incumbent party. He carried out vast programs to achieve goals written into the Constitution of 1917. He remodeled and strengthened the multi-class party his predecessor had founded. He eased the powerful Mexican army out of its preeminent role in politics. His outstanding qualities were deep concern for the peasants and workers, plus steady pursuit of constructive reforms. Recognition of his charisma spread mostly by word of mouth. The only modern technologies he used extensively were the radio, airplane, and telephone. Like several other populists, he was not a bombastic, crowd-pleasing orator. His influence grew quietly through thousands of face-to-face meetings. No Mexican leader since has been able to forge the kind of charisma Cárdenas achieved in the 1930s.
The second period, the heyday of Latin American populism, began in the 1940s and ended in the 1960s. This era saw populism emerge as the main form of politics in many countries; in others, it challenged traditional leaders to become more representative.
In 1944, a number of Latin American leaders began to advocate free elections and widening the franchise, a classic populist appeal. Democratization was triggered by the accumulating victories of the Allied Forces, in World War II. Whirlwind campaigning ensued in many countries, and populism reached it apogee in the 1950s. In most countries, women gained the vote following the war and became a potent force for change.
In Brazil, Getúlio Vargas adopted the approaches pioneered by Pedro Ernesto and Adhemar and eventually conducted that country's first modern election in 1950. He was soon challenged not only by Adhemar but by other populists, such as Janio Quadros, Juscelino Kubitschek, and Carlos Lacerda. By the late 1950s they wore joined by others, such as Miguel Arraes, Leonel Brizola, and Joao Goulart. Little wonder that Brazilian historians refer to the 1945-64 era as the Populist Republic.
In Argentina, the foremost populist leaders of the region, Juan Perón and his wife, Evita, began their political campaigns in 1944 and captured power in 1946 with a stunning election victory. Perón would only be removed by a military coup in 1955.
In 1940, Panama's President Arnulfo Arias launched what would become a long and tumultuous career in populist politics. In 1944 the former president of Ecuador, José María Velasco Ibarra, returned to office, this time as a populist without equal in his country. The energetic leader of Venezuela's Acción Democrática, Romulo Betancourt, led a coup in 1945 and established a regime considered populist by most analysts. The frontrunner in Colombia's 1950 election, Jorge Gaitán, was gunned down before the election, ending the first populist campaign in that country's history.
A young populist in Cuba, Eddie Chibás, considered a strong contender for the presidency, instead took his own life in 1951 out of frustration with electoral corruption. During the 1950s Gen. Carlos Ibáñez of Chile resurrected his career with a distinctly populist administration as president (1952-58). Populists dominated Brazilian national politics until the military took over in 1964. Arnulfo Arias returned to power (1949-51), as did Velasco Ibarra (1952-56, 1960-62). Víctor Paz Estenssoro's revolutionary government in Bolivia took on frankly populist overtones in the mid-1950s. Only dictatorial regimes or firmly rooted democracies were immune to the expansive politics of the era.
By the early 1960s, however, populism seemed to falter as a major form of politics. For one thing, the triumph of Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba polarized the hemisphere and reduced the room in which mainstream politicians could maneuver for votes. Increasingly, military groups removed presidents whom they accused of stirring the masses and encouraging leftists. The coups against Haya de la Torre in 1962, Frondizi in 1962, and Goulart in 1964 were of this nature. In addition, most people had become registered voters in preceding years, so that populists could not find as many new recruits as before. In short, the conditions that had favored the rise of populism in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s had eroded.
From the mid-1960s on, a wave of military governments took power, the onset of a period of authoritarian regimes. These governments were diametrically opposed to populism and justified their existence on the grounds that the populists had encouraged strikes, communism, inflation, and corruption. Military leaders promised to restore order and good administration and to carry out socioeconomic reforms from above. This was an era of anti-populist government.
A few populist leaders and movements persisted but did not prosper. Juan Perón returned to the presidency in 1973 but promptly died, leaving his inexperienced widow, María Estela Perón (1974-76), to cope with deteriorating conditions in Argentina. The daughter of Colombian dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, María Eugenia Rojas, revived her father's ANAPO party in the 1960s and ran credible populist campaigns before her untimely death. Several governors and congressmen in Brazil managed to defy the military and resurrect populism. Michael Manley's term as prime minister of Jamaica in the 1970s was decidedly populist, yet he was unable to convert early support into effective administration. In Ecuador, Jaime Roldós and Assad Bucaram took their populistic CFP organization into the presidency in the late 1970s, but within two years both died. Mexican President Luis Echeverría (1970-76) consciously tried to recreate the politics that Cárdenas had employed so successfully, but he failed utterly. Populism seemed to be dying out.
