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Jaime E. Rodríguez 0.
The Transition from Colony to Nation: New Spain, 1820-1821
Articulo 1, Tratados de Córdoba (1821)
The Transition from Colony to Nation:


Si alguna vez la necia antipatía Con la malignidad más insolente Sembré el rencor entre una y otra gente De la vasta Española Monarquía: Si alguna vez la negra tiranía Con mano armada en este Continente Nuestra sangre virtió: ya felizmente Vimos el fin al azarozo dia. La América y la España se están dando Las manos, en señal muy expresiva de su UNION que se están felicitando Y ambas entonan ya con voz festiva Viva la libertad, la UNION, FERNANDO Y la CONSTITUTION por siempre viva.
-José Joaquin Fernández de Lizardi (1820)

Esta América se reconocerá por nación soberana e independiente, y se llamará en lo sucesivo Imperio Mexicano.-Articulo 1, Tratados de Córdoba (1821)

THE MEXICAN NATION, which for three hundred years has possessed neither its own will nor the use of its voice, emerges today from the oppression in which it has lived."1 Thus begins the Declaration of Independence of September 28, 1821. The majority of its signatories consisted of former autonomists, such as Juan Francisco de Azcárate, the marqués de San Juan de Rayas, Francisco Manuel Sánchez de Tagle, Juan Bautista Raz y Guzmán, José Miguel Guridi y Alcocer, and José Maria Fagoaga. These leaders of the Mexico City-based national elite had pursued, since 1808, various avenues to autonomy: they aspired to home rule, participated in the secret society of the Guadalupes, and distinguished themselves as parliamentarians and constitutionalists. The autonomists considered the 1821 document the culmination of their more than decade-long effort to achieve power. Emancipation, however, required the aid of the military. Thus, while the autonomists believed it to be their triumph, the army, headed by Agustin de Iturbide, considered Independence its victory.
As Virginia Guedea has demonstrated, members of the national elite sought autonomy in 1808, conspired to win home rule between 1809 and 1820, and grasped for political power through constitutional means in the elections of 1812, 1813, 1814, and 1820-1821. All the while they flirted with the insurgents. Indeed, some autonomists seriously contemplated joining an insurgent government, the Supreme American National Congress, in 1813 and 1814 when that body appeared to have a chance of success. They went underground in 1814 and 1815 when the Constitution of 1812-the Constitution of Cádiz-and the insurgent movement seemed doomed, remaining active in clandestine groups until the liberals in Spain restored the constitution in 1820. Equilibristas, the appellation the insurgents gave them, epitomized their attitude.2
The autonomists, a key element of the national elite, were an extensive and flexible group. New Spain's upper class-which included nobles, great magnates, merchants, professionals, and intellectuals, among them many clergymen-resided primarily in Mexico City. Although some possessed properties and interests in the provinces or, in some cases, lived there, the elite interpreted the well-being of the Viceroyalty from the perspective of Mexico City. The group, however, possessed a proto-nationalist attitude. Their "America," New Spain, while not an independent nation, was, in their view, a real entity.
Since the activities of the autonomists were largely un-documented, it is necessary to reconstruct their efforts through indirect evidence. One must judge their role based on past actions and on subsequent outcomes because the members of the group proved extremely reluctant to discuss their endeavors after Independence had been achieved. Indeed, we know about their earlier activities only because the authorities seized same of their correspondence when they captured certain insurgents and because of judicial proceedings instigated against some members of the group.3 Because the viceregal regime used its coercive powers against them, the autonomists developed a pattern of politics based on shifting coalitions formed to attain specific ends. United by ties of family, profession, interest, and opportunity, they planned and reached decisions in informal and often clandestine gatherings at their houses, at meetings of professional organizations, such as the college of lawyers, and at social occasions like tertulias (a social gathering to exchange ideas), dinners, dances, and receptions. Since these groups were secret and their compositions changed, depending on the time and issue involved, it is difficult or perhaps impossible to identify all the participants and futile to assign to them a consistent political role. When individuals' interests diverged, they withdrew from the group.4
Although it is impossible to identify precisely the autonomists, it is evident from their activities that they possessed extensive contacts and communication networks. Viceroy Félix Maria Calleja, the regime's most able defender, described them as "counts and marqueses, judges, councilmen, and other individuals like doctors, lawyers, and merchants," characterizing their network "as a kind of Freemasonry . . . that protects them from all investigations regarding conspiracy. They are all united, they seek one goal, they work for the same principles, and they never give themselves away."5 Nonetheless, as Calleja indicated, they operated in a loose manner:
IThey] do not need to convene or agree; each one works for the general project according to his possibilities and resources: the judge and his subordinates, covering up and dissimulating offences; the priest per- suading the justice of insurrection in the confessional, and often even in the pulpit; writers corrupting opinion; women seducing by their charms, even prostituting themselves, lo get government troops to join the rebels the [government] employee paralyzing and revealing the dispositions of his superiors; the young man taking arms; the old man providing information and passing the mails; the rich man giving money; the scholar offering advice and direction; the corporations exacerbating by their actions the eternal divisions wilh the Europeans, by never admitting one into their body and by ensuring that they do not win popular elections making all aid to the government difficult; making it odious; . . . all, in short, toppling the edifice of the state.
Although somewhat exaggerated-some did convene and agree, for example-Calleja clearly described the activities of the autonomists.
During the restored absolutist period (1814-1820), the autonomists survived as best they could. Although some continued their covert activities, most attempted to lead quiet inconspicuous lives, hoping that the authorities would find no evidence or grounds to prosecute them for their earlier actions. Others were not so fortunate. Some were detained in New Spain while others were sent to the Peninsula. A few, like José Miguel Ramos Arizpe and José Mariano Michelena, found themselves in prison or in exile in Spain; others, like Judge Jacobo Villaurrutia, had been forced to accept a post there; still others, like José Maria Fagoaga and Ignacio Adalid, had to defend themselves from charges of disloyalty in the Peninsula.
The final stage in the process of emancipation began with the restoration of the Spanish Constitution in 1820. The years of absolutism had demonstrated the value of the home-rule institutions created by the Constitution of 1812-the provincial deputations and the constitutional ayuntamientos. New Spain's elite, who had conspired in favor of autonomy during the period of restored absolutism, eagerly grasped the second opportunity to achieve political power at home.
The restoration of the constitution unleashed widespread political activity in the Viceroyalty. Without waiting for instructions from the viceroy, the coastal cities of Mérida and Campeche took oaths of allegiance to the charter of Cádiz in early May. Veracruz and Jalapa followed later that month. Although he would have preferred to await formal instructions, public pressure in Mexico City forced Viceroy Juan Ruiz de Apodaca to proclaim the constitution on May 31. (That charter transformed Apodaca's role to that of capitán general [captain general] of the former Viceroyalty of New Spain and jefe político superior [superior political chief] of the Provincial Deputation of New Spain, the former Kingdom of New Spain.) Shortly thereafter, the authorities dispatched nearly a thousand copies of the constitution to officials throughout the realm. In the following months, cities and towns throughout the Viceroyalty reported that they had sworn allegiance to the constitution in formal ceremonies and that they had established or restored constitutional ayuntamientos. The "principal vecinos" (citizens) of Tlaxcala, for example, reported on June 6 that, together with civil, ecclesiastic, and military authorities, they had proclaimed their support of the constitution in the main square, celebrated a Te Deum in the cathedral, held public ceremonies, and generally rejoiced at the restoration of the constitutional system. Since the constitution allowed urban areas with a politically eligible citizenry of a thousand or more to establish ayuntamientos, the charter radically expanded the number of cities and towns in New Spain that could possess municipalities. By year's end the authorities in Mexico City had received hundreds of reports of urban centers that had established constitutional ayuntamientos. In the province of Puebla alone, 164 constitutional city councils, among them many in Indian towns, had been erected by January 31, 1821.
The leaders of the Viceroyalty of New Spain also restored the second tier of local government, the provincial deputations. Six provincial deputations-New Spain, Nueva Galicia, Yucatán, San Luis Potosi, Provincias Internas de Oriente, and Provincias Internas de Occidente-had been established during the first constitutional period. Two provinces reinstated their old deputations in 1820, Yucatán on May 13 and New Spain on July 20; the others were apparently not restored because new elections were to be held shortly. As had occurred in 1812-1813, New Spain established a preparatory junta to organize the elections.l7 Similar processes occurred in the other regions. Yucatán and Nueva Galicia held elections in August, New Spain and San Luis Potosí in September, the Provincias Internas de Oriente in October, and the Provincias Internas de Occidente in November 1820.18 Thus, by the end of the year, six newly elected provincial deputations functioned in the former Viceroyalty of New Spain.
The printing press, which became the indispensable instrument of politics, fueled the explosion of political activity in the former Viceroyalty. Important notices, decrees, laws, circulars, minutes of special meetings, reports of elections, statements from prominent persons, and other matters of interest were published almost immediately both in Mexico City and in the provincial capitals. Politically active New Spaniards learned of significant events within days of their occurrence; they possessed copies of important documents; and they made certain that they exercised their rights.
Thousands of pamphlets, newspapers, and broadsides circulated in which writers discussed the significance of the restored constitutional order and lauded the constitutional heroes of the Peninsula. The voluminous literature that was published is indicative not only of the enthusiasm with which the public viewed the constitutional system, but also of the intense debate about the kind of government New Spaniards desired. As Vicente Rocafuerte later recalled, "The rebirth of . . . [the constitution's] second epoch was welcomed with great joy. It received the most tender praises. No public paper nor poem was published which did not have as its object to praise it and to recommend it [to the people]." Some referred to the constitution as the "Sacred Code," the "Divine Charter," "la Niña bonita" (the pretty girl). They reprinted countless publications from the earlier constitutional era.
Several political catechisms appeared, devoted to extolling its virtues. As one indicated, the Spanish nation consisted of all the possessions of the monarchy; all people were not only citizens but also Spaniards; the king was "a citizen, just like everyone else, who obtains his authority from the nation"; and the rights of Spaniards consisted of "liberty, security, property, and equality." At least one writer addressed his comments to the Indians of central Mexico in their tongue in a publication entitled The Malinche of the Constitution in the Mexican and the Castillian Language. The anonymous author declared that the natives were now free, that they were Spaniards, that is, the equal of any other citizen, and that their future was assured so long as the constitution remained in effect. Even former insurgent supporters like Carlos Maria de Bustamante maintained, in a pamphlet entitled The Constitution of Cádiz, or Why I Love the Constitution, that the charter best addressed New Spain's needs.
The constitutional regime in Spain also contributed to the dissemination of political ideas when, on April 14,1820, it required that "all the schools of first letters and humanities in the realm" explain "the constitution in a clear fashion, taking into account the age and comprehension of the children." Indeed, the authorities believed the constitution should be used as a primer for learning to read. The decree, which was published in Mexico on August 17, was already being implemented in the city's schools by the end of the year. Teachers, however, complained that the cost of the printed copy of the constitution, ten reales, was too great. Many substituted the popular Political Catechism Based on the Constitution, which not only cost less, three reales, but which provided a much simpler and clearer explanation of the complex political concepts embodied in the new constitutional system.
The dissemination of constitutional ideas intensified in the months that followed. While most publicists discussed the issues raised by the restored charter, some focused on education: writers not only published political catechisms to instruct the public, priests read portions of the constitution to the faithful at Sunday mass. Arguing that "only through communicating his ideas does man learn about and concern himself with his duties and obligations," some proposed the establishment in Mexico City of a Patriotic Constitutional Academy, devoted to the study and discussion of government, law, society, morals, arts, and sciences. Then "this vast portion of the monarchy, from Veracruz to Taos and Acapulco to Béjar," would benefit from the "enlightenment of sabios [scholars] from this continent." Thus, "the magnificent plans and vast ideas of the sovereign cortes [parliament] regarding public education would be realized." The proponents concluded by inviting the civil and ecclesiastic authorities to support the project, which "would contribute to the general well-being and to the progress of civilization and culture."
Although political debate attracted public attention, elections, perhaps more than any other activity, politicized New Spain's society. Probably more than a thousand cities and towns held elections for constitutional ayuntamientos in the second half of 1820. Since there were neither literacy nor property qualifications for voting, nearly all adult males were eligible to participate. "The electoral procedures established by the cortes were not only indirect but also lengthy and complex. There were two stages for elections to the constitutional ayuntamientos: the selection of parish electors and the designation of the new alcaldes, regidores [councilmen], and syndics by the electors." In addition, the more populous parishes of the larger cities often possessed more than one electoral junta. "The election of deputies to the cortes and to the provincial deputations was even more intricate. Elections to these two bodies occurred at three levels: parish, partido [district], and province. Because of their complexity, preparatory juntas were necessary to organize and to conduct them.'' Elections for the six provincial deputations of the Viceroyalty of New Spain occurred between August and November. Two separate elections were held for deputies to the cortes: one rapidly in the autumn of 1820 for the cortes of 1821-1822 and a second starting in December 1820 for the 1822-1823 session of parliament. Thus, from June 1820 until March 1821, electioneering and elections preoccupied the politically active population of New Spain-perhaps numbering in the hundreds of thousands.
Such intense political activity could not fall to engender fears among various groups. In the provinces teachers complained that pupils no longer heeded them; curas reported that Indians did not respect them and refused to attend mass; and other officials charged that people no longer obeyed the authorities because they believed the constitution had relieved them from most obligations. In Mexico City Councilman Francisco Manuel Sánchez de Tagle reported that same ecclesiastics appeared hostile to the constitution. "I note with sadness," he declared, "that every day the constitutional system loses more and more support while its ensmies are making rapid conquests." He also indicated, however, that among those undermining the cortes and the constitution were "some members of the secular and regular clergy (few of them seducers and the majority seduced).... The feminine sex and, in general, the lower and middle [groups] of the people" were falling prey to the anticonstitutional propaganda of the clergy.The fiscal (crown attorney) of the audiencia José Hipólito Odoardo also reported that many ecclesiastics opposed the constitutional order. Carlos María de Bustamante, too, expressed concern about the clergy's attitude. In a pamphlet, he attempted to allay their fears that the constitution threatened religion and their status. As he concluded: "Venerable parsons, allow a simple member of the faithful to dare to entreat you to examine your interests and obligations carefully in the constitution and to apply your influence so that others may understand [their own] through your voice. Let us disabuse the people and not fear to shout, 'The Constitution is the only anchor which sustains the state!"