In the last period, following apertura (redemocratization) in the late 1970s, populism experienced a revival in some countries. Most notably when the military stepped down in Peru, APRA's candidate, Alan García, won the presidential election with a frankly populist campaign. His term (1985-90) proved disastrous, however, due to poor leadership and a climate unfavorable to the kind of policies he had inherited from Haya de la Torre. The subsequent government of Alberto Fujimori, while neoliberal in its economics, took a frankly populist approach that was both successful l and viable.
When the Brazilian military decreed amnesty for exiles in 1979, several former populists staged successful comebacks, mostly at the state level. By the mid- 1980s, Teonel Brizola, Janio Quadros, and Miguel Arraes had won governorships or mayoral races in the states of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Pernambuco, respectively. None was able to advance to the) presidency, however, or build a national constitnency.
Carlos Menem, president of Argentina from 1989-95 and reelected for a second term, became a neo-populist. Although he campaigned on the traditional pro-labor, economic interventionist platform of his Peronist party, once in office he enacted very different policies, consonant with the neo- v liberal ideas current in the world. Despite this flip-flop, Menem has been Argentina's most successful leader in several generations.
Brazil's Fernando Collor de Melo (1990-92) also employed a populist style during his campaign and first year in office. Youthful, handsome, athletic, and well spoken, Collor ran virtually without a party, on a platform stressing honesty, renewal, and neoliberal economics. This image, conveyed effectively to the masses through overweening media, proved captivating, and he won a close runoff against the Workers' Party candidate, Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva. Collor's pose as an outsider ready to overhaul the corrupt system of previous generations transformed into an inchoate charisma early in his administration. During his second year in office, however, Collor was implicated in a major fraud scheme involving kickbacks on government contracts. In 1992 he was impeached and resigned from office, a failed populist at best. His 1994 acquittal of corruption charges, however, left open the possibility of a future comeback.
Some writers have debated whether or not populism will die out by the end of this century. Those predicting it's demise argue that electoral expansion has ended, since most people now have the vote. The dominance of electronic media and techniques of political marketing have rendered nearly all candidates charismatic and "sellable" given enough money. Personal attributes and quasi-mystical connections with the masses no longer seem relevant to urbanized masses. And perhaps most important, the globalization of new economic, social, and environmental policies have rendered the old populist measures obsolete. These analysts argue that populism is finished in Latin America.
On the other hand, some observers point to the continued attraction of old-timers like Leonel Brizola and Miguel Arraes, and the evocative power of names like Perón, Batlle, Bucaram, and Cárdenas, as proof of the renewed viability of populism. They note the cult worship, even among young people, of figures like Evita, Lázaro Cárdenas, and Joao Goulart and the popularity of leaders who can manipulate the old symbols of cultural nationalism. Perhaps Menem and Fujimori have shown how to adapt populism to the changing times. After all, populists were always adept at bridging the gap between traditional and progressive measures. These analysts believe that conditions may soon be ripe for a major resurgence of populism.
Therefore, it may be premature to declare that populism is either moribund or on the rebound. The epilogue takes up these questions in greater depth.
STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
Organizational aspects of populist movements, in addition to leadership and means of reaching the masses, have struck observers as very important in distinguishing them from other forms of political mobilization. The multi-class makeup of populism stood in contrast to most other parties in the region, which drew from restricted social strata, for example, the workers, middle sectors, or rural landowners. Populists' broad appeals gave their parties heterogeneous followings that were unwieldy yet also very effective in reaching newly enfranchised voters, a something-for-everyone approach. Only very clever leaders could manage this without tripping over discrepant planks in their platforms.
In his classic article on populist coalitions, Torcuato Di Tella diagrammed various possibilities, reproduced in figure 1. The Peronist alliance, he believed, was the closest to pure populism. Many other observers have taken these suggestions and applied them in other settings. His most powerful finding was that all the variations drew on at least two classes and often from three. Since 1964 most theoretical writing has emphasized this feature.
Others have noted that the populist parties of Latin America did not meet criteria by which parties in the United States and Western Europe are judged, especially regarding aggregation of interests and adjudication of conflicts. Rather, personalismo and centralization, lasting features of Latin American leadership, infused populist movements as well. All decisions, appointments, and initiatives required action by the leader. This tendency undermined the effectiveness of populist leaders once in office, because no mechanisms had been created for shared decision-making and delegation of power. Moreover, personalismo condemned these movements to instability when the leader died or was removed from the scene, as happened frequently.
Despite their reluctance to bureaucratize their parties, populists were astute coalition builders. They formed alliances between existing interest groups and newly enfranchised sectors. The growing cities contained diverse groups recently active in politics-such as factory workers, white-collar employees, tradesmen, and the self-employed-as well as politicized sectors of professionals and public servants. The populists imaginatively constructed broad, heterogeneous followings by appealing to diverse groups in different ways. They also formulated vague programs and doctrines with which many sectors and classes could identity-Perón's Justicialismo and Vargas's Trabalhismo are good examples.