The military, like the clergy, was ambivalent about the restored order. The newly erected ayuntamientos rapidly seized upon constitutional guarantees to end the collection of war taxes and to prohibit royal officers from raising militia forces in their regions. Since many units had not been paid for months, lacked supplies and equipment, and could not continue to operate without the wartime levies, their officers viewed the restoration of the constitution as a mortal blow. In addition, earlier, particularly during the absolutist period, army commanders had become accustomed to overruling civilian officials in their efforts to end the insurgency, eventually exercising political control over their regions. Some also set up veritable fiefdoms for their personal profit, amassing wealth by misappropriating funds, bribery, and extortion. The new policies of the constitutional ayuntamientos not only weakened the institutional integrity of the royal army and eliminated the economic and political power of some officers, but also threatened many with prosecution for their earlier abuses.
"Radical" decrees passed by the restored cartes aroused military and clerical hostility to the constitution. These measures consisted primarity of the suppression of the monastic orders and of the Jesuits and the abolition of ecclesiastical and military immunity from civil prosecution. Whereas the decrees of the cartes intensified the disaffection of those two key groups, their discontent arose from more immediate factors. The case of the army is clear. As Christon 1. Archer has indicated, the restoration of the constitution ended the military's hopes of victory over the insurgents. At best, they could look forward to the ignominious oblivion of "defeat"; at worst, they might face punishment for their excesses. The impact of the restored constitution upon the clergy was less uniform, resulting in divisions within the Church. The political instability of the times adversely affected many ecclesiastics, such as the members of the monastic orders. But many other clergymen participated in the new politics with great success. Indeed, same of the most radical "anticlerical" politicians were churchmen. Perhaps, as Odoardo declared, the traditional segments of the military and the clergy resented the loss of their privileged status. Once the bulwark of the state, many of them believed themselves to be abandoned to opportunist politicians.
The disenchantment within the army and the clergy, while vexing to the Mexico City-based national elite, as Sánchez de Tagle's, Odoardo's, and Bustamante's writings indicate, was not sufficient to disrupt the restored constitutional system. Too many provincial deputations and constitutional ayuntamientos had been established and too many elections had been held for the two privileged corporations simply to overturn the new order. Thus, it appeared that the restored constitutional system would provide New Spaniards with the home rule they had been seeking for more than a decade.
In 1820, the autonomists followed two roads in their efforts to achieve home rule: the constitutional process and, as in 1813 when they had considered joining the insurgent regime, other means toward an "alternative government." Initially, they viewed the constitutional process as a more manageable and more attractive alternative. The autonomists gained control of the provincial deputations and constitutional ayuntamientos and won elections to the cortes. While they were willing to follow the constitutional road to autonomy, they remained determined to govern at home.
The provinces, however, were not content with the small number of deputations allocated to the Viceroyalty of New Spain by the earlier cortes. Each immediately organized to obtain its own provincial deputation. Shortly after being reestablished, the Constitutional Ayuntamiento of Puebla, for example, sent a formal representation to the cortes requesting that it be allocated a provincial deputation in accord with Article 325 of the Constitution, which stated: "In each province there shall be a deputation called provincial, to promote its prosperity, presided by the political chief." Indicating that the decree of May 23, 1813-which postponed the allocation of deputations to all the provinces of the Viceroyalty of New Spain until new territorial divisions had been formed in the Spanish dominions and which created the Provincial Deputation of New Spain consisting of seven provinces-was no longer applicable, the Ayuntamiento of Puebla urged the cortes to implement the national charter and approve deputations for each province in New Spain.
The ayuntamiento argued that distance and population size justified the creation of local provincial deputations.43 On September 18, 1820, during the elections of deputies to the cortes, the electoral junta of Puebla addressed another representation to the restored parliament reaffirming the province's need for a local deputation. "The Spaniards on the other side of the ocean," it declared, "are not lesser beings than the Peninsulars." If the kingdoms of Old Castilla and León merited nine provincial deputations, the Poblanos argued, then the much larger province of Puebla de Los Angeles with its greater population should not lack "the provincial deputation which the fundamental law of the monarchy grants it."
The provinces of the Viceroyalty insisted that each of them obtain provincial deputations. The cortes, however, authorized only one new deputation in 1820, that of Michoacán and Guanajuato, with its seat at Valladolid. The American deputies regrouped during the parliamentary recess from November 10, 1820, to March 1, 1821. New proprietary deputies arrived reinforcing the group, but, most of all, the provinces themselves strengthened the hands of their representatives by submitting detailed petitions for new deputations.45 In New Spain some individuals demanded immediate action. Juan N. Troncoso, a provincial elector in Puebía, insisted that there was no need to wait for approval by the cortes since the constitution clearly authorized provincial deputations for each province.46The big push occurred in the 1821 cortes when the American deputies insisted that each former intendancy in the New World be granted a provincial deputation. After considerable debate, on May 8, 1821, the cortes agreed.47 The New World representatives had won a significant concession in their effort to obtain home rule.
Implementing the decree proved more difficult, however, as Michoacán's experience demonstrated. The region was the only one of New Spain's provinces to be allocated a deputation, prior to May 1821, in part because its deputy to the cortes, José Mariano Michelena,48 worked closely both with the Ayuntamiento of Valladolid and with one of New Spain's most experienced parliamentarians, José Miguel Ramos Arizpe. Although the cortes approved the new provincial deputation on November 6, 1820, four days before it adjourned until March 1, 1821, the royal decree did not arrive in New Spain until much later. Michelena, however, immediately sent the Ayuntamiento of Valladolid the relevant documents, including the official government gazette that printed the decrees. As a result, on February 25, 1821, the municipal council of Valladolid requested that Jefe Politico Superior Juan Ruiz de Apodaca schedule elections for the new provincial deputation in March. Since he had not received formal notification from Madrid, Apodaca referred the matter to the Provincial Deputation of New Spain, which possessed jurisdiction over the province of Michoacán. Already besieged by numerous boundary disputes among the hundreds of constitutional ayuntamientos in its jurisdiction, that body opted to delay, declaring that "although it did not doubt the truth of the resolution cited [in the request], it had yet to receive through appropriate channels the sovereign decree."Undeterred, the Ayuntamiento of Valladolid convinced the interim jefe político of Michoacán to hold elections on March 12. The political chief, however, refused to install the newly elected provincial deputies until he received the royal decree.
Ever since the restoration of the constitution in 1820, New Spain's elites had insisted that only the full implementation of the charter could end New World discontent. The constitutional ayuntamientos, in particular, instructed their representatives to the cortes to press as rapidly as possible for all concessions that might grant home rule. But, preoccupied by the turbulent politics of the Peninsula, the Spanish majority in the cortes procrastinated when it came to the "American question." The failure of the cortes to address promptly their concerns demonstrated to the American representatives that they had to propose other means to ensure home rule in their region.
Proposals for American autonomy had been discussed for decades. Spain's earlier participation in the international conflict that coincided with the independence of the United States convinced some Spanish authorities that the New World possessions should be granted a form of autonomy. In 1781, the intendant of Caracas, José de Abalos, proposed that autonomous political and military "monarchies" be established in America to defend the region from England and the emerging United States. Two years later, the Conde de Aranda recommended to Carlos III that Spain retain the Antilles while establishing three monarchies in the rest of the continent: New Spain, Costa Firme (northern South America), and Peru. These realms were to be ruled by Spanish princes who would retain political, economic, and military ties to Spain. In 1797, Manuel Godoy suggested that Louisiana become a federated kingdom with a Spanish prince on the throne. Later, in 1804, he proposed the creation of American regencies ruled by Spanish princes. In October 1806, Carlos IV considered the establishment of New World kingdoms in the viceroyalties of New Spain, New Granada, Peru, and La Plata, once again governed by Spanish princes.
In 1811, Dr. José Beye de Cisneros, representative to the cortes from the Province of Mexico, proposed "to erect Provincial Juntas in every viceroyalty and superior government in America, composed of subjects named by their own peoples." Under this plan, the provincial juntas would recognize the cortes as an overarching imperial parliament superior to them. Beye de Cisneros further suggested that the imperial government could transfer to one of those provincial juntas and continue the struggle should the Peninsula fall to the French. Finally, in December 1820 Fernando VII wrote to Viceroy Apodaca in Mexico City indicating that he might flee to New Spain where he would rule as an absolute monarch.
Sometime in 1820, Michelena developed a plan that combined elements of earlier proposals for American autonomy with the new system of constitutional government. Since he was in communication both with his family in Michoacán and with the Constitutional ayuntamiento of Valladolid, the outlines of his plan became widely known both in New Spain and in the Peninsula. In Madrid, the substitute deputies discussed the Michelena plan at a series of meetings at the residence of the prominent New Spaniard Francisco Fagoaga, a man of great wealth with extensive contacts both in Europe and America and who, like Michelena and Ramos Arizpe, had ties with Masonic groups.58
Once again, internal problems prevented the government from resolving the "American question." Shortly alter the cortes reconvened in March 1821, the king dismissed the ministry, provoking a political crisis. When the monarch named a new moderate government of unknown doceañistas (men of the first constitutional period), a group of extreme radicals known as the comuneros appealed to the masses, inciting them to turn against the government. The new moderate ministry managed to control Madrid, but the comuneros dominated the provincial cities. In Barcelona, they took over the municipality and deported alleged absolutists. Similar acts occurred in Galicia, Cádiz, Sevilla, Málaga, Algeciras, and Cartagena. In Alcoy, workers burned the textile mills. Spain rapidly was becoming an armed camp where the radical masses in the towns opposed both the moderate government in Madrid and a conservative countryside.
Despite such difficulties, the American deputies insisted that more attention be paid to New World problems. Their position was strengthened when the newly elected proprietary deputies from New Spain, who arrived in May, approved the Michelena proposal. Earlier, on May 3, at the suggestion of the conde de Toreno, the cortes named a committee of four Spaniards and five Americans-four New Spaniards, Lorenzo de Zavala, Lucas Alamán, Francisco Fagoaga, and Bernardino Amati, and the Venezuelan Fermin Paul-to consider the matter. It appeared at the time that the government was disposed to grant same form of dominion status for America. In mid-May the minister of overseas affairs convened a mecting, which included former viceroys, captains general, and inspectors then in Madrid, "to agree upon a general project which ought to be presented [to the cortes]." The officials concluded that three "regencies," which the king would rule by means of Spanish princes under the constitution, should be established in the New World. Fernando Vll, however, convinced that the project was a plot by his enemies to "drive him to the guillotine," refused to "send a prince to America." As a result, the mixed committee of the cortes failed to offer the parliament a meaningful recommendation.
The Americans, however, insisted upon presenting the Michelena plan to the cortes. On June 25 they proposed dividing the New World into three kingdoms: New Spain and Guatemala; New Granada and the provinces of Tierra Firme; and Peru, Chile, and Buenos Aires. Each kingdom would possess its own cortes and govern under the Constitution of 1812. A Spanish prince or a person appointed by the king would preside over each area. Spain and the American realms would maintain special relationships in trade, diplomacy, and defense. Finally, the new kingdoms would pay a portion of Spain's foreign debt. The following day, Ramos Arizpe and José Maria Couto submitted an alternative proposal for the autonomy of New Spain. In contrast to the earlier American plan, theirs did not require the appointment of a Spanish prince as ruler and provided closer ties with the mother country by requesting that some deputies from the legislature in America also serve in the Spanish parliament. Neither proposal obtained the approval of the cortes.
Earlier, the deputies from New Spain achieved a significant concession that would have far-reaching consequences. From the time the cortes reconvened in 1820 the American representatives had argued that peace would be restored in the New World only if the authorities respected the constitution and the rights of Americans. They charged that many royal officials currently serving in the New World were not only associated with the earlier repression but also were anti-American.64 Their assertions gained credence when bureaucrats, like the fiscal of the Audiencia of Mexico, recommended that the constitution be suspended in order to ensure tranquility. Deputies Michelena and Ramos Arizpe of New Spain were among the most active in seeking the removal of the "anticonstitutional" and "brutal anti-American" officials, among them Viceroys Joaquín de la Pezuela of Peru and Apodaca of New Spain as well as Generals Pablo Morillo of Venezuela and José de la Cruz of Nueva Galicia. While Pezuela, Morillo, and Cruz had indeed distinguished themselves by their ferocious opposition to the insurgency in America and by their hostility to the constitution, Apodaca had not only sought to restore harmony to New Spain during the earlier absolutist period, but also had fully implemented the constitution when it was restored.
The representatives of New Spain endeavored to replace the moderate Apodaca with an individual who shared their particular vision of New World autonomy. Michelena, a well-known army officer and Mason, and Ramos Arizpe, another Mason and a distinguished doceañista, relied on their extensive contacts among military men, liberals, and fellow Masons to achieve their ends. They ultimately succeeded when, in January 1821, the government appointed General Juan O'Donojú captain general and superior political chief of New Spain. The new official, a distinguished officer, a liberal, and a Mason, had served as minister of war during the first constitutional period, and then was serving as political chief of the province of Seville.
O'Donojú was well aware of the aspirations of the New Spaniards. Michelena and Ramos Arizpe, and possibly others, met with him to discuss their plan of "regencies."69 That project appeared to have the support of the government as well as of the American deputies at the time O'Donojú departed for New Spain.70 In addition, the cortes was then preparing to approve the formation of deputations for every province in America. Indeed, Ramos Arizpe urged the legislature to pass the measure in time for O'Donojú "to take with him the order to establish provincial deputations in all the intendancies."71 Clearly, O'Donojú left the Peninsula believing that he had been charged with strengthening the constitutional order in New Spain and that, in all likelihood, he would also introduce the new system of "regencies." The situation when he landed in Veracruz on July 30, 1821, was not what he expected to find, however.