Populists also pioneered new enlistment methods that displaced traditional clientelism. The clientelist party relied on individuals' self-interests, offering a little something for everyone. Each person in a complex network of relationships claimed a degree of autonomy vis-a-vis others in the system. Clientelist recruitment, then, incorporated voters more slowly and broke down when presented with major policy demands. Clientelism had the further disadvantages of being expensive to sustain and unreliable in times of crisis.
In the populist mode, initiative and responsibility gravitated to the leader, whose charisma bridged the space occupied by clientelist intermediaries. The leader delegated the usual work of politics to aides: speech writing, managing the media, rallies, and fundraising. These anonymous staffers could not rival the leader; their only hope for advancement was to enhance the leader's popularity and win elections. In this manner, well-directed campaigns reached out and won over new voters rapidly.
Populists' campaign organizations did not have to dispense as much patronage as their clientelist rivals because the psychic rewards and security provided by the leader largely replaced tangible payoffs. The populists could also respond more quickly to changes and opportunities than traditional leaders, since they did not have to consult elaborate councils and committees. Finally, populists actually flourished in times of crisis, because their charisma reassured and calmed their followers. (See the discussion of charisma in the epilogue.)
ELECTION RESULTS
Populists, like most politicians in the Western world, measured their initial successes in terms of votes won. Elections were central to populism in Latin America, simultaneously as cause, means, and result. Populists first had to fight for fair elections to be held. Then they developed innovative ways to reach and win over ever-growing numbers of voters. Finally, in order to win subsequent election campaigns, they pressed to broaden further the franchise and assure impartial procedures.
In the early days populists like Batlle, Yrigoyen, and Alessandri had to struggle to affirm the sovereignty of the popular will, because free elections had never been held before. The early campaign slogans conveyed the urgency of their demands: Yrigoyen's "Intransigencia" until clean elections were held, Francisco Madero's "Effective Suffrage and No Reelection", and Batlle's "No More Deals" Without honest elections, these and many other candidates had no hope of gaining office.
Once clean elections were assured, later populists pushed to expand the suffrage and improve the administration of elections. Gradually they extended the vote to younger and un-propertied persons and to women. Their campaigns prospered because many of the newly enfranchised were loyal to the leaders who gave them the vote. By the 1950s and 1960s, populists urged better methods of polling voters, using simple, secret, uniform ballots. These reforms were often accompanied by the creation of independent judicial boards to supervise elections and certify their results. Even after the authoritarian turn of government in the 1960s, these procedures remained in effect, thanks largely to their institutionalization.
Finally, by the 1970s and 1980s the trend toward even greater inclusion in the electoral process had achieved near-universal suffrage. In most countries, eighteen-year-olds vote. Brazil even lowered the voting age to sixteen and enfranchised illiterates. Peru and Chile did so as well. Moreover, most countries now require that voters exercise that right or face fines and bureaucratic hassles. The obligatory vote undoubtedly causes larger turnouts.
These election improvements had a number of outcomes. Most notably, they increased the volume of voting many times over. Elections went from virtually nonexistent to mass participation in the course of this century. Table 1 demonstrates the dramatic increase experienced in most countries. Surprisingly, elections even affected military governments indirectly in the 1970s and 1980s. Contests for state and local offices became informal plebiscites on government performance. In many places, large numbers of blank and invalid ballots served as indictments of the governments' conduct. In Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile, declining fortunes at the polls helped convince military rulers to remove themselves from power.
Populists did not dominate, much less win, every election in Latin America, of course, but it seems fair to attribute much of the growing importance of the ballot box and improved procedures to populist campaigns earlier in the century.
The populists' contribution to establishing fair, broad elections does not mean that they were necessarily democratic themselves or that they would forego victories to protect popular sovereignty. Many populists had earlier careers as traditional, even oligarchical, leaders. Several imposed dictatorships-Vargas from 1937 to 1945 and Perón from 1943 to 1945, for example. A number conspired against duly constituted governments from exile. And in office, a number of the populists regularly violated the laws under which they were elected.
To some extent, the populists' devotion to electoral means of winning office ran against the grain of their personalities. Virtually all were driven, ambitious, even obsessed with gaining power. They sacrificed their families and health in order to campaign for office. Such win-at-all-cost motivation led them to unethical and undemocratic behavior. Many ran their parties as little more than personal fan clubs and campaign organizations. Paradoxically, though, they felt obliged to win popular approval through elections and thus contributed to the consolidation of democratic procedures.
CONCLUSION
This introduction has offered a broad view of the populist experience in Latin America. It conveys a sense of the writing about leading populists, their campaigns, and the eras in which they flourished. The nine original essays that follow comprise the core of this bank. They give more detailed studies of individual countries and leaders, taking into account their political cultures and chronologies. The campaigns, the excitement, the disappointment, and the individuals come alive in these chapters.