In New Spain, the autonomists had also been busy. They not only managed to win control of the new constitutional bodies, they were also exploring alternative means for obtaining home rule. In Mexico City members of the national elite, who were concerned about the need to retain autonomy, kept in close touch with like-minded individuals in the provincial capitais. Many issues worried them. The intense involvement of the people in the political process was new and unsettling. The discontent of segments of the clergy and the military augured ill for the success of the restored constitutional system. One faction, apparently led by the higher clergy, had sought in May 1820 to postpone implementation or to suspend the constitution. But mass popular support for the charter ended such a possibility immediately. Perhaps most distressing to the autonomists were reports about the political disintegration of the Peninsula. Was social revolution imminent? If so, what should be done to protect orderly representative government in New Spain? Perhaps the time had come to act? Some spoke openly of independence! One group, which included various factions, among them discontented clergymen, army officers, and government officials as well as large numbers of autonomists, seems to have concluded that independence might be necessary in order to retain home rule under the Constitution of 1812, that is, to establish a limited constitutionaí monarchy in New Spain. In a sense, the ideas being discussed were no more than variations of the plans for autonomy that had been debated in New Spain since 1808.
Although the members of the national elite gathered to discuss their country's future in a variety of places, one of the most prominent was the Mexico City salon of María Ignacia Rodriguez de Velasco, popularly known as la Güera Rodriguez. A notorious lady of fashion, la Güera was not only related to the realm's leading families, noble and nonnoble, she had also been involved with the insurgents and, possibly, with the conspirators of the first constitutional period. Among the many individuals attracted to la Güera's salon during the years from 1816 to 1820 was a then-unemployed royal army colonel, Agustin de Iturbide.
An efficient and ruthless officer, Iturbide had lost his command in 1816 when charged with corruption and abuse of authority. Although not prosecuted, Iturbide never managed to clear his name. Hence, in 1820, he found himself without command and, apparently, with no future in the royal army. Alienated by the authorities, he appears to have grown receptive to arguments for autonomy. Iturbide, the discredited counterinsurgent, desperate to restore his wealth and status, decided to act. Initially, he planned simply to force the "viceroy" to recognize a new regime. But, as Manuel Gómez Pedraza reminds us, wiser heads prevailed, convincing Iturbide that the plan was impractical since he lacked command of troops. In the end, such desperate measures proved unnecessary because on November 9, 1820, Apodaca appointed Iturbide to command the southern military district, an area where insurgents remained active.
The new command ended years of uncertainty and appeared to rejuvenate the creole officer who abandoned the autonomists to devote himself wholeheartedly to the task of defeating the insurgents. As the extensive correspondence to his intimate friend Juan Gómez de Navarrete demonstrates, Iturbide believed that he could restore order to the region. On November 25 he expressed the belief that his "plan of pacification will be completed with all happiness, and perhaps in January we shall gather laurels in Mexico City." Things did not go entirely as he hoped. Despite favorable reports to the viceroy, Iturbide could not subjugate the insurgents. On the contrary, his forces faced strong resistance and sometimes lost. Worried about reaction in the capital, he wrote Gómez de Navarrete in December: "I regret to say that in the last mail I have not received a single letter either from you or from any of my itinerant friends." And he confessed that "I am suffering a great affliction of the spirit." Later he wrote a relative that he was constantly in a perturbed state of mind.
The political ferment of the time compounded the difficult military situation. As Iturbide commented to Gómez de Navarrete, "The Constitution has many true supporters because of the advantages which it offers. Others fear it because of the heterogeneity of the Kingdom. Some believe it will be the means of assuring a permanent union of the Americas with the Peninsula; and not a few persons love the Constitution because they believe it to be the most certain means by which independence may be attained."
Denied military victory-and thus the opportunity to advance his career lturbide turned increasingly to politics. He worked hard to establish good relationships with important people residing in the region under his jurisdiction. On December 7, he wrote Gómez de Navarrete that "leaders and officials" indicated they were in his favor. A week later he declared: "People have assured me that in the Province of Guanajuato the inhabitants wish independence, that many persons in San Luis Potosí also desire it, that even among soldiers, both from this country and the Peninsula, they speak with much freedom about independence, and that, if there was a leader with ideas who would place himself at the head of a movement, they would follow him blindly." The situation, however, was fraught with danger; the wrong person might lead the nation to disaster. "This [possibility]," Iturbide declared, "leaves me trembling because a mass movement [un movimiento tamultuario] would unleash a thousand evils. Perhaps," he feared, "this is the last spring of our beautiful country."
By the end of 1820, Iturbide, diffidently and carefully, had begun to pursue the possibility of independent action. He surrounded himself with men he knew and trusted by obtaining the transfer of his old Celaya regiment to his new command. He also consulted a number of people, among them his friend and deputy to the cortes, Juan Gómez de Navarrete; his lawyer, friend, and former Guadalupe, José Zozaya Bermúdez; his old military colleague and deputy to the cortes, Manuel Gómez Pedraza; and other army friends and colleagues, among them Pedro Celestino Negrete.
The new year found Iturbide determined to act decisively. On January 10, he wrote Vicente Guerrero, the south's most important insurgent leader, suggesting that they, or their representatives, meet to resolve existing differences. While Iturbide emphasized the need to support the cortes, he also indicated that "if contrary to our expectations, we should not be granted justice, I shall be the first person to contribute with my sword, with my fortune, and with all my ability to the defense of our rights." Guerrero responded ten days later, challenging Iturbide to pursue the nation's true interests. The insurgent declared that he did not seek a pardon from the government; that his motto was "liberty, independence, or death." He ended by affirming that "anything that did not concern total independence . . . would be disputed in the field of battle." The exchange suggests that Iturbide did not genuinely seek Guerrero's support. It was intended to fulfill Apodaca's mandate to settle amicably the conflict and to lay the foundation for an accommodation in the future.
Iturbide's plans were solidifying by the end of the month. On January 25, he began to circulate a proposal that would become the basis for Independence. Later, defending his actions, Iturbide declared: "I formed the plan known of as Iguala; it is mine because I alone conceived it, elaborated, published it, and carried it out." But it is evident that the document possessed a more complex history. Contemporaries attributed authorship of the plan to various individuals, among them Matias Monteagudo, rector of the university and canon of the metropolitan cathedral; Antonio Joaquin Pérez, former deputy to the 1812 cortes and then bishop of Puebla; and prominent lawyers Juan José Espinosa de Los Monteros, Juan Francisco de Azcárate, José Zozaya Bermúdez, and Juan Gómez de Navarrete. Later, while attempting to unravel these events, Carlos Maria de Bustamante concluded that all those individuals took part in framing the document.
The plan evolved over time. It is likely that, as traditional historiography asserts, clergymen and conservatives formed the initial proposal in the former Jesuit oratory of San Felipe Neri, known as La Profesa, to prevent the restoration of the constitution in 1820. Monteagudo and Pérez, the reputed authors of the proposal, had strong reasons to oppose the restoration of the constitutional order. The former was well known for his role in the 1808 overthrow of Viceroy José Iturrigaray and for his opposition to many of the cortes's reforms, while the latter-despite having participated in the drafting of the Constitution of 1812-had earned the hostility of the supporters of the restored charter because he had been one of the Persas, the deputies who had welcomed the return of Fernando VII in 1814. The conspirators had selected Iturbide to conduct the operation, a fact upon which both his friends and enemies agreed. But, as Alamán reminds us, the project had to be abandoned when the viceroy was forced to implement the constitution.
The restoration of the charter of Cádiz nullified the plan of La Profesa. It had, however, aroused the interest of Iturbide, a man who "until then had lived a private life, without wishing to involve himself in public affairs." Determined to act, he consulted with leading persons in Mexico City. They dissuaded him from his initial plan to capture the viceroy. But, sometime after Iturbide received command of the south, la Güera Rodriguez proposed the development of an alternative proposal that might attract both Europeans and Americans, the clergy and the military, and conservatives as well as liberals. While the project of La Profesa sought independence to preserve the old order, the new plan would maintain the constitutional system through independence.
Iturbide then moved along two fronts: he attempted to obtain the support of leading persons in the Viceroyalty and he sought assistance in formulating a program. He accomplished his first goal by corresponding with prominent military, ecclesiastic, and government leaders and by dispatching trusted emissaries to discuss his project with "influential persons." He wrote, for example, to Pedro José de Fonte, the recently consecrated archbishop of Mexico; Antonio Joaquín Pérez, bishop of Puebla; Juan Cruz Ruiz Cabañas, bishop of Guadalajara; and Miguel Bataller, a prominent judge of the Audiencia of Mexico. But the individuals he courted most carefully were leading army officers like Pedro Celestino Negrete, José de la Cruz, Luis Quintanar, Domingo Luaces, Anastasio Bustamante, Luis Cortázar, Antonio Flon, and Juan de Horbegoso. Realizing that these men were crucial to his success, Iturbide crafted letters to each one emphasizing how the proposal would best serve their personal interests while maintaining, to the degree possible, the status quo. In his correspondence Iturbide argued that the best way to preserve and protect the interests of the Church, the army, and the nation was to form an autonomous monarchy in the name of the king and the constitution.96 At the same time, he consulted about the text of the plan wiíh many persons, among them Zozaya Bermúdez, Espinosa de Los Monteros, Monteagudo, Gómez de Navarrete, and Gómez Pedraza, asking them to suggest changes, modifications, or revisions.
Satisfied with his preparations, Iturbide issued his plan at the village of Iguala on February 24, 1821. A carefully crafted compromise document, the Plan of Iguala combined the long-discussed autonomous "regency" with the constitution-as did the Michelena plan. In addition, the Plan of Iguala provided protection for the clergy, the army, and the Europeans. Article 1 established the Roman Catholic faith as the official religion, "to the exclusion of all others." Article 2 declared "absolute independence" for the kingdom. Article 3 instituted a constitutional monarchy. Article 4 invited Fernando VII, a member of his family, or someone from another ruling dynasty, to govern. Article 5 established an "interim [governing] junta until a cortes meets to implement the plan." Article 11 required the cartes to draft the imperial constitution. Article 12 determined that all the kingdom's inhabitants were citizens and qualified for "any [government] job." Article 13 protected individual and properíy rights. Article 14 retained thefuero and the properties of the secular and regular clergy. Articles 15,16, 17, and 18 provided for orderly continuity in civil and military posts and for the incorporation of other persons into the army. A new force, the Army of the Three Guarantees-religion, independence, and union-would support the new regime.
Iturbide set the tone in the preamble by inviting "Americans, by which I understand not only those born in America, but also the Europeans, Africans, and Asians who reside therein" to join him. "For three hundred years," he declared, "North America has lived under the tutelage of the most Catholic and pious, heroic and magnanimous nation.... The Europeans believe this and so do the Americans of all origins." An addendum established the governing junta: president, "Viceroy" Apodaca; vicepresident, Miguel Bataller, regent of the Audiencia of Mexico; José Miguel Guridi y Alcocer, provincial deputy from Mexico; conde de la Cortina, president of the consulado (merchants' guild) of Mexico; Juan Bautista Lobo, provincial deputy from Veracruz; Matias Monteagudo, canon of the metropolitan cathedral; Isidro Yañez, judge of the Audiencia of Mexico; José Maria Fagoaga, provincial deputy from Mexico; Juan José Espinosa de Los Monteros, fiscal of the afldiencia; Juan Francisco Azcárate, syndic of the Ayuntamiento of Mexico; and Rafael Suarez Pereda, judge. The substitute members of the junta consisted of Francisco Manuel Sánchez de Tagle, councilman of the Ayuntamiento of Mexico; Ramón Osés, judge of the Audiencia of Mexico; Juan José Pastor Morales, provincial deputy from Valladolid; and Colonel Ignacio Aguirrevengoa.
The Plan of Iguala thus provided a compromise, a way of retaining representative constitutional government that did not preclude an understanding with Spain. Following Hispanic traditions and the practices introduced in 1808, the plan established a ruling junta until a congress was convened. The proposed governing committee consisted primarily of former autonomists, Guadalupes, and constitutionalists. While it contained two audiencia judges, it included only one conservative clergyman, Monteagudo, and one military man, nominated as a substitute. Significantly, Iturbide assigned himself no role other than the one he possessed, de facto head of the Army of Three Guarantees. Clearly, he did not yet consider himself a dominant figure; he was merely seeking to achieve a more prominent role in the military and, through it, in society.
Although the Plan of Iguala was signed on February 24, Iturbide did not formally present to his senior officers until March 1. At a private meeting in his headquarters Iturbide explained his intentions and the need for independence. After reading the plan and the composition of the proposed governing junta, the officers responded with enthusiasm, according to the movement's paper, El Mejicano independiente. The following day, in a formal ceremony, Iturbide took an oath to support the independence of the Mexican Empire; his officers and men followed; and the ceremonies ended with a Te Deum chanted at the local church.
The delay between the signing of the plan and the oath of allegiance occurred because of difficulties in printing the document. Early in February Iturbide dispatched one of his confidants, Miguel Cavaleri, to Mexico City to discuss the final draft of the plan and the preparations for its declaration with leading individuals in the capital and locate a press to publish the document. Unable to fulfill the second mission, Cavaleri sent a trusted agent, Captain Magan, to Puebla in hopes of obtaining the services of the prominent liberal publisher, Pedro de la Rosa. Despite entreaties and offers of large sums, de la Rosa proved unwilling to publish the proclamation. Magan then utilized the extensive autonomist network to locate and convince Father Joaquin Furlong, a member of a prominent family in Puebla, and a presbyter at the oratory of San Felipe Neri, to publish the plan and accompanying documents.
Clandestine discussions with important individuals in Puebla won the first adherents for the plan of independence. Father Furlong's brother Patricio, deputy from Puebla to the Provincial Deputation of New Spain, and other prominent Poblanos found the Plan of Iguala acceptable, provided it recognized the province's right to its own provincial deputation. Father Furlong also contributed portable type and the services of one of his printers to the movement. In addition, former insurgent José Manuel de Herrera joined the cause, traveling to Iguala to establish El Mejicano independiente, a paper in which, as Carlos María de Bustamante indicated, "is found the major portion of the history of independence."
On March 2, immediately after taking the oath of allegiance to the Plan of Iguala, Iturbide wrote Captain General and Superior Political Chief Apodaca, formally inviting him to participate in the movement. Later, on March 16, Iturbide informed the cortes and the king of his actions. Expressing his patriotism and his desire to protect the constitution and the Crown, Iturbide urged the authorities to recognize the necessity of acknowledging New Spain's desire for home rule. Apodaca rejected the rebel's entreaty, as did, initially, most of the ecclesiastic, civil, and military authorities of the realm.
Following the proclamation of the Plan of Iguala, Iturbide proceeded to implement his program. First, he ensured adequate finances by appropriating more than one-half million pesos to be shipped to Acapulco. Then he focused attention on winning the support of Vicente Guerrero, the most important insurgent leader. The old insurgent agreed to back the Plan of Iguala on March 9. The two men met the following day at Iturbide's headquarters in Teloloapan, agreeing that Guerrero would retain authority in the south. In essence the turncoat colonel co-opted the old insurgent by recognizing the power he already possessed. As Alamán indicated, Iturbide's primary concern was preventing Guerrero from "impeding or detaining the revolution."
The most critical task, however, was winning the support of the clerical, civilian, and military authorities. These consisted of the bishops and cathedral chapters; the provincial deputations and constitutional ayuntamientos; the former intendants, now jefes politicos, and the principal regional commanders. To the higher ecclesiastical authorities Iturbide offered respect and protection. Although initially cautious, the prelates ultimately responded positively. Indeed, Bishop Pérez of Puebla eventually contributed twenty-five thousand pesos to the cause. Only Archbishop Fonte of Mexico City steadfastly refused to accept the Plan of Iguala.Winning the backing of other authorities was more complicated. It required bridging the fundamental conflict between civilian and army interests. Civil and military leaders were divided not only over the continuation of war taxes and of recruitment, but also over the nature of government. The men who controlled the provincial deputations and constitutional ayuntamientos insisted upon the traditional civil dominance over the military; they no longer accepted wartime exigencies as reasons for officers to overrule civilian authority. In addition, many regions that earlier had possessed intendancies demanded the establishment of provincial deputations as the constitution promised. It would take several months to reach an accommodation acceptable to the various groups.
At the end of March, the Army of the Three Guarantees consisted of approximately eighteen hundred men, many of them Guerrero's irregular forces. It had won few battles and appeared unlikely to defeat the constituted authorities. The situation of the royal army, however, was dismal. Not only did ayuntamientos refuse to continue supporting the army with money and men, but many soldiers began to desert. Short of funds, supplies, clothes, and even food, some commanders were forced to cope with large civilian demonstrations in favor of independence. The publication of the Plan of Iguala in a supplement of the paper La Abeja poblana on March 2, for example, "caused wild festivities [in the city of Puebla], during which the crowd forced [Brigadier] Llano to fire three cannonades and to call out the town musicians. As he later explained to the viceroy, to have resisted the populace would have caused a general riot."
The discontent of the American commanders, however, constituted the greatest weakness of the royal army. After years of dedicated service, many American-born officers found themselves stymied " in their military careers and excluded from high political offices." As a result, same senior American commanders, such as José Joaquin de Herrera, Anastasio Bustamante, and Luis Cortázar, as well as junior officers like Antonio López de Santa Anna, joined the movement. Although some royalist commanders defended their areas, others simply abandoned their posts because they could not control their troops. During April, May, and June, large parts of the Bajío and Nueva Galicia accepted the Plan of Iguala.
The conflict in the provinces was also played out in the capital. There, Apodaca was forced to contend with two uncooperative institutions: the provincial deputation and the constitutional ayuntamiento. Tensions erupted shortly after the Plan of Iguala was made public in the capital. When Apodaca attempted to restrict the flow of information, both the provincial deputation and the ayuntamiento challenged his authority to limit the freedom of the press. Similarly, they opposed his efforts to raise forces to fight the new rebels, citing the protection of the constitution. While careful not to back the Iturbide movement, the two constitutional bodies also proved loath to defend the interests of the Crown.
Frustrated by Apodaca's inability to defend the realm from the new insurgency, the royal army units in Mexico City forced him to resign on the evening of July 5, 1821. The former viceroy "transferred" his authority "for the good of the nation" to Field Marshall Francisco Novella. Notified the following day, the Provincial Deputation of New Spain refused to accept the coup. It declared the action null, "first because . . . it is well known that violence accompanied the act; second because Your Excellency does not possess the authority to transfer power to whomsoever you select." The constitutional ayuntamiento immediately seconded the provincial deputation. Despite such opposition, Novella assumed control of royal government in the city. But it proved difficult to extend his power beyond the confines of the capital. The two constitutional bodies continued to oppose him, albeit with care because he possessed military power.
In the provinces, the cause of independence gained support. Royal officers, such as Luis Quintanar and Pedro Celestino Negrete, as well as former insurgents, such as Guadalupe Victoria and Nicolás Bravo, joined the movement. The most important victory, however, occurred in Puebla at the end of July. Provincial leaders, particularly those in the Constitutional Ayuntamiento of Puebla, negotiated with the new insurgents, agreeing to support the movement in exchange for the creation of a provincial deputation. Once an accord was reached, Iturbide entered Puebla in triumph on August 2. Carlos Carcía, former intendant and interim jefe politico, ordered elections held on September 1.
When O'Donojú arrived in Veracruz at the end of July, large parts of the realm were in the hands of the insurgents and, in the capital, Spanish troops had overthrown the legally constituted authorities. O'Donojú faced a delicate task. As a Spaniard he was committed to maintaining ties between the mother country and New Spain, and as a liberal he was determined to ensure that constitutional rule was firmly implanted in New Spain. Under the circumstances, the only course of action open to him was to enter into negotiations with Iturbide. The two men met in the city of Córdoba on August 23, 1821. The following day they signed a treaty that recognized the Independence of New Spain. They reached an accord quickly because the Plan of Iguala was essentially the same as the Michelena proposal that O'Donojú expected the cortes to ratify. As Iturbide later declared, the Spaniard accepted the American's proposal "almost as if he had helped me write the plan.''
The Treaty of Córdoba not only ratified the Plan of Iguala but also established the procedures by which the independent goverament would be formed. Article 1 declared: "This America is recognized as a sovereign and independent nation, called hereafter, the Mexican Empire." Article 2 established that the government of the empire would be a "moderate constitutional monarchy." Article 3 determined that the ruler would be either Fernando VII, a Spanish prince, or someone designated by the imperial cartes. Articles 6, 7, and 8 stipulated that, "in accord with the spirit of the Plan of Iguala," a provisional governing junta would be established, and that O'Donojú would be a member of that body. Article 9 provided for the election of a president of the junta, chosen "by an absolute plurality of the votes." Article 11 required the junta to name a regency of three persons. And Article 14 declared that "executive power resides in the regency and legislative [authority] in the cortes.'' Like the Plan of Iguala, the Treaty of Córdoba did not grant Iturbide any specific role.
O'Donojú acted immediately to implement the accord. Believing that the cortes in Spain had probably already approved the project of "regencies," he informed his government of the agreement and urged its rapid approval. The chief obstacle now lay in the capital where Novella reteined control. That officer was unwilling to recognize the agreement reached in Córdoba. On August 30, he convened a meeting of the civil, ecclesiastic, and military corporations to discuss the situation. Although both the provincial deputation and the constitutional ayuntamiento voted to send representatives, they attended only as observers. At the meeting, the civil and ecclesiastical representatives, speaking as individuals, declared that O'Donojú was the lawful captain general and political chief and should be allowed to enter the capital peacefully. The following day, both the provincial deputation and the constitutional ayuntamiento wrote to O'Donojú welcoming him to the kingdom and informing him of their actions and of the meeting held by Novella. The Mexico City commander, however, took the position that O'Donojú had signed the Treaty of Córdoba under duress. The newly arrived captain general and superior political chief, now in Puebla, tersely informed Novella that he expected him to comply with his obligations.
Unwilling to surrender power easily, Novella attempted to win the backing of the capital's corporations at a meeting he convened on September 9. The officer, who had been using the title of captain general and political chief, requested that the representatives of the capital's corporations confirm those titles. But, as in the previous meeting, those present were there as individuals and not as representatives of their entities. The provincial deputation and the ayuntamiento, which hoped to resolve the impasse, agreed to dispatch a delegate to meet with O'Donojú. They selected José Miguel Guridi y Alcocer, a distinguished autonomist, drafter of the Constitution of 1812, former Guadalupe, and then member of the Provincial Deputation of New Spain. Novella picked one of his aides, Lieutenant Colonel Bais del Castillo Lana, to accompany Guridi y Alcocer.
The commission sealed Novella's fate. Guridi y Alcocer informed O'Donojú of the constitutional bodies' desire that he end "the scandalous occurrences in the capital and abolish the irregularities of individual pretensions [to power]." Consequently, the captain general granted Novella twenty-four hours to return legality to the city. O'Donojú agreed, however, to overlook the officer's violation of the constitution and the military code of conduct, provided he submitted immediately. Novella yielded to the new captain general on September 12. The following day, accompanied by Novella, as commander of the capital's garrison, the provincial deputation, and the constitutional ayuntamiento, in formal attire and carrying their maces of office, traveled to the Hacienda de la Patera at the outskirts of the city for a meeting with O'Donojú. On September 14, at a joint meeting of the provincial deputation and the constitutional ayuntamiento in the capital, Novella formally accepted O'Donojú as captain general and superior chief of New Spain.Since O'Donojú had recognized the independence of New Spain, the ceremony, in essence, acknowledged the country's new status.
Earlier, while in Puebla, O'Donojú and Iturbide had agreed on the composition of the transitional government. They expanded the regency from three to five and increased the size of the governing junta to thirty-eight members. The body consisted of the most important men of the realm, among them leading autonomists, constitutionalists, former Guadalupes, and a few conservative clergymen and officers. Alamán described them as
the most notable . . . by virtue of their birth, education, and position. . . . (Included among them were) the subjects who most took part in the preparation of the Plan of Iguala, such as the Canan Monteagudo, Lic. Espinosa de Los Monteros, the Bishop of Puebla [Pérez], the Archdeacon of Valladolid Bárcena; the judges Ruz and Martínez Mantilla; several distinguished lawyers, such as Azcárate, Guzmán, and Jáuregui; Briga- dier Sotarriva; Colonels Bustamante and Horbegoso; don José Maria Fagoaga and [Guridi y] Alcocer of the provincial deputation; [Sánchez del Tagle [of the constitutional ayuntamiento], and other persons.
The body initially convened at Tacubaya, outside Mexico City, on September 22, 1821, to be sworn formally into office. At its second meeting it unanimously voted that "the junta will possess the exclusive exercise of the national expression until the Cortes meets." It also arrogated to itself "all the goveroing powers established by the [Spanish] Cortes and the Constitution of 1812." Further, it asserted that "the [Mexican] Regency would have the same powers that the Spanish Regency had possessed, providing they did not contradict the Treaty of Córdoba." The junta also affirmed that the provisional governing bodies "would function interim a cortes meets and interim the king of Spain presents himself in Mexico.''
Captain General and Superior Political Chief O'Donojú entered the capital on September 26 to the sound of bands, the ringing of bells, and the firing of cannon. "The ayuntamiento offered him refreshments, dinner, and lodging, as was the custom when receiving viceroys."' The provincial deputation and other corporations paid their respects to the "effective collaborator of our independence," as Carlos María de Bustamante noted.
The Army of the Three Guarantees entered the capital the following day. O'Donojú and ecclesiastic and civil officials received Iturbide at the former viceregal palace. After the army paraded before the authorities, the archbishop celebrated a Te Deum at the cathedral. That evening, the ayuntamiento welcomed the heroes of Independence at a lavish dinner in the palace. After many toasts and speeches Councilman Sánchez de Tagle read an ode in which he declared that the American people thanked O'Donojú, that "superhuman mortal . . . who assures us peace."
At its first session in Mexico City, on September 28, the junta signed the Declaration of Independence. Then the body, together with other corporations, attended a mass of thanksgiving at the cathedral. That evening, the junta reviewed and approved the participation of the members present. Then the body selected the five individuals who would compose the Council of Regency. Without opposition, Iturbide was selected first regent and president of the council and O'Donojú second regent. The three other regents were elected from among fifteen nominees. While the governing junta granted Iturbide a significant honor by naming him president of the Council of Regency, it did not confer power by its action. As the junta made clear at the outset, in accord with Spanish precedent, sovereignty resided in the legislative branch. The executive was limited to carrying out the dictates of the legislature.
Although New Spain had achieved its Independence, tensions existed between the civilians and the military, both of whom considered emancipation their triumph. As I have indicated elsewhere, "two opposing political traditions . . . emerged between 1808 and 1821 . ….. one forged in the crucible of war emphasized executive power and the other, based on civilian parliamentary experience, insisted upon legislative dominance." It is possible that an experienced administrator and a committed liberal like O'Donojú would have resolved peacefully those tensions. As O'Donojú had declared on September 17, before entering the capital: "The government agreed upon in the Treaty of Córdoba, which is now known to all, is the legitimate authority. I shall be the first to respect the representatives of the public. My functions will be confined to representing the Spanish government, by occupying a place in yours in accordance to the Treaty of Córdoba, to being useful in every way possible to the American [government], and to sacrificing myself gladly for the sake of the Mexicans and the Spaniards.'' Unfortunately, O'Donojú became ill immediately after entering the capital and could not attend the ceremonies of the Declaration of independence on September 28. He died of pleurisy on October 8. His absence may explain why Iturbide became president of the council of regents.
The conflict between the two traditions-executive power vs. legislative dominance-erupted with the death of the Spanish liberal officer. The autonomists believed that they had achieved Independence and that the ideas of 1808 had been fulfilled in 1821. They had participated in a political process that over the years evolved into a strong representative parliamentary system. While the rural insurgency had threatened their interests and later offered them opportunities, the autonomists were certain that they had achieved moderate representative government. These members of the national elite aspired to rule at home. That it had ultimately required Independence was merely an accident. Because they retained many ties to Spain, most autonomists probably would have preferred not to sever relations with the homeland. But, in the end, they accepted Independence because it was the only way they could control their own government. Iturbide, on the other hand, was convinced that he had liberated the nation with his army, and that, therefore, he embodied the national will. The struggle intensified when Spain rejected the Treaty of Córdoba. Iturbide's ouster in 1823 did not end the clash. The conflict between the two traditions-executive power vs. legislative supremacy-would dominate the political life of Mexico during the first half of the nineteenth century until the great liberals Benito Juàrez and Porfirio Dìaz imposed presidencialismo upon the country.